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ABSTRACT 
Tynen, Sarah Elizabeth (M.A., Geography Department) 
Uneven Housing Development and the Spatial Negotiation of Class in Nanjing, China 
Thesis directed by Professor John O’Loughlin 
 
The discourses of free-market economic reform policies in China have encouraged the 
decentralization of state power and devolution of fiscal responsibility to local governments. The 
restructuring of local state control under the mounting pressures of economic globalization 
provides a broader political-economic context for the changing built and social environments of 
the Chinese city. When the central government permitted city officials to lease state-owned land 
to private real estate developers in 1998, the resulting acceleration of housing redevelopment in a 
rapidly urbanizing China dramatically transformed complex socio-spatial divisions between 
various groups in the city of Nanjing. I examine urban citizenship, modernity, and private 
homeownership through participant observation and interviews examining how various social 
groups in China (i.e. rural migrants, urban poor, urban middle-class) negotiate the construction 
of new and transforming class boundaries. Through an ethnographic study in five field sites—
two gated communities, two public housing compounds, and one old city neighborhood—I 
explore the everyday experience of residents in the midst of urban housing redevelopment. Using 
Lefebvre’s concept of the production of space and Gramsci’s notion of cultural hegemony, I link 
the economic and cultural domains of class construction to further understand the dynamic 
interplay between broader political-economic context and individual lived experience. My 
interrogation of the built and social environments of urban China sheds light on the antagonisms 
and alliances between social groups, the representations and practices of old city preservation 
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and demolition, and the effects of economic reform on daily life. I illustrate that uneven housing 
development constitutes changing spatial dimensions of class in Nanjing, China. This study 
illuminates the theoretical and practical implications of uneven development on social cohesion, 
economic growth, and political stability. 
Keywords: class, landscape, development, privatization, inequality, culture, political economy 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION: STATE RESCALING IN URBAN CHINA 
I. Problem Statement and Research Questions 
Cities around the world are facing immense challenges due to rapid post-industrial 
economic transformations, ranging from the deterioration of livelihoods in Detroit and 
homelessness in Los Angeles to the expansion of slums in Mumbai and unprecedented rural to 
urban migration in Shanghai. Other cities closely connected in the global economy are 
encountering similar problems, especially regarding housing provision, slum eviction, and 
socioeconomic inequality. The city of Nanjing in eastern China presents a particular case study 
in which to examine the challenges of urban housing because it is located in a Communist state 
that encourages private capital investment and only recently became highly integrated into the 
global economy (see F. Wu and He 2005; Liu and F. Wu 2006b; F. Wu 2007c). The changes in 
urban governance resulting from the post-Mao economic reforms included the devolution of state 
power and fiscal responsibility to local city governments, especially on the east coast (F. Wu 
2002; Hoffman 2011).1 The local state restructuring policies in China are shifting the housing 
market from primarily state-provided residence to commercial development, resulting in altered 
socio-spatial formations and housing inequality that creates and reinforces new class boundaries 
(Hu and Kaplan 2001; Z. Li and F. Wu 2008; L. Zhang 2010). 
                                                
1 This phenomenon, sometimes also referred to as “rescaling state power” or “state restructuring” is defined 
as the process in which the central government devolves governance authority and fiscal responsibility to the local 
state. 
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My case study in Nanjing is particularly relevant in this context because it scrutinizes the 
state/market dichotomy and the effects of the state’s role in regulating the land market. While the 
Chinese state owns all of the land, the central government granted city officials the exclusive 
authority to lease urban land (and urban land only) to private developers in 1998 (J. Xu, A. Yeh, 
and F. Wu 2009). The resulting commodification of public land by city governments encouraged 
the rapid pace of new commercial housing development that followed. Because there are 
significant economic, political, and social incentives for local officials to proceed with large-
scale urban redevelopment projects at an extremely accelerated pace (Hsing 2010), widespread 
dispossession of the urban poor through residential eviction and demolition is common (Ma and 
Lin 1993; F. Wu 2004; Shin 2009). Chinese cities were hence transformed into a highly 
variegated landscape of high-rise apartment complexes dotted with low-income areas of old city 
dilapidated housing, socialist-style public housing, and rural migrant makeshift housing (W. Wu 
2002). Variegated types of neighborhood governance is a growing trend that geographically and 
socially separate the lower, middle, and upper classes (Tomba 2009; S. Li, Zhu, and L. Li 2012).  
China’s income inequality has increased dramatically in the past thirty years. China’s 
income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient grew from .280 in 1981 to .491 in 2008 
(Ravallion and S. Chen 2007; “Inequality: Gini Out of the Bottle” 2013).2 The Gini coefficient 
dropped slightly to .474 in 2012.3 This level is comparable to the United States, where the U.S. 
census bureau reported the Gini coefficient to be .469 in 2010 (Rabinovitch 2013). The 
                                                
2 The Gini coefficient measures inequality among values of a frequency distribution (e.g., levels of 
income). Zero means perfect equality and 1.0 means one person owns all of the wealth. According to the United 
Nations, a number above .4 is considered above the “danger level” of inequality for a national population sample. 
The numbers here include adjustment for Cost-Of-Living (COL) difference.  
 
3 The official figures shown here represent National Bureau of Statistics data and are controversial because 
a survey published in 2012 by researchers at the Southwestern University of Finance and Economics in China found 
that China’s Gini coefficient had reached 0.61 in 2010 (Rabinovitch 2013). 
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burgeoning inequality points to a growing urgency to study the potential social instability 
resulting from the staggering increase in inequality since 1981 (see figures 1-3).  
 
Figure 1: National, Rural, and Urban Income Inequality from 1981-2001: Here is a graph from 
Ravallion and S. Chen (2007, 21), which shows the increase of the national Gini coefficient from 
.2798 in 1981 to .3945 in 2001. The rural levels of inequality increased from .2473 in 1981 to 
.3648 in 2001. The urban levels of inequality increased from .1846 in 1981 to .3232 in 2001. 
During this time period, the rural areas experienced higher levels of inequality, while the urban 
areas saw a more dramatic increase in inequality. Source: Ravallion, Martin, and Shaohua Chen. 
2007. “China's (Uneven) Progress Against Poverty.” Journal of Development Economics 82 (1): 
1–42.  
 
Figure 2: China’s Gini Coefficient from 2003-2012: Here is a graph from The Financial Times 
showing the change of Gini coefficient from .479 in 2003 to a peak of .491 in 2008, then down to 
.474 in 2012. Source: Rabinovitch, Simon. 2013. “China Wealth Gap Data Stoke Scepticism.” 
The Financial Times, January 18. 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1feb0128-614a-11e2-957e-00144feab49a.html#axzz307jZ0BAu. 
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Figure 3: China’s Gini Coefficient Compared: This graph from The Economist represents data 
from 2012 that compares China’s Gini coefficient to other countries around the world, ranking 
China as one of the most unequal countries in the world. Source: “Inequality: Gini Out of the 
Bottle.” 2013. The Economist, January 6. http://www.economist.com/news/china/21570749-gini-
out-bottle. 
In this thesis, I integrate the cultural and economic spheres to examine the relationship 
between housing development and socioeconomic inequality in Nanjing, China. My work builds 
on L. Zhang’s (2010) theory of the “spatialization of class” in China, Lefebvre’s theory of social 
formation through spatial production, and Gramsci’s notion of cultural hegemony in order to 
contextualize class antagonism in broader economic structures, cultural practices, and everyday 
life. While my fieldwork covered one Chinese city, Nanjing, these theorists illuminate the 
broader theoretical relationship illuminated in my study between state, society, and space that 
profoundly influences the way we see the world and interact with the environment and people 
around us. Drawing on Hanser’s (2008) ethnography of the retail industry in China, I too argue 
that my case study of class boundaries in various neighborhoods in Nanjing, China “is not 
autonomous from larger social changes taking place in China. It is a field in which the ‘search 
for distinction’ and the production of social differences tell us much about Chinese society writ 
large” (11, emphasis in original). Furthermore, my investigation has practical implications for 
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understanding the challenges of urban growth and development, housing allocation, and social 
cohesion facing many cities around the world. Investigating questions on how the state and 
market affect Chinese society can further illuminate potential causes of and solutions for uneven 
development and social divisions. 
In this study, I seek to answer the question: how does recent spatial production create 
new social and material relations in contemporary urban China? In order to shed light on this 
question, the issues to be addressed in the empirical chapters are as follows: how important are 
daily practices in determining urban citizenship as belonging (chapter 4)? How are the homes 
and people of Old Nanjing regarded by the city government and residents through 
representations and practices (chapter 5)? How are transforming notions of private property 
ownership and the emerging middle classes constituted in and through the built environment and 
everyday practice (chapter 6)? China’s income inequality is growing and my investigation of 
these questions will shed light on the implications of inequality for urban society.  
II. Local Politics in China: The Pressures and Politics of Economic Globalization 
The growth and transformation of Chinese cities in the past thirty years can only be 
understood with consideration of global processes at work on the ground in the local milieu. 
Indeed, the forces of global capital materialized in local politics continue to shape the trajectory 
of cities in wealthy and poor, democratic and authoritarian countries alike. I therefore draw from 
various literatures in urban studies and geography in order to situate my localized ethnography in 
broader global and national processes, especially that of the decentralization of state power and 
pursuit of capital interests. Examining the broader processes of global capital investment and 
state restructuring is crucial to understanding daily life China. Drawing from studies by Ong and 
Collier (2005) and Roy and Ong (2011), I argue that an active engagement with a carefully 
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chosen and diverse array of theories is the most appropriate way to engage with urban 
environments that simultaneously exhibit homogenous global processes and heterogeneous 
localized particularity. My goal is to engage in an iterative back and forth process between 
theory and data throughout the entire work. The process of building a bridge between theory and 
empirics necessarily critiques the ability of my choice of geographical theories to engage with 
data collected during fieldwork in China. 
In this chapter, I review the literature that asks the question: how is the political-
economic climate in China similar to and different from “democratic capitalism”? The 
theoretical debate regarding the nature of the state-market relationship in China is important 
because it sets the groundwork for understanding the broader political-economic context for the 
rest of my thesis. I move away from labels such as “capitalist” or “socialist” to stress that 
political-economic dynamics are more complex and fluid than rigid categorical divisions allow. 
Following Robinson (2006), I call for a comparative urbanism that goes against 
“exceptionalism” and stresses the importance of approaching all cities as “ordinary,” rather than 
through the lens of a “privileged modernity” of the West.  
The literature that I cite in this section situates social phenomena within political-
economic transformations of multiple scales. My departure point is the argument that 
transnational flows of capital and the rescaling of state power results in localized socio-spatial 
inequality and uneven development. I draw on Smith’s (2008) definition of uneven development 
to describe the contradictory processes of growth and stagnation across space and time as a direct 
result of capitalism: 
these geographical patterns are the product of contradictory tendencies…the tendencies 
toward differentiation and universalization, or equalization, emanate side by side in the 
belly of capitalism…Space is neither leveled out of existence nor infinitely differentiated. 
Rather the pattern which results is one of uneven development, not in a general sense but 
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as the specific product of the contradictory dynamic guiding the production of space. 
Uneven development is the concrete manifestation of the production of space under 
capitalism. (122, emphasis in original)  
 
I further build on Marston (2000) in understanding scale as socially constructed. I borrow 
Jessop’s (2005) definition of scale: “the nested (and sometimes not so nested) hierarchy of 
bounded spaces of differing size, e.g., local, regional, national, continental and global. Scale is 
typically the product of social struggles for power and control” (425). By multiscalar, I mean the 
“tangled hierarchies of scale” that encompass simultaneous political and economic exchanges 
across various geographical spaces and levels, including the global, national, and local, wherein 
all scales influence each other in a mutually constitutive and dialectical relationship (Jessop 
2005, 426). 
First, I engage with the critiques and applications of “neoliberalism” regarding Chinese 
state space and contend that “urban entrepreneurialism” is a more useful concept than 
“neoliberalism” for understanding the role and importance of the local state in China. Secondly, I 
outline two different approaches that debate the effects of state restructuring in urban China. 
Some theorists suggest that state restructuring under recent transformations of the global 
economy is causing the “hollowing out” of the state, often referred to as “state decline 
arguments” (see Jessop 1990, 2003 for arguments and counter-arguments of the epistemology of 
state centrism). In following Brenner (1998, 2004), I argue that state restructuring in China 
results not in the disappearance of the state, but rather in the redistribution and rearticulation of 
state power and “territorialization” on multiple scales. It is the latter that I find most useful to 
understanding my case study in China. I do not dispute the extensive documentation that state 
restructuring in China under the pressure of economic globalization devolved central state power 
to the local governments (see F. Wu 2002; F. Wu 2006; F. Wu 2007a).  
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The literature review therefore accomplishes two primary goals: 1) it situates my work in 
the scholarly conversation found in the urban studies and China literature, and 2) it explains and 
interrogates the current scholarship that describes China’s political-economic climate (is China 
neoliberal, socialist, capitalist, or some kind of hybrid?). Although I do not assert that Chinese 
modes of governance are identical to Western ones, some important and dramatic political-
economic transformations that have recently taken place in China resemble aspects of urban 
entrepreneurialism and state rescaling similar to those witnessed in the U.S. and other Western 
states.  
A. Decentralizing State Power: Urban Entrepreneurialism and Neoliberalism 
Background  
A trend of decentralizing state power in the 1970s and 1980s transformed urban 
governance in many countries by giving more fiscal autonomy and responsibility to city 
governments. City governments under a neoliberal trajectory often form growth coalitions with 
private businesses (Cox 1993). The neoliberal mode of governance creates inter-city competition 
to attract capital investment, producing “entrepreneurial cities” that behave in a manner similar 
to private firms (Leitner 1990; MacLeod and Goodwin 1999).4 Urban studies scholars in the 
“entrepreneurial turn” literature generally assert that since states began adopting neoliberal 
policies and downsizing central governments, urban entrepreneurialism promoted the 
reorientation of urban governance away from the provision of welfare and towards a focus on 
growth and development (Harvey 1989). Intense inter-city competition to ensure a place in the 
national and international economy exacerbates the negative consequences of entrepreneurial 
                                                
4 Urban entrepreneurialism is a tradition that dates back to the beginning of capitalism, beginning with the 
Hanseatic League and Italian City-States. In this paper, I will focus on the contemporary version of entrepreneurial 
cities in the context of the rise of neoliberalism that began in the 1970s.  
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cities, such as uneven development and the displacement of the poor to the urban fringe (Hall 
and Hubbard 1998; Brenner and Theodore 2003; Ward 2003).  
The shift from the Fordist to Post-Fordist mode of production underlies the shift to 
neoliberal modes of governance (Peck and Tickell 1992). In simplified terms, Post-Fordism 
involved the deregulation of the market, while the state still played an important role: “Fordism 
depended, evidently, upon the nation state taking—much as Gramsci predicted—a very special 
role within the overall system of social regulation” (Harvey 1990, 135). As Harvey (2005) 
explains, the function of the neoliberal market depends on interference by the state. 
Neoliberalism concerns the economic liberalization associated with capitalism that began taking 
root in the 1970s. The term usually refers to policies that encourage free trade, privatization, 
deregulation, and enhancement of the private sector. The policies were spread and encouraged 
around the world through the World Bank and IMF loan policies. When defining neoliberalism 
in this way, an important distinction to make is that between “ideological neoliberalism” and 
“existing neoliberalism.” Whereas the ideological neoliberalism refers to that defined above, 
“existing neoliberalism” is defined as the increased role of the state in regulating the market and 
ensuring the market to function (Harvey 2005). Thus the actual role of the state in the Post-
Fordist mode of production is fiercely debated, a disagreement that is reflected in the academic 
dispute regarding the extent of state involvement in urban China and applicability of 
“neoliberalism” to the Chinese context (He and F. Wu 2009). 
The complexity of the state-market relationship in China 
 Most simplified accounts describe the characteristics of China’s political-economy as a 
fusion of communist politics and capitalist economics (W. Zhang and Sun 2012). Some insist 
that China is a capitalist state under the guise of socialism (Hanser 2008), and others claim that 
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China is capitalist and neoliberal (J. Zhang 2012). Others contend that as a Communist country 
with a socialist marketplace, along with other factors such as control over the land market and 
hierarchical approach to governance, China exhibits unique exceptionalism (F. Wu 2007a). The 
description of China’s economic condition ranges from the “Beijing consensus,” to 
“authoritarian state-capitalism.” Some scholars argue that China is nothing more than an 
authoritarian and developmental state modeled after Singapore (Ortmann 2012; Shatkin 2013). 
Others point to evidence that China’s financial markets still are not fully liberalized and remain 
as key pillars of control and rule by the Chinese Communist Party (Panitch and Gindin 2013). 
Meanwhile China’s success during the financial crisis under the state-controlled model may 
undermine the Western-dominated neoliberal system (Vivoda 2009; Chu 2010). I argue that the 
literature on the Western experience of neoliberal state restructuring is not enough to explain the 
characteristics of the local state in China. This section will explain the contentious use of the 
term “neoliberalism” to describe Chinese politics.  
Some scholars attribute the uneven development and place-based promotion efforts that 
are characteristic of Chinese cities to the adoption of neoliberalism and capitalism to China (X. 
Ren 2008a, 2008b). The contentious application of the terms “neoliberalism” and “capitalism” to 
the Chinese case exemplifies an important debate in the literature regarding the extent to which 
the central and local government intervenes in the Chinese marketplace. Ong and L. Zhang 
(2008) describe their interpretation of neoliberalism as realized in China: “we maintain that the 
cross between privatization and socialist rule is not a ‘deviant’ form but a particular articulation 
of neoliberalism, which we call ‘socialism from afar.’ We call it this because state controls 
continue to regulate from a distance the fullest expression of self-interest” (2-3). While 
neoliberalism can be a useful analytic for understanding the type of socialist climate that often 
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persists in China (He and F. Wu 2009; Lin and A. Zhang 2014), one must recognize the 
divergences of neoliberalism as realized in China as opposed to the U.S., Brazil, or any other 
country. Harvey’s (2005) focus on global capitalism neglects a more nuanced understanding of 
the role of the local state in China. Therefore, a geographical emphasis on scale helps illuminate 
various forms of privatization and sovereignty existing in multiple forms of urban governance 
(He and F. Wu 2009). Neoliberalism in China can thus be best understood an assemblage of 
various interpretations of policy mobilized on the ground in local governments (Ong and Collier 
2005).   
Neoliberalism as realized in China 
Beginning in the 1980s and 1990s, in order to gain membership into the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), and especially after membership into the WTO in 2001, China has been 
adopting more evidently “neoliberal” policies (F. Wu 2002; Rofel 2007). According to scholars 
following the Western neoliberal approach, Chinese cities followed the same trajectory of 
uneven development and place-based promotion to take advantage of global capital mobility as 
those witnessed in the U.S. and Western Europe (F. Wu 2003; Shin 2009; Park, Hill, and Saito 
2012). J. Zhang (2012) for example, writing on the capitalist agenda of Shenzhen party officials, 
says: “a genuine concern for distributional justice and common prosperity has diminished in the 
policy-making process monopolized by the ruling party elites, thus giving way to an increasingly 
neo-liberal, elitist urban agenda [in China]” (2854). According to these scholars advocating for a 
neoliberal approach to studying China’s market transition, many aspects of the post-Mao urban 
politics of Chinese cities are remarkably similar to those in Western contexts (Harvey 2005; Lee 
and Zhu 2006).  
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While China is significantly different from many other countries since the state plays an 
important role in the property market, some scholars argue that China is overall leaning towards 
neoliberal approaches to governance and development (Ma and F. Wu 2005; F. Wu 2007b). For 
example, the application of urban entrepreneurialism in China is a valuable contribution to 
understanding the ways that cities function in China (for example, see F. Wu 2003; Shin 2009; 
Chien and F. Wu 2011). Urban entrepreneurialism is highly relevant to China, as cities compete 
for national and global recognition and capital investment. Inter-city competition was especially 
obvious during state-led efforts to build for the 2008 Beijing Olympics in order to achieve 
international recognition (Broudehoux 2007; X. Ren 2008a). Urban entrepreneurialism as a form 
of neoliberalism is a more useful concept than ideological neoliberalism for understanding the 
role of the local state in China. 
Urban entrepreneurialism in China remains markedly different from other contexts in one 
key area: the land property market (Lin and A. Zhang 2014). The local states use their authority 
over land leases and their ability to intervene in the property market to shape trajectories of 
governance and assert local state territorialization (Chien 2010; Hsing 2010; Lin 2011). I draw 
on E. Yeh’s (2013) study of the spatial relations of Chinese development in Tibet, where the 
process of territorialization is a “deeply material and embodied process that involves the 
transformation of both subjectivities and landscapes” (5). Territorialization understood in this 
way can be applied to local states in eastern Chinese cities as well (Hsing 2010; Hoffman 2011). 
In China, the city managers are Communist Party officials, not the elected representatives or 
business owners that one sees in the U.S. The decentralization of state power to the local 
governments in China encouraged localized territorialization when local governments were 
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granted the authority to intervene in the property market and granted control over land-use rights 
(Hsing 2006b). 
Furthermore, F. Wu, J. Xu, and A. Yeh (2007) suggest that the devolution of central state 
power to the local state has transformed modes of urban governance, and argue that the local 
state has now adopted neoliberal, corporatist, and entrepreneurial tactics. They argue that the 
neoliberal mode of governance in China transcends the developmental state model, which is a 
model wherein the state is the main driving force of economic development, the model often 
used to describe Chinese development driven by the state (Yang and Wang 2008). In another 
example, Lee and Zhu (2006) use a case study of the housing market and provision of welfare 
services in Guiyang to argue that China is following a particularly Westernized neoliberal model 
of urban governance. Some anthropologists argue that China’s modes of neoliberal governance 
are changing Chinese citizens’ subjectivities (Hoffman 2011), and that under neoliberal 
governance rural migrants’ notions of labor value and measurements of the self’s value are 
changing (Yan 2003).  
Some scholars assert that the state and centrally-planned economy have a relatively minor 
role to play in influencing the development of cities, providing evidence that points to the 
decentralization of the Chinese state, market-led urban development initiatives, retreat from 
socialist ideology, and market deregulation (A. Yeh and F. Wu 1999; F. Wu 2003). Other 
evidence points to the rise of local corporatism as a key institutional consequence of the recent 
rescaling of China’s political economy (Yeung 2000). Some scholarship also points to the 
formation of neoliberal subjectivities, in which willing consumer subjects are constructed under 
the neoliberal governmentality of post-reform China (Hoffman 2006; Rofel 2007; Ong and L. 
Zhang 2008). These scholars provide evidence for the side of the debate that argues China is 
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becoming more neoliberal, and in turn, the central state is becoming less powerful in comparison 
to the local state. 
Fulong Wu uses both empirical data sets from the Chinese government and fieldwork 
consisting of surveys and interviews from localized case studies to emphasize the importance of 
the role of the state in manipulating neoliberal discourses to justify its role in stimulating 
economic growth. He refers to the role of the state in Chinese cities as locally initiated 
globalization: “Foreign investment cannot act on its own without the support of the local state…. 
Foreign capital has to be embedded into local politics. The global-local nexus means that 
globalization is not simply a ‘homogenization’ process through which the global overcomes the 
local” (F. Wu 2007a, 5). The land-use rights law in China allows the state to use the free market 
to justify its engagement in the global economy and restore its political power: “Whereas the 
state’s legitimacy embedded in the public ownership of production has been eroded through 
marketization, the entrepreneurial project allows the state to tap the market to restore its role in 
response to perceived, as well as real, globalization” (F. Wu 2003, 1673). In fact, he argues, the 
local state has been strengthened by institutional reforms while relying on the socialist model for 
citizen support: “our view is that the legacy of state socialism only provides a convenient means 
for the local state to act” (F. Wu, J. Xu, and A. Yeh 2007, 16). In contrast to the Western model 
of state deregulation of the market, in China the local state achieves legitimization through 
economic rationality of the market and the state’s role as the primary market actor and builder 
(F. Wu, J. Xu, and A. Yeh 2007). In other words, the Chinese state uses neoliberal discourse as 
an excuse to intervene in the market and encourage the growth of the market. For the scholars 
that employ the analytic of neoliberalism to describe recent changes in China, the shift towards 
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neoliberal urbanism is directly related to the massive urban development projects that cause 
widespread demolition and displacement (He and F. Wu 2009; Shin 2009).  
Divergences from the neoliberal model in China 
I argue that Chinese state-led capitalism exhibits stark differences from the West, 
primarily stemming from a larger role of the government in managing the land market and a 
hierarchical approach to state governance (Ma 2005; Chien 2010). Chien and F. Wu (2011) even 
observe that although the real estate boom in China in the 1990s was primarily market-driven, 
urban economic growth has been largely state-driven from 2005 to present. L. Zhang (2010) 
argues that one way the state legitimizes its political power through market growth is by actively 
encouraging new construction projects and controlling the land market:  
forced evictions and unprecedented displacement are essential to “postsocialist primitive 
accumulation,” propelled by the newly formed pro-growth coalitions between local 
governments and developers…I characterize this pattern of urban development as 
“accumulation by displacement” to accentuate the centrality of space in political and 
economic reconfigurations. (138) 
 
The political economy of housing development in China creates a unique regulatory climate of 
state-led capitalism operating on the local level. For example, in Madrazo and Kempen’s (2012) 
study, they compare literature on socio-spatial divisions in Western (U.S. and Western Europe) 
and Chinese cities. While they assert that spatial patterns of segregation and inequality in China 
exhibit similar characteristics to those seen in the West, the research shows that the influence of 
the state and its institutions play a stronger role in China than in the West: “[t]he intertwined 
structure of party-state political power, the complex reciprocal relations between government and 
business, and the ingrained institutional factors” make the nature of divisions in Chinese cities 
unique (Madrazo and Kempen 2012, 165). In another U.S.-China comparative case study, the 
authors found that while government-business coalitions were the driving force of inner-city 
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development efforts in the U.S., in China urban development relies on “emerging local elites 
using decentralized state power to pursue fast growth in rising real estate markets” (Y. Zhang 
and Fang 2004, 286).  
The literature on China points to the similarities of state decentralization in the West 
while asserting that state-led capitalism leads to significant differences in China. Chien (2010) 
uses the term “asymmetric decentralization” to describe the phenomenon of new urban 
governance in China where local officials have been granted greater autonomy and enormous 
fiscal power in simultaneous combination with political centralization of the CCP. Ong (2004) 
refers to this hybrid as “variegated sovereignty” to describe the “Chinese axis” of power through 
various places, an analysis that “requires identifying the specific assemblage of rationalities 
(political, economic, ethical) that interact to create the conditions of possibility for sovereignty” 
(73). According to Ma (2005) a unique approach must be applied to China for two main reasons. 
First, the government still uses a strict hierarchical structure and classification left over from the 
socialist system. Second, the state still plays a unique role in regulating and controlling the 
economy. He contends that China’s economy continues to be governed administratively through 
a special scalar system of spatial units: 
 I argue that the administrative rank of an area is one of the most important  
 factors affecting China’s local space economy and that the administrative ranks of  
 territorial units should be incorporated in the theorization of scales…. [Scale] is a   
 representation, arena, scaffolding and organization of sociospatial formation. I   
 argue that, in the Chinese context at least, a place’s administrative rank or level   
 significantly affects its political and economic relations with other places. (Ma 2005, 480- 
81) 
 
Scale should therefore be taken into more serious consideration because the nature of 
administrative units in China significantly affects local economic growth, social formation, and 
social regulation. In other words, Chinese urban governance takes on a socialist form in its top-
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down hierarchical and highly structured administrative units, and a special consideration of scale 
within the Chinese socialist context must be considered. The next section provides an alternative 
to understanding urban transformation of China as a reterritorialization of the state across 
multiple scales.  
B. Rescaling State Power: Territory and the Land Market 
I define “territorialization” as the making, naturalization, and legitimization of state space 
(E. Yeh 2013). Jessop (1998) engages with an analysis of territorialization and the 
entrepreneurial city to apply his concept of state theory to the local state. For Jessop (1990, 
1995), the decentralization of power on the national level resulted in more power on the local 
level. In other words, these processes of globalization and state capitalism resulted in the 
“hollowing out” of the central state. Brenner’s (1998) definition of “glocalism” and 
Swyngedouw’s (2000) notion of authoritarian governance highlights the idea that the state scale 
is actually not being eroded, but rather rearticulated and reterritorialized on the local and supra-
state scales. For example, Swyngedouw et al. (2002) conducted a study of cities in twelve 
European countries to conclude that new forms of urban governance are characterized by less 
democratic and more elite–driven priorities. This is the perspective that I take to my study of 
Nanjing. Brenner (1999a) defines a glocal state as a global city that is the coordinate of state 
territorial power on a local and global level. Brenner disagrees with Jessop and the many other 
scholars in the entrepreneurial turn of the literature who suggest that state power is being 
transferred to the local. While Brenner (1999b) agrees that governance is changing, he disagrees 
with how territory is being reconfigured onto a glocal scale:  
 Territorialization and deterritorialization are constitutive moments of an ongoing dialectic 
 through which social space is continually produced, reconfigured, and transformed under 
 capitalism. Thus conceived, the contemporary round of globalization entails neither the 
 absolute territorialization of societies, economies, or cultures on a global scale nor their 
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 complete deterritorialization into a supra-territorial, distanceless, borderless space of 
 flows, but rather a multi-scalar restructuring of capitalist territorial organization. (68,  
emphasis in original)  
  
The implications of international capital flows on the rescaling of state power and shaping modes 
of urban governance includes the reterritorialization and rescaling of the state, which has resulted 
in a shift from local governments committed to social welfare to more authoritarian local 
governments focused on economic growth. 
 When evaluating China, it is more useful to apply Brenner’s (2004) conception of the 
reterritorialization of the state on multiple scales than the “hollowing out” model. Brenner 
(1999b) illustrates that local states are not a static, discrete space, but rather a constantly 
changing territory comprised of dynamic social relations in constant interaction with the 
national, regional, and global as socially constructed scales. In China, decentralization 
strengthens the power of the state through localized political territorialization and the local 
state’s control over the land market. When examining governance, the local scale is in constant 
tension and interaction with the national and global scales (Brenner 1998). Cities are key nodes 
in the process of state rescaling as the reconfiguration of the nation-state (Sassen 2001). Uneven 
development is the key outcome of the rescaling of state power because local states have the 
central aim to promote the competitiveness of their particular locations within broader spaces of 
competition at global scales. 
Evaluation of the rescaling of state territorialization to urban China 
Development in China is much more than simply capital accumulation and a spatial fix of 
investing in the built environment (Harvey 2005). Urban redevelopment in China is about the 
production and reproduction of local state power. Hsing (2010) provides crucial insight into the 
relationship between state and society through the land property market. Hsing (2006a) termed 
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the land market in China as “commodification without privatization.” She argues that land is the 
focus of local politics in urban China as land rents are the main way that the state controls and 
profits from the local political economy. Urban construction projects are the primary way that 
the state earns political legitimacy and economic profits (Lin 2007, 2011). She highlights the 
importance of the role of the local state in managing the real-estate market in order to assert its 
territoriality and legitimacy. Hsing (2010) defines territoriality as “spatial strategies to 
consolidate power in a given place and time” involving the local government’s occupation and 
domination of space (8). It is primarily through the local state’s regulation of land as a 
commodity that the state’s authority is exercised and territoriality is realized (Lin and A. Zhang 
2014). 
Hsing (2006b; 2006a) explores the way local officials use their power to lease land in 
order to reach economic development goals set by the state and receive promotions. The local 
political and economic restructuring in China began in the 1980s when municipal governments 
were granted greater authority in urban land management.5 The Ministry of Land Management 
was established in 1986 and by 1998 city governments were granted the exclusive authority to 
lease urban land from the central government: “land [now] serves as the main vehicle for the 
local state to consolidate its territorial authority in the era of fiscal and administrative 
decentralization” (Hsing 2006b, 577). These changes led to what Hsing (2006a) calls the “new 
urban politics of China,” described as decentralization of state power to the local governments; 
increased fiscal autonomy of the local state; local governments directing and participating in the 
market of commodified but not privatized urban land; and “transnational capitals [responding] 
to, instead of shaping, the agenda of the local market [in urban China]” (167). The power of the 
                                                
5 Previously during the Mao era, the socialist legacy of land ownership in the form of the work unit 
(danwei), also known as danwei land masters or socialist landowners, controlled urban land management through 
the ownership and control of state-owned enterprises. 
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local government in shaping state-led capitalism and its ability to shape the land market is 
perhaps the most important distinction between Chinese and Western modes of governance. 
The typical Chinese territorial approach to governance through active participation in 
urban land management and the property market does not automatically guarantee an increase in 
local state power (Lin 2011). Rather, local states must earn the authority to govern: “In their 
struggle for urban land control…municipal leaders face challenges and opportunities to define 
and defend the boundaries of their territorial power, and their governing capacity is tested and 
built” (Hsing 2006b, 591). In the West, the leaders win elections. In China, the leaders prove 
their authoritative legitimacy by devoting themselves to large-scale urban redevelopment and 
public infrastructure projects:  
Redevelopment and infrastructure projects have the legitimacy of building a modern city 
and of public interests, giving the city government a higher moral ground. City 
governments and their young urban planners also launch ideological campaigns that 
promote the idea of efficient land use, which rejects the socialist pattern of allocating 
central locations to state-owned factories and schools. (Hsing 2006a, 176, emphasis 
added) 
  
She describes the local governments’ attempts to maintain a socialist state in a market economy 
as municipal governments struggle against socialist work-unit (danwei) landowners and high-
ranking state agencies to secure land rents from redevelopment projects. In other words, the 
Chinese government embraces and rejects various aspects of socialism to maintain legitimacy. 
More so than in the West, government officials invest in local and public infrastructure to solve 
the crises of overaccumulation and give the city government the “moral high ground.” 
 Hsing’s (2010) analysis highlights the importance of the role of society in resisting the 
state, what she deems as “civic territoriality.” The mobilization of local urban residents against 
the government to assert property and residential rights illustrates changing state-society 
relations as citizens engage in public protests against illegal land grabs by the city government 
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and private developers alike (Hsing and Lee 2010). The increase in protests in recent years 
illustrates that power in space is not given, but earned. Her insights are crucial as she uses 
ethnography to prove that the state plays a major role in the political economy of the land market 
in urban China. Hsing’s (2010) Lefebvrian and Polanyian analysis lays the foundation for 
understanding the significance of Lefebvre for this case study. Lefebvre is particularly relevant 
because he is specifically interested in the role of the state in the production of space, and with 
the local state in urban China as heavily involved in the commodification of land, I use Lefebvre 
to further inquire on the state mode of production of space. Lefebvre also emphasizes the ways 
people appropriate space for their own use through the messiness of everyday practices, which 
will be further explored in the empirical chapters.   
III. Conclusion 
 How is China similar to and different from Western countries? While some scholars 
insist that the term “neoliberal” cannot be applied to a communist state, others use neoliberalism 
as a theoretical tool to describe the growing prominence of discourses surrounding privatization 
and self-responsibility in China. In this section, I interrogated the theories of multiscalar 
globalization and neoliberalism to urban China. Based on my observations and findings, China 
exhibits urban entrepreneurialism as evidenced in its rapid pace of development, uneven 
development, and place-based competition. China’s economic market remains highly 
distinguished from the conventional neoliberal model, however, primarily based on its role in 
managing the land market. Local states utilize their power over the land market to assert 
localized territoriality, shape trajectories of urban governance, and receive personal promotions. 
The local state legitimizes and expands its power through its management of the land market by 
collecting land rents and controlling the conditions of development. Due to this relationship, it is 
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not useful to think of China’s central state as “hollowing out,” but rather reterritorialized on 
multiple scales (Brenner 2004).  
This section focused on the aspect of the capitalist political economy that encourages the 
devolution of central state power to the local governments. Indeed, extensive scholarship on 
urban China of the past twenty years clearly illustrates that since the economic reforms of 1978, 
China has experienced the decentralization of state control, increased fiscal autonomy and 
entrepreneurialism of local governments, and place-based competition for investment (F. Wu 
2007a; F. Wu 2007b). While Western and Chinese scholars alike largely agree that there has 
been a rescaling of state power in China as a result of the reshaping of the country’s relationship 
to the global economy since the 1970s, they disagree on the effects and whether the state has 
generally gained or lost power. The unique cultural and political-economic context of state-led 
capitalism in the context of shifting notions of private property and land is key to understanding 
the recent changes in the social and built environment of urban China. While the processes of 
residential eviction and demolition inevitably associated with urban redevelopment projects in 
China seem similar to that of gentrification in the U.S. and similar urban improvement projects 
around the world (He 2007), there are very different processes and historical contexts underlying 
these seemingly similar processes. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS: GRAMSCI AND LEFEBVRE 
Scholars of China from inside and outside the country frequently employ conventional 
geographic theories (e.g., Foucault, Lefebvre, Agamben) to understand China (Ong 2006; H. Ren 
2013). I use Gramsci and Lefebvre, as well as scholars that draw on them, as parts of my 
theoretical toolbox to explain my data. This chapter is devoted to understanding the use of these 
theoretical frameworks. In this project, I am inspired by T. Li (2007), who primarily uses 
Foucault in conversation with Marx and Gramsci to explain her ethnography of Indonesia:  
my purpose in making these moves is not to construct a super theory, an improbably 
seamless amalgam. Rather, I tolerate the untidiness and tension introduced by different 
theoretical traditions because of the distinct questions they pose, and the tools they offer 
to guide my analysis. (19)  
 
In taking a geographical approach to advance existing work in the urban studies literature, 
Lefebvre and Gramsci provide the best tools to explain the reproduction of social divisions and 
class inequality across space as I recorded in urban China. My aim is not to apply theory to the 
data, but rather to use theory as a departure point to engage with the data (see methodology 
section in chapter 3).  
Bringing Gramsci and Lefebvre together in conversation with one another helps explain 
class, inequality, and the relationship between state and society. Specifically, first in 
understanding class as a dynamic, heterogeneous, and functional group embodying cultural and 
economic life fundamental to the production of space. Second, in examining the perpetuation of 
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inequality through cultural hegemony as a dynamic and contested process. Third, in focusing on 
the individual re-articulations, resistance, and embodiments of state power in everyday practice. I 
have divided this chapter into two major themes that are particularly relevant to the overall 
thesis: 1) cultural materialism, and 2) the production of space. In an effort to engage in an 
iterative process of connecting theory and empirics, throughout the thesis I illustrate the parallels 
and divergences between geographical theories and what I have witnessed in Nanjing. 
I. Gramsci and Cultural Materialism: Understanding Class and Landscape 
The theoretical tools of cultural materialism are useful for interrogating class formation 
and landscape. My Gramscian approach will help to illuminate the ways in which the homes and 
residents of Old Nanjing constitute and are constituted by class identities and divisions. In this 
section, I define the terms cultural materialism, class, and landscape (see chapter 5 and 6 for the 
empirical applications of these terms). I draw on Cresswell (2010) to define culture as the 
distinctive processes through which meaning and value are communicated, and how meaning 
becomes social and political. For Williams (1976), culture is the relationship between the 
symbolic and material. Culture thus plays a critical role in the production and reproduction of 
inequality. In this thesis, I examine the social construction of difference through cultural 
processes manifested in landscape. Gramsci’s theory of cultural hegemony offers helpful insights 
to understand the perpetuation of inequality.  
A. Gramsci and Cultural Hegemony   
Gramsci wrote in the particular political climate of Italy between 1915-1937, and so his 
writings reflect the working class and Communist movements of a democratic and newly unified 
Italy in the aftermath of the Russian Revolution. Thus there are some inevitable limitations of 
Gramscian theory when examining contemporary China. For example, one of Gramsci’s main 
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ideas was that democratic countries rule by consent and China is not a democratic country. I 
argue, however, that Gramscian “consent” is still useful for understanding how the Communist 
Party is quite successful in maintaining power not through domination or coercion but instead 
through certain levels of consent. I complement a Gramscian approach with writings from 
Lefebvre to provide the most robust theoretical approach.  
Gramsci provides a particularly useful way to understand class formation in a functional 
sense, which is a perspective on class that reflects not only economic situation, but also cultural 
aspects of class. In contemporary China, culture is crucial to class formation. Gramsci 
understands culture as a form of hegemony, a type of power that is realized through consent and 
“common sense” as organized by civil society. Hegemony is distinct from domination. For 
Gramsci, hegemony is to consent through civil society as domination is to coercion through 
political society. Consent and coercion thus cannot be divided as the two notions of power work 
together to allow ruling groups to maintain influence and control. In this sub-section, however, I 
limit my explanation to Gramsci’s understanding of consent, cultural hegemony, and civil 
society because that is most relevant to my topic.   
Cultural hegemony  
Traditionally, culture in Marxist terms was not an element of the material, but rather an 
element of the ideological superstructure. In this way, culture was conventionally treated as a 
subset of the economic base. Gramsci, however, recognized that culture is not simply the 
expression of underlying economic relations and advocated for the integration of the cultural and 
economic spheres, for integrating base and superstructure as a circuit in a dialectical and 
reflexive relationship. This integrative circuitry relationship of economics (i.e. the material) and 
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culture (i.e. the symbolic) is the foundation of cultural materialism (Williams 1976; Williams 
1977).  
Gramsci used culture to understand how ruling groups win and maintain power. Gramsci 
defines hegemony as an unending process of moral and intellectual leadership that takes on 
cultural, political, economic, material, and legal forms. Hegemony is not a static top-down 
conception of power as domination, but rather hegemony is an ongoing negotiation between the 
rulers and the ruled. The Gramscian term “hegemony” acknowledges the active role of 
subordinate people in the operation of power. In other words, people are not just fools of the 
ruling class, but rather actively participate in granting their consent to be ruled by those in power. 
As explained by Jones (2007), a ruling power “must be sufficiently flexible to respond to new 
circumstances and to the changing wishes of those it rules. It must be able to reach into the 
minds and lives of its subordinates, exercising its power as what appears to be a free expression 
of their own interests and desires” (4). Gramsci (1971) sees hegemony as a form of common 
sense, a: ‘chaotic aggregate of disparate conceptions’ that holds together ‘Stone Age elements,’ 
the principles of advanced science and ‘intuitions of a future philosophy’” (324). Every social 
group has various manifestations of common sense. Common sense is “continually transforming 
itself, enriching itself with scientific ideas and with philosophical opinions which have entered 
ordinary life” (Gramsci 1971, 326). Common sense is one way through which the rulers grant 
consent from the ruled through cultural hegemony.   
Civil society  
Hegemony, consent, and common sense are organized through civil society. In some 
places, Gramsci (1971) writes that consent is a tool used by the state or ruling classes in the guise 
of civil society to gain or maintain power: “Between the economic structure and the State with its 
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legislation and its coercion stands civil society” (448). The state provides an important 
instrument in connecting civil society and the economy. In this sense, civil society organizes 
consent and constricts class struggle through its connection to the state (Burawoy 2003, 199). In 
other places, Gramsci (1971) more loosely defined civil society as “the ensemble of organisms 
commonly called ‘private’” (12). Civil society thus blurs the distinction between public/private 
as political authority and individual decision-making: “Yet it is precisely in this private realm 
that ruling values seem most natural and therefore unchangeable” (Jones 2007, 32). Civil society 
is therefore not only regulated cultural institutions, such as church and school, but also individual 
behavior, tastes, and values. Civil society is particularly important for this study of everyday life 
in contemporary urban China, where class formations are made obvious through conspicuous 
consumption, especially the production and consumption of housing, which displays material 
forms of taste. I pay particularly close attention to the ways that certain cultural practices (e.g., 
behavior and manners) indicate and reinforce class divisions (Watkins 1993).  
I draw on Gramsci to understand class formation in urban China. Drawing on L. Zhang 
(2010), I understand that there are two fundamentally intertwined aspects of class in China: 1) 
social and cultural positioning (i.e. cultural differences displayed in tastes and lifestyles), and 2) 
capital accumulation (i.e. fundamental socioeconomic inequality). I use landscape and class to 
understand the relationship between the cultural and economic spheres as detailed by the 
theoretical approach of cultural materialism. My cultural materialist approach further integrates 
the cultural and the economic spheres by drawing on Lefebvre’s conception of the mutually 
constitutive relationship between spatial production and social existence. 
B. Class Formation in Economic and Cultural Domains 
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I define class as an activity or practice rather than as a category. I am inspired by Gramsci 
to merge the economic and cultural spheres in the analysis of class-making. T. Li (2007) 
discusses the usefulness of the Gramscian approach to understanding social history. She asserts 
that Gramsci is useful for taking into account the multiple positions that people occupy and the 
diverse power they wield:  
Gramsci is…interested both in studying…conjunctures at which social groups come to 
see themselves as collectivities, develop critical insight, and mobilize to confront their 
adversaries [or not]…[Gramsci] understood that the actual social groups engaged in 
situated struggles are far more diverse as reflections of their fragmentary experiences, 
attachments, and embedded cultural ideas. (T. Li 2007, 22) 
 
In other words, Gramsci allows for the specific, situated, and embodied, which is particularly 
useful in forming an understanding of class as a dynamic, heterogeneous, and functional group of 
cultural and economic life (Willis 1977). As Jessop (2005) points out, one important aspect of 
Gramscian class formation is the way in which social relations are inherently spatial and 
temporal, especially regarding the uneven development and internal colonialism of Italy. For 
Gramsci, the spatial implications for building different types of hegemony and rootedness of 
social classes were key to illuminating “the relative dominance of different scales of economic, 
political, intellectual and moral life” (Jessop 2005, 427). Gramsci’s spatial and scalar 
understanding cultural hegemony is especially useful when discussing the deeply embedded 
social divisions between urban and rural China. When people strongly identify with a certain 
place and then experience new forms of interaction, the result is stronger class divisions. 
Understanding place-based identity in this way is especially relevant to China when looking at 
the divisions between rural and urban in the wake of rising rates of migration (B. Goodman 
1995).  
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Thompson’s (1966) account of how the English working class maintained an active role 
in class construction as situated in a particular political, economic, and historical context: “[Class 
is not] ‘structure,’ nor even… ‘category,’ but as something which in fact happens…in human 
relationships” (9). In Thompson’s view, the English working class identity was not an identity 
placed on them by the ruling classes. Many recent studies explore the making of class in 
contemporary China. These studies examine how ideas about class revolve around economic 
modes of production and cultural ideals of difference and hierarchy to show the valuable use of 
cultural materialism the Chinese context (Anagnost 2008; D. Goodman 2008; Hanser 2008; W. 
Sun 2009a). It is important to note the complexity of the category of “class” in China, which is 
illustrated in the following quote from H. Ren’s (2013) study on the middle class in China: “The 
productivity of class lies in its multiple uses in delineating the boundaries between the legible 
and the legitimate, between the permissible and the prohibited, between the recognizable and 
unrecognizable self-responsible subjects, and between the winners and the losers” (144). This 
thesis serves as a case study to demonstrate that these approaches are extremely valuable in the 
Chinese context, as class formation in contemporary urban China is a highly contested, dynamic, 
and cultural formation communicated through values, taste, and behavior.  
Suzhi is an important aspect of class-making in China (Anagnost 2004). The Chinese 
word suzhi has multiple definitions in English as the concept does not fully exist in the English 
language. The numerous English translations of the word include quality, character, essence, 
qualification, disposition, and constitution. In this paper, I will sometimes use the terms “inner-
quality” or “quality” for suzhi, which is typically defined by Chinese people as a measurement of 
one’s personal quality, morality, civilized behavior, and level of education. Even though none of 
my interview questions explicitly asked about suzhi, the term was brought up at least once in 
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each interview. After suzhi was brought up unprompted by my interviewees, I usually asked 
them to give me some examples of low and high suzhi. My research participants described low 
suzhi as anything from jaywalking, spitting, talking loudly, cursing, failing to form a line, poor 
hygiene, and wearing pajamas in public. Low suzhi behaviors are commonly associated with 
migrant workers in the popular imagination, though locals engaging in these habits are still 
described as “uncivilized” or low quality too. High suzhi was described in certain practices such 
as following the traffic signals, speaking standard Mandarin, or being polite, such as giving up 
your seat on the bus for an elderly person. High suzhi was also described as having “high” 
culture, such as ballet or piano lessons, as well as experience going or studying abroad.  
Literature on suzhi has proliferated in recent years. China scholars employing the 
governmentality analytic suggest that former Chinese President Hu Jintao developed a state 
discourse of “social harmony” to propagate a new and less-expensive version of political 
governance in China: the cultivation of high quality (suzhi) citizens that could govern themselves 
(Tomba 2004; Greenhalgh and Winckler 2005; Jacka 2009; Sigley 2009; W. Sun 2009b; 
Woronov 2009). Others have examined how suzhi has been used as a part of the development 
discourse to justify civilizing the “untamed” countryside and benefit the migrant workers’ social 
cultivation and economic opportunities (Yan 2003, 2008). According to Greenhalgh (2010) 
China has embarked on a “quality project” aimed at creating citizens able to compete in a 
globally integrated society. Indeed, the discourse of suzhi is perpetuated through state institutions 
that justify social stratification (Bach 2010; Y. Guo 2013; Tang and Tomba 2013), and as 
popular notions of segregation seen in societal attitudes (Huang 2006; Shin 2012). 
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While suzhi is difficult to define, it is a general measurement of one’s level of education 
and social status, and often refers to certain “uncivilized” behaviors, such as talking too loud. 
One research participant gave a useful definition of suzhi during an interview: 
It’s hard to define suzhi because it’s really just a feeling. For me the word to describe it 
would be comfortable- how comfortable you feel with someone and how comfortable 
they make you feel. It’s also about how well you feel you would get along with someone. 
You also want to consider politeness, how often they swear or use bad words, a loud 
voice, and dialect, like my husband for example. That’s really bad behavior for kids to be 
around. For example, some people are just casually walking down the street in their 
pajamas, that’s really inappropriate. Suzhi is really a holistic thing. (Zhu Chongyang, 40-
year-old female, low-income Old Nanjing resident).  
 
The standards and measurements of suzhi defined as such indicate that standards of civilized 
residents are based at least in part on behavior. Indeed, Zhu Chongyang’s definition of suzhi in 
the previous paragraph resonates with Hanser’s (2008) description of class in China: “Following 
Bourdieu, I argue that social interactions involve an acting out…of our culturally coded habits 
and preferences. We rely on our habitus to tell us what feels right in a given situation and how 
we should behave” (8). As further explored in chapter 4, class in China is thus based on a 
person’s civilized behavior as defined by the social norms and mannerisms of many upper-class 
urban residents (Anagnost 2008). 
C. Landscape and Class Formation 
Landscape is one way I choose to investigate the cultural materialism of class in China as 
the landscape serves as the site of class-making (Cosgrove 1984). Landscape is defined here as 
the representations and practices of materialized power relations: “landscapes…[are] physical 
concretizations of power” (Mitchell 2000, 125). The landscape understood in this way serves as 
the site of the making of class (Cosgrove 1984; Mitchell 1996). As Zukin (1993) articulates it, 
landscape is “the architecture of social class, gender and race relations imposed by powerful 
institutions” (16). She emphasizes that landscape is a dynamic social relation, subject to 
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continuously changing social and economic struggles. Landscape is a point of view and changes 
according to its reader, a definition that draws inspiration from Gramsci (Jones 2007). Landscape 
is therefore a material object in which different narratives, representations, and practices coexist.  
I interrogate and examine the cultural landscape through observations and interviews that 
express narratives that value and devalue the landscape in different ways. Mitchell’s (1996) work 
on landscape helps to illuminate the ways the landscape of Old Nanjing embodies the 
inequalities of the capitalist economy while also further reinforces lower class identity and social 
reproduction. The changing landscape of China is a manifestation of the way that the Chinese 
have transformed their way of seeing the world through the lens of property relations (Cosgrove 
1984; Pow 2007).  
I study how the landscape of poverty produces and reproduces stereotypes of the 
residents of Old Nanjing as “uncivilized” and “backward.” This process of creating a landscape 
of “backwardness” constitutes certain lower class identities:  
the landscape itself is an active agent in constituting that history, serving both as a 
symbol for the needs and desires of the people who live in it…and as a solid, dead 
weight… ‘Landscape’ is best seen as both a work (it is the product of human labor and 
thus encapsulates the dreams, desires, and all the injustices of the people and social 
systems that make it) and as something that does work (it acts as a social agent in the 
further development of a place). (Mitchell 2000, 94, emphasis in original) 
 
The landscape of Old Nanjing embodies the inequalities of the capitalist economy while also 
reinforcing lower class identity and social reproduction (Zukin 1993; Mitchell 1996). The 
changing landscape of China is a manifestation of the way that the Chinese have transformed 
their way of seeing the world since economic reform through the lens of property relations (Pow 
2007). I interrogate and examine the cultural landscape through narratives that value and devalue 
the landscape in different ways (see chapter 5). In short, Gramsci provides the foundation for a 
cultural materialist understanding of class formation in China. 
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II. Lefebvre: The Spatial Triad and the Production of Space 
Lefebvre is particularly useful to this case study because of his close attention to the role 
of the state, as well as his focus on individual re-articulations, resistance, and embodiments of 
state power in everyday practice (Elden 2004; Brenner and Elden 2009). Lefebvre is particularly 
complementary to Gramsci because he also emphasizes the dialectical relationship between the 
cultural and economic, and the material and symbolic (Stanek 2011). For Lefebvre, space (i.e. 
mental, physical, and social space) is the crucial component to analyzing the relation between the 
material and symbolic. The trialectical relationship of space that concerns Lefebvre is the triad 
between physical space (spatial practice, or “the perceived,” e.g. roads and gates), mental space 
(representations of space, or “the conceived,” e.g. maps), and social space (representational 
spaces, or “the lived,” e.g. the military, nation-state, or nature) (see Lefebvre 1991; Elden 2004). 
Although Lefebvre uses these various terms for the spatial triad interchangeably, I will primarily 
refer to the triad as physical, mental, and social space(s) for the purposes of simplification.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A. Bridging Idealism and Materialism 
Lefebvre argues for an approach to social space that bridges Hegelian idealism and 
Marxist materialism. Lefebvre challenges and extends Marxist theory to advocate for an 
Social	  (Lived)	  “Spaces	  of	  Representation” 
 	  	  	  	  Space 
Mental	  (Conceived)	  “Representations	  of	  Space” 
Physical (Perceived)	  “Spatial	  Practice” 
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incorporation of the materialist (i.e. economic modes of production) and idealist (i.e. discursive, 
linguistic, and ideological) spheres in order to understand the mutually reciprocal relationship 
between base and superstructure. He asserts that the split between the practical and symbolic is a 
socially constructed division of academic labor (Lefebvre 1991, 141). Lefebvre (1991) criticizes 
semiology for reducing political and social space to simply the “mental space” of ideology and 
discourse (6-7). Lefebvre (1991) argues that the built environment (i.e. “physical space”) and its 
symbolic forms (i.e. “mental space”) must be analyzed together in a mutually constitutive 
relationship, which he calls social space (131). Lefebvre writes of the production of space as an 
economic and social process: 
It would be more accurate to say that it [space] is at once a precondition and a result of 
social superstructures…Is space a social relationship? Certainly—but one which is 
inherent to property relationships (especially the ownership of the earth, of land) and also 
closely bound up with the forces of production (which impose a form on that earth or 
land); here we see the polyvalence of social space, its ‘reality’ at once formal and 
material. (1991, 85)  
 
Lefebvre helps me understand how in post-reform China transforming notions of private 
property relations are changing social space in the city (see chapter 6). For Lefebvre, the 
interrelationship between physical, mental, and social space illustrates that both the material and 
symbolic are equally important in the epistemology of space as a social construct (Lefebvre 
1991, 117). As Stanek (2011) writes: “what relates the spaces differentiated by gender, age, 
class, memory, and desire to one another? This is the political stake of Lefebvre’s unitary theory 
of space, which is today more relevant than ever before: to think of space as a whole means to 
keep it open to everybody” (137). The production of space is hence defined as both the physical 
construction of buildings, as well as the social construction of meaning imbued in space. 
Lefebvre’s theories on space illustrate experiments in oscillation between materialism and 
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idealism, and it is these tools that are used in an iterative process and dialectical tension with 
empirical evidence collected in contemporary urban China. 
Lefebvre (1991) insists that space is never a static or neutral container, but always 
socially constructed and grounded in a network of dynamic social practices: “The qualities in 
question are qualities of space, not…qualities embedded in space” (230, emphasis in original). 
One of Lefebvre’s main contributions to social theory is his argument that space neither serves as 
a neutral container in which social processes are assembled, nor provides an insignificant stage 
where life is played out. Rather space is a socially produced node in a dynamic system. Only 
through certain social processes (e.g., functionalist urban planning) does space lose its social 
character and become completely abstract. It is through his research in France on post-World 
War II construction that he witnesses the scientific authority of functionalist urban planning that 
attempts to divide the city into commodified, isolated, and functionalist pieces that treat space as 
mere container (Stanek 2011). Lefebvre calls this type of space “abstract space” to describe 
alienated and homogenous space produced for the purpose of extracting surplus exchange-value. 
This is a particularly appropriate theoretical framework to use when examining China because 
the proliferation of urban planning academic discourse and government support of functionalism 
ignores the social aspects of space and only sees space as exchange value (Abramson 2008).  
B. The Production of Space 
Lefebvre’s theories of the trialectic between mental, physical, and social space 
emphasizes the creation of new social groups through the production of space—not only the 
physical construction of a socio-spatial segregation, but also in the ways in which the state, 
businesses, and people imbue spaces with meaning. For example, a homeless person is never 
welcome in a boutique mall or fancy restaurant, but may or may not be welcome in a public park 
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(thus the social construction of “homelessness” or “homeless people” is mutually constituted 
through presence in and association with public parks). Lefebvre’s revolutionary approach to the 
economic production of space as a site of conditioning social relations integrated the cultural and 
economic spheres, and demonstrated that there is a constitutive relationship between spatial 
production and social existence.6 Lefebvre (1991) writes: 
Though a product to be used, to be consumed, it [space] is also a means of production; 
networks of exchange and flows of raw materials and energy fashion space and are 
determined by it. Thus this means of production, produced as such, cannot be separated 
either from the productive forces, including technology and knowledge, or from the 
social division of labor which shapes it, or from the state and the superstructures of 
society. (85, emphasis in original)  
 
In other words, the everyday practices of the people who inhabit space and bestow it with 
meaning contributes to the production of social space. 
Lefebvre’s elaboration of a mutually constitutive relationship between spatial production 
(e.g., construction of buildings and meanings in a space) and social formation (e.g., creation of 
new social classes based on housing inequality) is very helpful in my thesis. Nowhere is this 
phenomenon more true than in China, where capital accumulation in the built environment 
accounts for most of the national GDP and provides political legitimacy for local governments 
(Hsing 2010). For example, L. Zhang (2010) builds on Lefebvre to develop the analytic of the 
“spatialization of class” that integrates culture and economy:  
the production of commodity housing (as it is known in China), gated communities, and 
private living provides the physical and social ground on which the making of the new 
middle classes becomes possible…Emerging places offer a tangible location of a new 
class to materialize itself through spatial exclusion, cultural differentiation, and lifestyle 
practices. The new spatial and social formation has also compelled novel modes of 
governing that are distinctly different from those of the socialist era. (3-4) 
 
                                                
6 In using to the term “social existence,” Lefebvre refers to class-consciousness and class formation as 
explained by Marx (1859) in the following quote: “It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, 
but, on the contrary, their social existence determines their consciousness.” 
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The formation of the middle-class in China is thus established through private property relations 
and the spatial production of gated communities.  
Lefebvre (1991) also traces the history of a movement from absolute space to abstract 
space to illustrate the differences between spatial production as domination and appropriation 
(164). He postulates that the appropriation of space results in something called “absolute space,” 
which embodies use value (as opposed to “abstract space” that embodies exchange value). 
Absolute space embodies community and works of creation (as opposed to “things of 
production”) that harmonize with the body and emerge out of the needs of everyday life 
(Lefebvre 1991, 71).7 The domination of space, on the other hand, results in something called 
“abstract space.” This kind of space is manifested in things of production that can be bought and 
sold on the market for the purposes of perpetuating state power and the reproduction of capital. 
Abstract space is rendered homogeneous but creates differentiation and in this way obscures 
itself as a part of capitalist domination. The domination of land by the state and capital, such as 
through the expertise of city planners, demonstrate an inherent violence in the production of 
abstract space (Lefebvre 1991, 387). The role of the state in the domination of space and 
production of abstract space is key to understanding the influence of local governments in the 
urban Chinese land market.  
C. Lefebvre and State Space 
In The Production of Space, Lefebvre (1991) demonstrates that the widespread and 
overarching structure of capitalism as partnered with the state is a system of material and 
discursive relationships that produces and reproduces abstract space that is seemingly 
homogenous, but actually highly differentiated based on spatio-temporal differences across scale. 
                                                
7 Social practice creates works when labor plays a secondary role, but produces things when labor plays a 
primary role. 
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The aim of the state in producing space is to make space appear homogenous (Lefebvre 2003b, 
227). Capitalism creates pressure to homogenize and innovate at the same time because people 
seek difference in a society based on mass production (Harvey 1990). In one of Lefebvre’s 
(2003b) essays, “Space and the State,” explained below, he discusses the role of the state and the 
individual in producing social space.  
Lefebvre understands space, the state, and state space as concrete abstractions. In 
examining space and the state as concrete abstractions, Lefebvre examines them in the following 
way: “space as a dynamic relationship among its bodily experience, symbolic meaning, social 
organizations, and scientific representations” (Stanek 2011, 140). One of my goals in this thesis 
is to emulate this approach by examining the dynamic relationships between the body, symbols, 
social norms, and discourses as witnessed on the ground in urban China.  
Concrete abstractions are ideas that emerge from social practice. In other words, a 
concrete abstraction is the connection between social practices and conceptual experiences. Only 
by understanding space as a concrete abstraction, Lefebvre argues, can social reality begin to be 
examined and understood. Studying Lefebvrian space as a concrete abstraction merges the 
universal and specific, and connects social practices to conceptual experiences. The state too, 
like space, is a concrete abstraction because the state manifests itself as a reification through the 
mental space of nationalist ideology. For Lefebvre (2003b), the state is social space because 
various social institutions combine to form the political monumentality of the state itself.   
The process of state control and coordination of capital exchange through the space of 
state territory is what Lefebvre calls the “state mode of production,” or SMP. Lefebvre (2003b) 
defines the mechanism of SMP as the state’s “control of flows and stocks by ensuring their 
coordination [and exchange]” through political space (226). For example, I illustrate in the 
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following chapters how state intervention in the land market engages with capitalist modes of 
production, which produce high-rise apartment buildings geared toward private homeownership. 
For Lefebvre (2003b), state control over territorial and institutional space is the key to 
maintaining and reproducing the social relations that underpin state power and the exchange of 
capital (241). In other words, the state not only is key to the production and reproduction of 
social space, each state itself is a type of social space (225). That is to say, the state is not an 
isolated “thing,” but rather a system of networks (241).   
Lefebvre (2003b) argues that the SMP is distinct from the capitalist mode of production 
because it involves the politicization of space through national identity: “in the course of a three 
fold process [growth, urbanization, and spatialization]...a qualitative leap occurs: the emergence 
of ...SMP” (226). Lefebvre (2003b) calls this development of statism the “rationalization and 
socialization of society” through the naturalization of state territory and social and political space 
(226). State intervention in the market is constant and necessary for the management and 
production of space: “through its control, the State tends to accentuate the homogenous character 
of space, which is fractured by exchange” (Lefebvre 2003b, 234). We witness this with the 
proliferation of large scale construction projects in urban China.  
My aim is to illustrate the connection between the state and everyday practice. Therefore, 
Lefebvre provides an especially productive theoretical approach to my case study because he 
pays particular attention to the role of both the state and individuals in appropriating and 
dominating space for their own interests (Elden 2004). For example, in his theorization of state 
space, Lefebvre (2003b) writes: “This space [of the SMP] implies not only that everyday life is 
programmed and idealized through manipulated consumption but also that spatiality is 
hierarchized to distinguish noble spaces from vulgar ones, residential spaces from other spaces” 
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(235). My study of civilized and uncivilized landscapes in chapter 5 speaks to the ways in which 
representations by the state and people produce and reproduce hierarchized spaces. To 
understand the ways that the individual body disrupts abstract space, however, one first must 
understand the ways that the state is socially constructed in space.  
The state mode of production: Fragment under private property and unify under national identity 
Lefebvre (2003b) maintains that the state’s role in the production of space is to manage 
the various fragmentations of space. He writes that the homogenized and fragmented spaces of 
capitalist modernity are produced not only through capitalist strategies, but also through the 
regulatory strategies of the state. The space of the state is one of control and exchange. The state 
provides the institutional and territorial basis of managing the crises of capital. Lefebvre (2003b) 
writes: “[t]he relation between ‘private’ interests and the activities of ‘public’ powers sometimes 
involves a collusion, sometimes a collision. This creates the paradox of a space that is both 
homogenous and broken” (227). The process of homogenization and fragmentation that Lefebvre 
describes reflects the way that the Chinese state is shaping public space and managing the 
commodification of land. It is through Lefebvre’s clarification of the SMP that illustrates the 
way in which the state and the market cannot be divorced into separate dichotomous spheres, as 
some China scholars have been known to do (for a critique of the state-market dichotomy used in 
China scholarship, see Lin and A. Zhang 2014).  
Commodity exchange and the extraction of surplus value are controlled by the state to 
maintain social stability and aid in the production of social space. Indeed, Lefebvre (2003b) 
writes that the state is the “guiding hand” in the production of space (227). In this way, socialism 
and capitalism in China are mutually constitutive. For the Chinese, the market is viewed as a 
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powerful engine of growth and wealth, but at the same time it is “so powerful” that the state 
always “must” protect people from it and regulate it.  
While the state and its capitalist interests protect private property and produce abstract 
space for the purposes of extracting exchange value, the state simultaneously fragments space 
into different functionalities (Brenner and Elden 2009). As Lefebvre writes: “knowledge that is 
directly invested in the production of space can process it in vast expanses (highway 
construction); but this space is fragmented, pulverized by private property” (235).  One of the 
ways this is most clearly illustrated in the Chinese case is the way in which changing notions of 
private homeownership have transformed understandings of the state/market relationship and 
role in Chinese society (see chapter 6).  
The tension between homogenous and differentiated space is also exemplified in the 
state’s efforts to create various functional regions of the city (consumption, leisure, production, 
tourism, etc), what Lefebvre (2003b) calls a hierarchized “collection of ghettos” (244). The SMP 
engages in an effort to create a unified entity of social space through the nation, maintain a 
coherent national identity and cohesion, and significantly, “imposes the reproduction of the 
relations of domination” (Lefebvre 2003b, 244, emphasis in original). However, the state must 
unify these separate spaces by establishing a national identity to maintain the relations of 
domination and prevent collapse (Elden 2004).  
The individual body in abstract state space 
The amalgamation of Lefebvre’s (1991, 1996, 2003b) works together maintains that there 
is a constant dialectical tension between appropriation and domination. While Lefebvre 
acknowledges the homogenous and consistent historical and material system that produces 
abstract space under capitalism, he also understands the individual variances across space and 
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time based on culture and ideology through the appropriation of space by individuals. He does 
not try to construct a narrative of domination and power emanating in a top-down structure from 
the state, but rather insists that power relations are a dynamic and contested process materialized 
in the appropriation and domination of space by both the state and the individual.  
For Lefebvre, the individual and nuanced rearticulations of the “disobedient” body 
through social space are primary ways that the individual disrupts abstract space. Lefebvre 
(2003b) emphasizes that social space as a merging of the material and symbolic is the lived 
experience of the body is inherently differential and opposed to homogeneity: “The 
understanding of space [as the spatial triad]...must begin with the lived and the body, that is, 
from a space occupied by an organic, living, and thinking being” (229). Lefebvre is primarily 
interested in the appropriation of space in everyday life, how people are resisting (often within 
the constraints of state space), and how they are resisting state power by appropriating their own 
space for themselves (Lefebvre 1996). For example, the illegal activities of prostitution and 
selling pornography in Old Nanjing or migrant workers selling street food without a license 
illustrates the everyday resistance of the residents by occupying space to support their own 
livelihoods. The state thus attempts but cannot succeed in producing a fully realized abstract 
space. This analytic is thus used throughout the thesis to understand the results of and pushback 
against state discourse through the production of space.  
Urban modernity 
Lefebvre’s (2003a) aim in the Urban Revolution is to trace the history of urban modernity 
(see chapter 5 for more discussion on urban modernity). His main argument is that urbanization 
has overtaken industrialization as the key determinant in the formation of social relations. His 
work records the witnessing of new social relations comprising what he calls “urban society,” as 
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opposed to “industrial society.” In other words, class relations in the city are now based on 
struggles over urban space instead of struggles over ownership of the modes of production. 
Lefebvre (2003a) postulates that there is a key moment of transformation when urban society 
takes over industrial society. This moment is when the urban is no longer viewed as a distinct 
entity of the rural, but rather the rural becomes essential for the existence of the urban. All of this 
is predicated on the fundamental notion that social space as a social construct is comprised of the 
struggle between capital, labor and land.  
 In thinking about structure and power, Lefebvre brings new insight into our 
understanding of discourse and materialism. Lefebvre stresses the importance of discourse 
through semiotic and symbolic analysis of the signs of the built and social environments of the 
city. At the same time, he stresses the importance of materialism by emphasizing the importance 
of investment in the built environment as reinforcing capitalist modes of production. In analyzing 
the historical development of the urban environment, Lefebvre sees social relations and everyday 
practices changing under the new epistemological and ontological conditions of urban 
modernity. 
III. Conclusion 
 Gramsci and Lefebvre complement each other as theorists writing out of the Marxist 
tradition of political-economy. While Gramsci helps illuminate the use of cultural materialism in 
understanding class formation through the landscape in China, Lefebvre unpacks the importance 
of the spatial triad in spatial production and social formation. Both theorists pay special attention 
to linking the material and symbolic, the intersection at which Williams (1976) defines as 
“culture.” Despite the fact that they are both writing in different places (Lefebvre in post WWII 
France and Gramsci in post WWI Italy) they both provide broader theories of culture and the 
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state, which can be interrogated in other contexts. In China, there are many similarities and 
differences between the Western contexts that concern Lefebvre and Gramsci. However, my goal 
is to use their theories as a trampoline rather than a box to expand my own understandings and 
interpretations of urban China, not as an objective understanding of the world, but rather as a 
window to a larger debate on state, society, and space.  
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CHAPTER 3 
THE CONTEXT OF NANJING AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
The purpose of this chapter is to establish the historical and geographical context of the 
city of Nanjing and the five field sites I lived in over the course of 14 months of fieldwork from 
2011-2013. I explain the historical and political context for the highly variegated urban 
landscape of the city. In this thesis I take a descriptive approach to understanding the spatial 
patterns of urban development and socioeconomic divisions in the city. Therefore an 
appreciation of Nanjing’s history of state-driven city planning, uneven development, and the 
urban-rural divide establish a foundation for understanding the rest of the thesis. I also outline 
the implications of the free-market economic reforms since 1978 for the spatial concentration of 
urban poverty and housing inequality in Nanjing. I describe the contemporary urban landscape as 
highly variegated and dynamic.  
This chapter will outline the uneven development of Nanjing that can be explained by 
numerous factors, including: 1) its history as the national capital and symbol of modernity; 2) the 
commodification of land and consolidation of local state power during the economic reforms of 
the 1980s and 1990s; and 3) contemporary demolition and development projects that reinforce 
patterns of socio-spatial segregation. After first giving a general overview of Nanjing’s 
geographical location and economic status, this chapter explains the history of Nanjing; 
contemporary patterns of poverty, demolition, and segregation; methodology; and conclusion.  
I. Geographical, Historical, and Economic Context of Nanjing 
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A brief description of Nanjing’s demographics and economic activity provides 
background on the city’s overall position in China’s economic development trajectory. Nanjing 
is the capital of Jiangsu province (see figure 4), a province that held a total population of 79 
million in 2012 (urban: 40 million; rural: 39 million). The majority Han ethnic group makes up 
97% of the total provincial population. Jiangsu Province is one of the wealthiest provinces in 
China and it serves the area as a focal point and economic center of the Yangtze River Delta. 
According to China’s 2012 National Bureau of Statistics data, Jiangsu’s nominal GDP in 2012 
was 5.41 trillion RMB (US$892 billion), making it the second largest nominal GDP of all 
Chinese provinces that year. Jiangsu’s per capita GDP in 2012 was 68,347 RMB (US$10,827), 
ranking the province as the fourth highest in China in terms of GDP per capita 
(http://www.stats.gov.cn, accessed February 18, 2014).  
 
Figure 4: Map of China: Nanjing is the capital of Jiangsu Province, a coastal province of China 
as highlighted in red. Jiangsu is one of the wealthiest provinces in China and usually ranks as the 
first or second province in the country for highest nominal GDP. Source: Uwe Dedering (2010) 
Although the economic indicators of Jiangsu province are some of the highest in the 
country, the province exhibits highly uneven development. The province is characterized by 
extreme uneven development between the urban and prosperous south (Sunan) and the rural and 
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impoverished north (Subei). Wei and Fan (2000) used Jiangsu as their case study in researching 
regional inequality in China to illustrate the spatial ramifications of economic reform. I include 
their maps of uneven development in Jiangsu here (see figure 5). The wealth gap and unequal 
economic growth of Jiangsu is also exemplified in the fact that most of the cities of Jiangsu 
province have a GDP per capita around 1.5 times the provincial average. For example, Nanjing’s 
GDP per capita in 2013 was 98,000 RMB (US$16,000) (http://www.stats.gov.cn, accessed 
February 18, 2014). Under the current regime, China’s political-economic structure operates on a 
remarkably hierarchal arrangement based on multi-scalar distributions of state power and 
investment preference (Ma 2005). Development priority is thus given first to cities over rural 
townships, to coastal cities over inland cities, and to first-tier cities (e.g., Beijing and Shanghai) 
over second-tier cities (e.g., Nanjing and Chengdu) resulting in uneven development on the 
national and regional scale (Wei and Ma 1996; Wei 2000)
 
Figure 5: Maps of the uneven development of Jiangsu Province. Source: Wei, Dennis and Cindy 
Fan. 2000. “Regional Inequality in China: A Case Study of Jiangsu Province.” Professional 
Geographer 52, no. 3: 462-64. 
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Nanjing (sometimes spelled “Nanking”) boasts a population of over 8 million, and is 
located in southern Jiangsu about 150 miles (240 km) west of Shanghai (see figure 6). The city is 
accessible to Shanghai in 90 minutes by high-speed train. Nanjing was the capital of China 
during 10 dynasties, most recently as the imperial capital during the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644). 
During the Republican Era (1912-1949), Nanjing again served as the national capital when China 
was ruled by the Guomindang (GMD), the Chinese Nationalist Party, under Sun Yat-sen and 
Chiang Kai-shek.8  
 
Figure 6: The location of Nanjing within Jiangsu Province. The yellow area indicates the 
“Greater Nanjing Metropolitan Region.” Source: www.nanjing.gov.cn, accessed April 30, 2014. 
Despite the meager academic literature on the city, Nanjing is a particularly important 
city and ideal research location for a project on urban transformations. Nanjing creates an 
interesting case study because of the inherent tensions manifested in the city as a historical 
national capital and industrial center that recently became highly linked to the global economy 
(F. Wu 2007c). Nanjing exhibits many characteristics of industrial cities due to its legacy as an 
                                                
8 Guomindang is also sometimes written as Kuomintang (KMT). I use the standardized pinyin version of 
Guomindang in this thesis. During the Republican Era under the rule of the GMD, the Chinese fought the Japanese 
in World War II. Because Nanjing was the national capital during that time, it was the site of much violence. 
Nanjing is often known in for the “Rape of Nanking,” a massacre in 1937 led by Japanese troops to take over the 
capital city during World War II. During the tragedy, 300,000 civilians were killed and 20,000 women were raped in 
a period of six weeks. 
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important industrial center during the Maoist era (1949-1976). The city is currently restructuring 
its economy to attract private and foreign investment in efforts to follow the same trajectory as 
larger cities on the east coast. Nanjing’s urban development and economic growth remains 
highly uneven, however, as is obvious in the spatial concentration of impoverished districts that 
remain socially and economically segregated today (see figure 7 for a map of the spatial 
concentration of poverty of Nanjing). This is similar to the social and economic segregation seen 
in other large cities in eastern China as evidenced in studies conducted on urban poverty and 
segregation in Guangzhou, Shanghai, and Beijing (Hu and Kaplan 2001; F. Wu 2004; Z. Li and 
F. Wu 2008; F. Wu, He, and Webster 2010; Chung and Zhou 2011; G. Chen 2012a). 
 
Figure 7: This map depicts the spatial concentration of urban poverty in Nanjing based on the 
recipients of Minimum Living Standard Program, which provides a living wage of 220 RMB 
(US$25) a month to residents without income. Old Nanjing is located in the district labeled 33 
(Zhonghuamen), which is the southern district containing one of the highest level of poverty in 
the city. Source: Chen, Guo, Chaolin Gu, and Fulong Wu. 2006. “Urban poverty in the 
transitional economy: a case of Nanjing, China.” Habitat International 30 (1): 11. 
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Nanjing’s urban landscape is diversified due to its history as a national capital and center 
of industry during the Mao era (F. Wu 2007c). As a result of recent private capital investment, 
Nanjing’s skyline is a highly urbanized and modernized provincial capital (see figure 8). The city 
combines its image of modernity with historically important monuments, such as Sun Yat-sen’s 
mausoleum, the tombs of the Ming Dynasty, an ancient city wall, and the Presidential Palace. G. 
Chen (2012b) has conducted numerous case studies and fieldwork projects in Nanjing and 
writes: “Compared with other Chinese cities, Nanjing’s unique history has resulted in a highly 
visible landscape that contrasts post-reform achievements with pre-reform fixtures, pre-
revolution landmarks, and historical footprints” (253). On the street level, its variegated 
landscape of housing inequality is dotted with culturally significant dilapidated old town 
neighborhoods amidst posh shopping malls, ritzy apartment complexes, and high-security gated 
communities (see figures 9 and 10 for photos of the variegated urban landscape). Against the 
backdrop of spatial patterns of uneven development, Nanjing’s history as a national capital and 
the post-Mao economic reforms provide the historical context for the contemporary phenomena 
of housing inequality and socio-spatial segregation.  
 
Figure 8: The Nanjing City Skyline: An image of the highly urbanized and modernized Nanjing 
skyline. Source: www.nanjing.gov.cn, accessed April 30, 2014. 
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Figure 9: Old Nanjing, one of the author’s five field sites, is located next to the ancient Nanjing 
city wall. Old Nanjing is a typical dilapidated old city neighborhood that interrupts the urban 
landscape of skyscrapers and high-rise apartment complexes with its distinctive red-roofed one-
story homes. Source: Photo by author, July 2013.   
 
Figure 10: The Old Nanjing skyline as an old city neighborhood peppering the urban landscape 
of high-rises with traditional Chinese architecture. Source: Photo by author, July 2013. 
A. History of Nanjing 
This section details Nanjing’s legacy as the historical capital of 10 imperial dynasties and 
the Chinese Nationalist Party from 1912-1949, which makes it a traditional center of state power 
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and national identity with a long history of socio-spatial segregation. Nanjing was favored during 
the Mao era as a center for industrial production, but is currently attempting to abandon its 
industrial past and integrate more closely with the global economy (F. Wu 2007c). Its economic 
and spatial patterns thus resemble a combination of a highly industrialized landscape similar to 
the central regions of China, while also maintaining features of the booming eastern coastal 
cities, such as the skyscrapers of Shanghai. In this section, I will establish historical context for 
present-day patterns of uneven development explained by 1) a legacy in Nanjing of state-driven 
city planning for the goals of modernity and national identity; 2) favoring certain districts as 
focal points of economic development; and 3) the urban-rural divide in China. 
Modernity and nationalism through urban planning 
I now turn to a discussion of some of the ways that modernity and nationality were 
manifested through the development of the built environment in Nanjing. The Chinese city is 
situated in a specific historical context of social and political loci for the development projects of 
modernity and national identity. There is a tradition in China of modeling the academic and 
professional urban planning of Western cities (Musgrove 2000), a material effect that can be 
seen in Chinese cities that attempt to emulate Western styles of skyscrapers, shopping malls, and 
wide, ordered boulevards (Abramson 2008). There is a historical legacy in Chinese cities of 
consolidating power, discipline, and order through city planning (Esherick 2000). This is 
compared and contrasted to Western urban planning inspired by Le Corbusier and modernist 
urban design, which have collaborated with real estate capital and state economic development 
goals (Boyer 1996). In the West, modernity was often manifested in rational planning during the 
twentieth century, which was later considered to be a complete failure (Jacobs 1961). 
  
53 
Though China has a extensive history of urban planning (Skinner 1977; Rowe 1984), in 
the Republican Era (1912-1949) both Chinese and foreigners saw Chinese cities as disorderly 
and in desperate need of fundamental reform. The reorganization of urban space was a 
fundamental part of the government’s modernist agenda during the Republican Era. It was during 
this time that modernity became associated with cities and their built environments as manifested 
in Western models of orderly and efficient urban planning. Because Nanjing was the capital of 
China during this period, it became the experimental subject of Western-educated urban planners 
and government officials in realizing a vision of modernity and national identity embodied in the 
built environment (Esherick 2000).  
In Asia where modernity and progress often have been defined and imposed by 
imperialism, the Chinese city thus exhibits tension between Western modernity and Chinese 
national identity. During the Republican Era, China’s leaders sought to break from the classical 
imperial mold and build Nanjing as an entirely new city of “wide streets, open vistas, 
monumental public buildings…In all cases there was a particular concern to structure the capital 
[of Nanjing] to impress…foreign visitors” (Esherick 2000, 4). The architecture, however, 
remained distinctly Chinese. The tension between making a city modern and keeping it Chinese 
was manifested in a built environment that reflected efforts to strike a balance between achieving 
modernity and maintaining national identity through distinct architectural styles.  
According to Musgrove (2000), the sections of Nanjing that were constructed during the 
Republican Era (1912-1949) served as a new center of state power and national identity. The 
Guomindang (GMD) leaders directed the city planning efforts and intended to model the city 
planning of Nanjing after Washington, DC and Paris. The GMD leaders wanted the city planners 
to combine modernity, efficiency, rationality, and order with “traditional” Chinese architectural 
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style. The GMD and their city planners used techniques that combined creative references to 
traditional Chinese aesthetics and style, while also utilizing the latest in international design 
techniques. Nanjing thus features clearly defined zones of functionality, based on the modern 
city planning ideas of Le Corbusier and Haussmann (see Abramson 2008).  
History of uneven development 
The urban development plans of the GMD government favored the northern part of the 
city as home to political elites, which is now known as Gulou and Xuanwu districts, still the two 
wealthiest districts within the city of Nanjing (refer to figure 6 above). Liu and F. Wu (2006a) 
show that the historical and contemporary efforts of state-led urban development in Nanjing has 
resulted in the spatial concentration of urban poverty in certain districts, especially old city 
neighborhoods and the urban fringe.9 As a result, during the Republican Era residential 
segregation in Nanjing was among the highest in China: 
The history of urban development has left visible imprints on the current urban landscape 
of Nanjing in terms of land use pattern and pockets of low-standard housing…In 1949, 
there were over 0.2 million people living in 309 slums scattered over the southern part of 
the city, mainly along the railroad or near the city wall…The historical slums or pockets 
of low-standard housing in Nanjing had not been fully redeveloped until the early 1980s. 
(G. Chen, Gu, and F. Wu 2006, 20)   
 
Beginning in the 1980s, economic reforms (e.g., privatization) allowed for the commodification 
of state-owned land to private real-estate developers, resulting in widespread demolition and 
displacement. However, the legacy of uneven development patterns during the Republican Era 
remain in the southern part of the city, where Old Nanjing is located, and it remains a highly 
impoverished area of the city (see figure 6, Old Nanjing is located in the 33 Zhonghuamen area).   
B. The Urban-Rural Divide 
                                                
9 For a more detailed history of the urban development and spatial concentration of poverty in Nanjing, see 
Liu and Wu 2006, pages 615-617. 
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In this thesis I also confront the topic of rural to urban migration and a discussion of the 
history of the rural/urban divide in Chinese history is crucial here. The role of cities in Chinese 
history is a hotly debated topic in the historical literature. Some authors insist on an urban-rural 
continuum during the late imperial era (1880-1912) where the urban and rural did not exhibit 
unique economic or cultural characteristics (Mote 1973; Skinner 1977). In other words, 
according to some scholars of late imperial China, a distinctive urban economic structure did not 
exist until capitalism was introduced by Western influences beginning in 1889. This scholarship 
has been widely criticized as an imperialistic and Eurocentric idea—that China was relatively 
“backward” and did not achieve “modernity” until it began to build cities based on Western 
models of capitalism in the late nineteenth century (see Rowe 1984).  
Other historical scholarship proposes that China developed a distinct urban culture and 
capitalist economy even before the penetration of Western influence in 1889 (Rowe 1984). In a 
study of the history of urbanization in Nanjing, Fei (2009) notes that along with the 
agglomeration of people and resources in a small area, there is evidence of “significant 
alterations in the fabric of life” in cities, such as distinct cultural and consumption patterns (14-
15). According to Fei (2009), the history of Nanjing involves the legacy of a unique urban 
culture and lifestyle, including literature, theatre, and fashion. The historical legacy of an urban-
rural gulf that economically, socially, politically, and culturally divides China remains today. 
It is also important to understand the history of urbanization and migration in terms of the 
historical importance of native-place identity. Regional ethnicities distinguish Chinese people in 
terms of major linguistic, ethnic, and cultural differences (Honig 1992). Ethnicity in China must 
be understood beyond state-constructed categories of “nationality” (minzu) to include profound 
regional contrasts that are manifested in cultural and linguistic differences between migrant 
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workers and local residents of cities (L. Zhang 2001). For example, B. Goodman (1995) points 
out the importance of native-place identity and urban-rural migration in shaping Chinese urban 
society from 1853-1937. For her, the Chinese project of achieving modernization and building 
national identity during the Republican era marked a major change in the urban geographies of 
China:  
modernization…does not presume the withering of traditional ties and practices. 
Instead…‘tradition’ was not fixed but dynamic, not given but constructed, and the means 
by which elements of ‘traditional’ Chinese culture helped facilitate and structure the 
process of radical social transformation we associate with modernity. (B. Goodman 1995, 
46) 
 
The Republican Era was a crucial time for the Chinese state as people began developing a 
broader national identity within regional and local identities. It is precisely in this process of the 
adoption of different nested identities that conceptions of modernity and tradition were forged 
and transformed (B. Goodman 1995). It is important to note that the social, cultural, and 
economic gulf between the urban and the rural remained throughout the Republican Era, as the 
city became a privileged site of both modernity and nationalism. The tension between tradition 
and modernity persists today in the built and social environment.  
Since the free-market economic reforms that began under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership in 
1978, the divide between China’s urban and rural areas is manifested in state and popular 
discourses. The progressive and civilized urban modernity is contrasted with the backwardness 
of the rural (Yan 2008). These discourses are realized materially in projects that attempt to 
achieve urban modernity through campaigns to encourage orderliness, civilized morality, and 
cleanliness, as well as large-scale construction projects of malls and skyscrapers (see chapter 4). 
Meanwhile, rural migrants in the city are often equated by city residents with crime, disease, 
poverty, and the uncivilized (Solinger 1999; Solinger 2006). 
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II. The Shift from the Mao Era to Post-Mao Era 
The uneven development of Nanjing, especially as exemplified in extreme housing 
inequality, can be attributed to the commodification of land and consolidation of local state 
power during the economic reforms of the 1980s and 1990s (F. Wu and He 2005). G. Chen 
(2011) details the history of urban development policies in Nanjing, showing that urbanization 
was second priority to industrialization during the Maoist era. During economic reform, 
however, Nanjing trajectory changed to a rapid pace of development:  
The real takeoff for Nanjing’s municipal development occurred in the 1990s after China's 
city planning law, enacted in 1989, and tax reform launched in 1994, gave the local 
government unprecedented legal and economic power to redesign Nanjing’s urban space… 
The momentum they produced in Nanjing was particularly explosive due to the preceding 
long years of underdevelopment and the prowess of Jiangsu province’s economy. This 
thrust resulted in  accelerated urban redevelopment cycles and rapidly rising housing prices, 
which keep driving Nanjing’s poor families to the edge. (G. Chen 2011, 1148)  
 
As a result of uneven development throughout the Republican era and Mao era, Nanjing’s rapid 
pace of contemporary urban redevelopment exacerbates the gap between the rich and the poor.  
 Three different types of land take-over, eviction, and demolition dominate the process 
commodification of public land in rural, suburban and urban areas—each with very destructive 
effects. My focus is specifically on urban demolition, which examines the existing old city 
neighborhoods—comprised of one-story houses and winding alleys too narrow for cars—that are 
surrounded on all sides by skyscrapers and high-rise apartment complexes. A mix of rural 
migrants from all over the country and local Nanjingese residents that are awaiting inevitable and 
impending urban “renewal” occupies these impoverished and dilapidated neighborhoods.  
A. Demolition and Segregation 
Contemporary demolition and development projects and discourses reinforce patterns of 
uneven development and justify socio-spatial segregation (J. Chen, Guo, and F. Wu 2011). Due 
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to skyrocketing property values, business deals between local governments and private land 
developers, and the increasing popularity of privately run, gated high-rise compounds, China is 
razing old cities and displacing the residents to faraway suburbs at an alarming rate. Although 
reliable demolition statistics for Nanjing are unavailable, Beijing’s Old Dilapidated Housing 
Renewal (ODHR) program evicted more than 500,000 residents from 1990 to 2003. As reported 
by Meyer (2008), some unofficial estimates of evictions even go as high as 1.25 million 
residents. According to data provided by the Beijing Academy of Urban Planning, while the 
number of hutong, or alley-ways, in Beijing exceeded 7,000 in the early 1950s and was reduced 
to about 2,000 in 1990, today only an estimated 900 hutong remain in Beijing (Meyer 2008). 
Urban poverty in Nanjing can be attributed to the privatization and restructuring of the 
urban economy, especially in terms of the closure of state-owned factories (G. Chen 2012b, 253). 
The problems in Nanjing resulting from rapid urban redevelopment are exacerbated in 
preparation for hosting the Youth Olympics in summer of 2014. Figure 11 shows the new 
stadium that was built for the Youth Olympics. Figure 12 shows two propaganda posters pasted 
on a house in Old Nanjing in February 2012 that reflects the debate and resistance of urban 
development for the purpose of the Youth Olympics.  
 
Figure 11: The 2014 Youth Olympic Stadium in Nanjing, exemplifying the priorities of the city 
government in promoting this event. Source: www.nanjing.gov.cn, accessed April 30, 2014. 
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Figure 12: Two propaganda posters for the Youth Olympics pasted on the side of a home in Old 
Nanjing. In the poster on the left side, the message reads: “Safeguard the people’s livelihood; 
Promote harmony; Revitalize the old city; Welcome the Youth Olympics.” In the poster on the 
right side, the message declares: “Support government policy; Evict and relocate according to the 
law; Rationally hold talks together; Reasonable compensation.” “Welcome the Youth Olympics” 
was a common theme in signs and posters around the city (not only in Old Nanjing). Source: 
Photo by author, February 2012. 
 
The city is undergoing widespread urban redevelopment as it builds four new subway 
lines and attempts to conceal or demolish any dilapidated neighborhoods. According to one city 
official in the Jiangsu Provincial Physical Education Bureau on the Nanjing Youth Olympic 
Games Preparation Team, the Nanjing city government approved 100 billion RMB ($16 billion 
USD) for urban redevelopment projects alone in preparation for the Youth Olympics (Interview 
with author, November 2011). As such, the city currently serves as a case study for 
entrepreneurial cities using demolition and redevelopment in place-promotion for large sporting 
events (Shin 2012), as Beijing was similarly scrutinized during the 2008 Olympics (Broudehoux 
2007; X. Ren 2008a). One of the main projects is the construction of several new subway lines, 
which is one of the principle causes of urban redevelopment and displacement in Nanjing today.  
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While the overall city populations are very diverse in China, they remain highly 
segregated at the neighborhood level (Huang 2005). The emergence of class distinctions based 
on private wealth, as well as recent developments in strong desires for privacy, individualism, 
and consumption mark stark differences from the former socialist egalitarianism. Hence the 
recent formations of collective identities on a neighborhood-scale that began to form as a result 
of distinct divisions in the built and social environments. Pow (2009) argues that gated 
communities are sites where middle-class interests are being territorially defined through 
conspicuous consumption and exclusion of non-members. The property market embodies the 
emergence of new class relations in Chinese society, which L. Zhang (2010) calls the 
“spatialization of class,” as social stratification is directly related to new urban spatial 
reconfigurations and spatial exclusion through gated communities and mechanized security 
systems.  
According to He and F. Wu (2009), the socio-spatial consequences of China’s property-
led urban redevelopment are deep and widespread. For example, demolition and rapid 
displacement of entire neighborhoods break original residents’ social networks and deprive them 
of employment. Furthermore, according to Tomba (2009), the semi-privatization of housing in 
China has resulted in discourses that justify socio-segregated zoning policies that restructure the 
city, determine how communities are governed, and institutionalize class segregated community 
building. The result is the expansion of gated communities, rapid real-estate development into 
the suburbs, and sections of inner cities “becoming dilapidated and ‘colonized’ by migrants and 
lower-status urban residents” (Tomba 2009, 598). The existing research thus serves as an 
important departure point to examine inter-group tensions and socio-spatial segregation in the 
context of the political economy of housing development in urban China. 
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B. Previous Case Studies of Nanjing in the Transitional Economy 
Four important studies on the geography of urban poverty have been conducted using 
Nanjing as the case study. G. Chen, Gu, and F. Wu (2006) analyzed data from a survey with 
recipients of Minimum Living Standard Program (MLSP) and a household questionnaire survey 
conducted in 2001. The survey covers 78 urban households including 230 people in 11 typical 
neighborhoods. Samples from 2 of the 11 neighborhoods were located in the area where I 
conducted my research. In their study, the area where Old Nanjing is located is identified as one 
of the highest concentrations of household living under the poverty line (defined when the study 
was conducted in 2000 as 220 RMB/US$25 per month per capita) in the city of Nanjing. They 
also measured how many people in each poverty group had their own bathroom (only 20% of 
residents in Old Nanjing have their own bathroom). Their findings suggest that “the new urban 
poverty in China is the inevitable result of economic restructuring, the state’s retreat from 
workplace-based welfare provision and the urbanization process that re-organizes urban spaces” 
(G. Chen, Gu, and F. Wu 2006, 22). The state thus plays an important role in exacerbating and 
perpetuation patterns of uneven development and cycles of poverty.  
The other studies conducted in Nanjing also identify the state as playing the largest role 
in reinforcing spatial concentrations of poverty, especially in the southern part of the city where I 
conducted my fieldwork (F. Wu and He 2005). In a study of Nanjing, some researchers found 
that “the root of poverty concentration lies in the state-led urban development policy and the 
socialist housing provision system” (Liu and F. Wu 2006, 624). It is made clear in the research 
that the state plays a crucial role in dictating the city planning and urban development efforts. 
The state, as the director of such urban redevelopment efforts, thus exacerbates the spatial 
concentration of urban poverty. G. Chen (2012b) conducted a survey of poor families in Nanjing 
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in 2012 and found that the three main factors contributing to housing inequality were the 
institutional restrictions of the household registration (hukou) system, the restructuring of 
privatization and notions of homeownership in the real-estate market, and resettlement 
conditions after demolition and displacement in the inner-city. She concluded that China is 
largely privatization-oriented and development-driven, while the institutional mechanisms to 
provide basic housing to the poor is nonexistent (G. Chen 2012b).  
Finally, a study by G. Chen (2011) used both quantitative analysis of census and 
household-survey data combined with qualitative analysis of interview transcripts to understand 
the homeownership transition under the new capitalist economy. Using a framework of structure-
agency interaction, she concludes that the transition of private property and homeownership 
rights in the post-Mao era has been largely detrimental to poor families in Nanjing. Her findings 
suggest that private homeownership has been promoted amongst the urban poor, resulting in 
economic exploitation of their family situation, as well as profound deprivation for poor 
homeowners and non-homeowners. She calls for a new framework for China to address the 
needs of non-homeowners (G. Chen 2011). In chapter 6 of the thesis, I will use an ethnographic 
case study from my fieldwork to illustrate the cultural, economic, and social pressure on poor 
families to own a private home. 
III. Methodology 
This project was born out of a long history of interest in China and experience in Nanjing 
in particular. I started learning Chinese seven years ago during my freshman year of college, and 
I first went to Nanjing on study abroad from 2009-2010. I lived and studied in Nanjing for a year 
with a host family, who were instrumental in my ability to become fluent in the language by the 
end of the year. I wrote a research paper in Chinese citing Chinese journal articles about Deng 
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Xiaoping at the end of my second semester. During the summer of 2010, I taught an English 
course to twenty adult students, who were civil servants at the Physical Education Bureau of the 
Nanjing municipal government and earnestly preparing for the Youth Olympics in 2014. In 
preparation for the foreign guests that would be arriving in the city in four years time, they were 
required to take an English class for four months during the summer. I befriended a few of my 
students and they often told me about the urban redevelopment projects that were being planned 
for the city in preparation for the Youth Olympic games. One of my students even took me to her 
grandmother’s house in Old Nanjing, the same neighborhood I would return to a year later to 
begin my fieldwork. That experience inspired me to apply for the Fulbright to study demolition, 
displacement, and dissent related to urban redevelopment in Nanjing. I returned to Nanjing in 
September of 2011 on the Fulbright and began my ethnographic study of Old Nanjing.  
Ethnography provides the best method to examine the nuances and contradictions of 
popular discourses and everyday practices on an individual level. My ethnographic methods for 
this paper are participant observation, informal interviews, and semi-structured interviews. The 
ethnographic participant observation occurred while living in five different field sites and 
visiting over 15 other sites (various housing compounds) during the course of 14 months in 
Nanjing, China (Fall and Winter 2011, Spring and Summer 2012, Summer 2013). My five 
different field sites were as follows. I lived in two different privately managed (wuye guanli) 
apartments in gated communities for two months (rent was 5,000 RMB/$820 USD per month). I 
lived in two different publically managed and subsidized work-unit (danwei) apartments for 
seven months (rent was 1,000 RMB/$164 USD per month). I lived in a two-story house 
(laofangzi) in the old city, the low-income neighborhood Old Nanjing for six months (rent was 
500 RMB/$82 USD per month). I will include more detail on these field sites in the next section.  
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I see my field sites as windows into a debate on social and class divisions as reflected in 
differences in the social and built environments and located in the context of rapid shift from a 
socialist to a capitalist economy (Kitchin and Tate 2000). This is a window into the debate on the 
regulation of the market by the state and how it influences society (Cloke et al. 2004). 
A. Interviews and Coding 
The purpose of the interviews were to elicit feedback on participants’ perceptions of 
changes that had occurred during their lifetime, especially regarding demographic shifts and 
construction projects (see appendix A for a complete list of the interview questions in Chinese 
and English). My other goal during the interviews was to gain a more thorough understanding of 
how people of certain socioeconomic groups perceived people of other socioeconomic groups 
(Elwood and Martin 2000). This gives a look into the larger project of this thesis in how 
globalization and uneven development may result in an increase in socioeconomic and spatial 
segregation. The interview questions were divided into three broad categories, 1) questions about 
their life, including demographic information, childhood experiences, hobbies, plans for the 
future, and general satisfaction of life, 2) questions about their neighborhood, including reasons 
for place of residency, in-group and out-group perceptions of various types of people and their 
neighbors, any changes that have occurred recently or in the past, satisfaction levels with social 
life and physical conditions of the neighborhood, and any experiences of feeling safe or unsafe, 
and 3) questions about construction projects, including their feelings about demolition and 
displacement campaigns, and other urban redevelopment projects in their neighborhood and 
around the city.  
 During my time in Nanjing, I interviewed 61 people (37 females and 24 males), which 
consisted of 35 structured, recorded, and transcribed interviews and 26 informal interviews from 
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field notes. I interviewed 20 middle-income Nanjing residents living in an apartment complex 
(xiaoqu) earning between 3,000-10,000 RMB/$490-$1,600 USD per month. Five of the 
complexes were gated communities with private management companies and fifteen were 
subsidized middle and low-income danwei apartments largely without gates. However, they are 
grouped together in the analysis because they were all located in apartment buildings within a 
complex termed xiaoqu, though not necessarily with a management company (wuye guanli).10 I 
interviewed 21 low-income locals living in one or two story houses in the old city of Old 
Nanjing earning 1,000-5,000 RMB/$160-$820 USD per month and 20 migrant workers living or 
doing business in Old Nanjing earning 1,000-3,000 RMB/$160-$490 USD per month. The 
migrant workers interviewed for this thesis were long-term and short-term residents of Old 
Nanjing, usually vegetable or trinket peddlers, scrap collectors, shop owners, or restaurant 
workers. This population is distinct from other various types of rural migrants such as factory 
workers or construction workers, whose dwellings (such as dormitories or trailers) are provided 
for them on-site. Most of the migrants I interviewed found their own housing by living in their 
shops and/or seeking low rents from local Nanjingese of Old Nanjing. The groups are not rigidly 
defined categories as many people could be classified into more than one group. For simplicity 
sake, I divided them based on my knowledge of their socioeconomic status.  
The sixty-one interviews were conducted in Nanjing with people ranging from 18-87 
years old and lasted from 30 minutes to six hours. Except for three of the interviews with fluent 
English speakers, the remaining 58 interviews were conducted in Chinese. Five of the interviews 
conducted in the local Nanjingese dialect were transcribed into Mandarin Chinese with the help 
of a research assistant. The translations from Chinese into English are my own. The names used 
                                                
10 Because this study focuses for the most part on rural migrants and local poor in Old Nanjing, I group all 
apartment residents together as a broad term of “middle-class.” However, in Chapter 6 I look at the differences 
between privately managed gated communities and publically subsidized danwei apartments. 
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in this paper are pseudonyms and identifying information has been removed. These interviews 
are not meant to serve as a representative sample, but rather as an in-depth insight into the 
diverse experiences of select Nanjing residents (Dunn 2000).  
Ethnography is inherently subjective and therefore numerous interpretations of the same 
data are possible. The following is a brief and simplified description of the method I used to code 
and analyze the qualitative data (Cope 2003). Coding is a conversation you have with your data 
in order to weave together subjective experience with abstract concepts. The goal was to bridge 
the theory and data. I used a grounded theory approach that combines inductive and deductive 
reasoning as a constant process of going back and forth between the data and theory. I started 
with a theoretical framework and research questions, while paying close attention to patterns in 
the data. Coding is a subjective and iterative process, with generally increasing levels of 
abstraction with each iteration (personal communication with Tim Oakes, August 2013). After 
reading through the raw data twice, I highlighted repeating ideas using the comment function in 
Microsoft Word. I made a list of all repeating ideas in a separate document. In the end, I coded 
ninety repeating ideas. For example, some of the most common repeating ideas were, “I want to 
be able to provide the things that my kids need,” “buying a house is too expensive,” and “life 
was different back then.” Next, I grouped the repeating ideas into twenty themes. Some of the 
themes were dissatisfaction of living environment, the pressure and burden of housing prices and 
its impact on the family, and satisfaction with social life in the neighborhood. Finally, I grouped 
the themes into four theoretical constructs: 1) conflict between the active role of the state and the 
retreat of the welfare/socialist state, 2) conflict between the role of development as a force for 
good and evil, 3) the depoliticization of the pressure of social reproduction and providing for the 
family, 4) changing social relations between the rural and urban with simultaneous awareness 
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and denial of exclusion and discrimination against rural migrants. Although my project grew and 
changed as I wrote the thesis, those theoretical constructs are the foundation from which this 
thesis was built. I collected all relevant quotes from the themes I decided to use and selected a 
few of those quotes to include in the final versions of the chapters.   
Despite some socioeconomic differences, there were some significant similarities across 
the groups. Although they were unprompted (none of my interview questions directly asked 
about housing prices), members of all three groups stressed at least once the heavy burden and 
immense pressure of high housing prices, but expressed resignation that there was nothing to be 
done about it (mei banfa). Almost all of the participants with children, both men and women, 
expressed pressure for their child’s future success, mentioned the stress of providing for the 
future, and indicated concern about being able to provide for the family. These concerns are 
partially a reflection of a long-standing tradition and culture of upholding the family honor, as 
well as state discourses of suzhi, which emphasizes self-reliance, self-responsibility, and 
cultivation of global citizens (Ong and L. Zhang 2008; Greenhalgh 2010). Perhaps even more 
important, this is a result of the biopolitics of the One Child Policy (Greenhalgh and Winckler 
2005). I do not reduce these broader social and cultural changes to simplistic economist 
arguments, but rather intend to lay the foundation for understanding the complexities of the shift 
toward individualism in the relationship between culture and economics throughout the rest of 
the thesis.  
Within this context there were subtle gender differences. Although women expressed a 
desire to be able to fulfill the role of caretaker and provider, most men expressed stress to earn a 
higher-income. Most participants, including the migrants themselves, communicated suspicion 
towards migrant workers, accusing them of criminal activity or thievery. During all of the 
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interviews, the participants in all three groups mentioned disgust or annoyance towards 
uncivilized behavior or suzhi, which, when prompted, was described as anything from drinking 
alcohol, talking loudly, spitting, jaywalking, failing to form a line, wearing pajamas in public, 
gossiping, or bad hygiene. These behaviors were often associated with migrant workers as a 
function of their poor educational background. These similarities indicate that the dominant 
discourses in Chinese society surrounding civilized behavior permeate all social classes. 
Being a foreigner and doing research in China is challenging. For each field site, 
especially Old Nanjing, when I first arrived it was impossible to do anything because my 
presence attracted so much attention. But after a few months, people got used to seeing me and 
my presence there was normalized. However, it must be acknowledged that in an interview 
setting, people will adjust their answers to questions based on historical context, their own 
expectations, or perceived expectations. Interviews are an articulation of a situation, perhaps 
practiced or changed based on the situation (Al-Hindi and Kawabata 2002). This may or may not 
be more skewed because I was a foreigner. There were some significant benefits to being a 
foreigner doing research in China. One was that people often described very basic, foundational 
things to me, which they thought were common sense that they might not think would be 
necessary to explain to a native Chinese person. For example, interviewees would often 
explicitly explain or describe the rural-urban divide (“No, you don’t understand, in China, rural 
migrants are backward”) or some other social situation (“You wouldn’t understand as an 
American, but in China housing prices are everything to us”). During the interview, we started 
from basics, and it is those basics that I present in this thesis. The issues are highly complex and 
variable, and my interpretation of the interview transcripts is inherently subjective. The point in 
conducting such research is to present a window into broader debates about the human condition, 
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specifically in this case, to make an argument about the importance of the local state in urban 
China. In other words, the point of ethnography is not to make objective claims about the truth, 
but rather to build a bridge between the findings, theories, and literatures (the connection to 
previous literature is what distinguishes this from journalism). My task then is to use the 
interview transcripts to give one illustration and my interpretation of how structural, political-
economic, and geographical changes have ruptured previous notions of rurality, modernity, and 
development in urban China.  
B. Location of Field Sites 
One of my primary field sites, Laochengnan, is home to some of Nanjing’s oldest 
housing structures and poorest residents. It is a dilapidated neighborhood near the center of the 
city of Nanjing composed of a mixture of low-income locals, retirees, and migrant workers who 
are waiting for news of demolition and displacement. Many of the homes already display official 
graffiti marks announcing their pending eviction and demolition and propaganda posters and 
banners encouraging residents to “evict and relocate” are pasted on the outside of most of the 
homes. 
I began conducting research in Old Nanjing in September 2011. I befriended several of 
the residents and visited the site everyday. In November of that year, I began asking around to 
see if anyone was looking for a tenant or wanting to rent out a room of their house. One of my 
main informants, Guo Yifan, got me in touch with his neighbor, a 19-year old female named Xie 
Rui in vocational veterinary school. Though her mother had since moved out, Xie Rui was still 
living alone in the house in which she grew up. They agreed I could move in at the end of 
December 2011 and I lived there until May 2012. Xie Rui and I quickly became best friends. 
During that time, I conducted in-depth, intensive fieldwork in the neighborhood virtually 24 
  
70 
hours a day, 7 days a week. I enjoyed relatively free access to the neighborhood, and was only 
twice ever given any trouble by the residents or authorities.11  
Home to some of Nanjing’s oldest housing structures and poorest residents, Old Nanjing 
is a small, historic neighborhood located near the center of Nanjing. The meandering alleys are 
too narrow for vehicles and lined with old homes, or laofangzi as the locals call the one-to-two 
story dilapidated houses with the fading traces of traditional courtyard architecture (see figure 13 
for a map with GPS tracks of my field site). The laofangzi here may date back over 500 years to 
the Ming Dynasty (see figure 14 and 15). The residents of this community are currently awaiting 
eviction and demolition. Many of the residents expect their homes to be relocated within the next 
year. 
                                                
11 The first time occurred after eating lunch at a research participant’s house when she stopped talking to 
me. Whenever I would see her or talk to her, she would completely ignore me or ask me, “What are you still doing 
here?” Oddly, when I returned in summer of 2013 she welcomed me with a cheerful hello and seemed excited to see 
me. The second time was after 5 homes in the neighborhood were demolished to make way for a parking lot and a 
“cultural commodity center of exchange.” After the construction of the new building was complete, they had a big 
ceremony and invited some city officials to come. I was there taking pictures and was asked to leave.  
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Figure 13: Map of the Old Nanjing where I conducted field research. The red tracks are the main 
alleys where my research participants live and work. I geotagged the red tracks to mark the route 
I frequently walked on a daily basis (to and from the market, bathrooms, showers, and 
friends/participants’ houses). This image was taken from Google Satellite Images in July 2012.  
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Figure 14: A typical dwelling in Old Nanjing. Photo by author, October 2011. 
 
Figure 15: The typical landscape of Old Nanjing. The sign reads, “Old Zhao’s Shenzhen 
Barbecue.” It is a common sight to see street food carts around Old Nanjing, which the rural 
migrant residents use to sell late-night snacks to club and bar patrons in the area. Photo by 
author, October 2011. 
Old Nanjing has a unique local culture and a distinct local dialect. Walking into the 
neighborhood, I had the feeling that I was stepping back in time about 50 years—dinner was 
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cooked on outdoor make-shift coal stoves, chickens walked freely around the streets, pet pigeons 
cooed, mahjong, cards, and Chinese chess were played and games watched by a crowd of at least 
10 adult men, and children and adults alike walked in and out of their neighbors’ homes freely. 
Everybody knew everybody else’s business, and it felt similar to a small rural village in many 
ways. Some of the rural migrant residents said that their experiences in the old city 
neighborhoods reminded them of their life in the countryside. I made many close friends there.  
When I interviewed Xie Rui in February 2012, she described Old Nanjing as I would 
have. Here is Old Nanjing in her own words: “About Old Nanjing? I’ve only lived here for three 
years, so I’m not an expert, but I’ll tell you what I think. My favorite neighbor is Big Brother 
Guo. His family is so hospitable; they have such good hearts. No matter what bad things happen, 
we can always call him to come fix it. We have that type of relationship that you see often in Old 
Nanjing; the kind where you can walk in the door without knocking. 
If I had the choice to live in Old Nanjing or live in a high-rise apartment, I think living in 
Old Nanjing would be more fun and more interesting. If you live in a high-rise, you can’t have 
such good neighbors. No one really knows each other, and everyone keeps their door shut. In 
Old Nanjing, everyone is willing to help everyone else out. You can go into other people’s 
houses without knocking, sit down and have a chat. In a high-rise, it’s a really cold feeling 
among the neighbors.” 
I also lived in two gated communities run by private management companies for a total 
of two months (see figure 16). First, for one month in spring of 2012 and then for one month in 
summer of 2013. During one month in the spring of 2012, I lived in a high-rise and gated 
apartment complex in Gulou district near the campus of Nanjing University. Gulou district was 
one of the favored districts during the Republican Era as it housed political elites as well as the 
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administrative centers of the government. During the summer of 2013, I lived in an upscale 
apartment complex with 24/7 security guards and within walking distance of my field site in Old 
Nanjing, which indicates a highly variegated and highly uneven development in the landscape 
with wealth and impoverished neighborhoods side by side.  
 
Figure 16: Photo of a high-rise gated apartment complex managed by a private company (wuye 
guanli), one of the author’s field sites. Photo by author, July 2013. 
During fall of 2011 and summer of 2012, I also lived in two different low-income 
apartment buildings. The compounds were in very close proximity to the university and located 
in the wealthy district of Gulou, so the area was considered to be relatively safe and the 
apartments cost more than they normally would because the location was considered to be ideal, 
within easy proximity to both downtown and the university. The first was a danwei apartment for 
post-doctoral students at Nanjing University where I lived for four months (see figure 17). I had 
one Chinese roommate, a 40-year old physics post-doc at the university. The second was a 
danwei apartment for faculty at Nanjing University. In that apartment, I had two Chinese 
roommates, two recent graduates of Nanjing University working their first professional jobs in 
the city. The students and faculty are given the apartments at subsidized rates to either buy or 
rent, and then the owners and renters lease and sub-lease the apartments out to other students at 
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the university and other residents of the area. Both were not gated and did not have security 
guards, and were considered to be lower class, though acceptable. Some of the units were rented 
out to migrant workers and the residents complained about them. The apartments were 
subsidized by the university and thus not as good quality as the private homes, but good value for 
the price.  
 
Figure 17: Photo of a danwei apartment building: One of the author’s field sites, a lower income 
and subsidized danwei apartment building without a private management company to manage 
trash and security. Photo by author, October 2011. 
IV. Conclusion 
This chapter has established the geographical and historical context of the city of Nanjing 
and my field sites to establish a foundation of understanding for the rest of the thesis. Nanjing’s 
spatially uneven development can be attributed to the historical context of the state-led projects 
of modernity and national identity through urban planning, consolidation of local state power and 
territoriality through the commodification of land, and current practices of displacement and 
demolition of inner-city residents to make way for new development projects. These spatial 
practices contribute to the continuation of socio-spatial segregation and discrimination and class 
antagonism in the city. Nanjing as a historical national capital has a history of tension between 
  
76 
modernity and national identity manifested in its built environment that utilizes Westernized 
techniques of urban planning while maintaining traditional Chinese architecture. Nanjing also 
maintains a legacy as a stronghold of industrial production during the socialist era, when 
industrialization was prioritized over urbanization. As the current provincial capital of Jiangsu 
province, one of the wealthiest provinces in China, it currently exemplifies the tension it 
experiences as a historical capital and former industrial center that recently began to integrate 
itself closely with the global economy. Nanjing’s development is highly uneven as the northern 
part of the city is favored in development over the southern part, as exemplified in the spatial 
concentration of poverty in certain districts. The resulting socio-spatial segregation and housing 
inequality is the subject of this thesis.  
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CHAPTER 4 
REARTICULATING CITIZENSHIP IN URBAN CHINA: RURAL MIGRANT WORKERS, 
INNER-QUALITY, AND “CIVILIZED” BEHAVIOR 
      
I. Introduction 
Considerable demographic and social changes have occurred in Chinese cities in the past 
30 years with the increasing presence of rural migrants (K. Chan and L. Zhang 1999; L. Zhang 
2001; P. Li and Roulleau-Berger 2013). There were 263 million rural migrant workers living in 
Chinese cities in 2012 (http://www.stats.gov.cn, accessed January 2014). The income inequality, 
social exclusion, and institutional discrimination against rural migrant workers in urban China 
has been well-documented (W. Wu 2002; Fan 2004; W. Wu 2004; Liu and F. Wu 2006b; J. 
Chen, Guo, and Wu 2011; X. Wu 2012). The socioeconomic divisions and interactions between 
various social groups in Chinese cities are particularly complex, especially between the three 
major social groups: urban middle-class, urban poor, and rural migrants (Fan 2002; Solinger 
2002). Detailed studies on urban poverty in China provide evidence of housing inequality and 
socio-spatial segregation by neighborhood between the three major social groups (Gu and Shen 
2003; He and F. Wu 2007; Pow 2009; S. Li, Zhu, and L. Li 2012). The resulting dynamics—
urban geographies of inclusion and exclusion—are reflected in the social and built environments. 
Discrimination against rural migrants in Chinese cities is rooted in the official and 
popular discourses of the past 30 years that reject the rural as backward and uncivilized (Yan 
2008), while common sense ideas sanction the urban as modern and progressive (Kong 2007). 
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When the post-Mao liberal economic reforms began to establish state-led capitalism under Deng 
Xiaoping’s leadership in 1978 (Hsu 2007; W. Zhang and Sun 2012), a major shift occurred in 
collective consciousness. The new prevailing perception glorifies urban modernity while city 
officials strive for global city status (Kloet and Scheen 2013). Meanwhile dominant discourses 
reject rural people and livelihoods, which marks a major shift in social relations in the post-Mao 
era (see chapter 3). The new discourses stand sharply distinct from the Maoist policies of 
celebrating the rural by sending urban youth to the countryside to learn from the farmers during 
the “up to the mountains, down to the countryside movement” (shangshan xiaxiang yundong) 
(Yan 2008). The amalgamation of institutional and societal practices surrounding the urban-rural 
dichotomy and rural to urban migration in China thus comprises dynamic and contested 
definitions of urban citizenship (B. Goodman 1995). In general, these discourses equate the 
urban with prosperity, orderliness, civilized morality, and cleanliness. Meanwhile, the rural is 
often equated with disease, poverty, and the uncivilized.12 
The household registration (hukou) system classifies Chinese citizens as either rural or 
urban and restricts welfare benefits to one’s place of registration. Thus rural hukou holders living 
in the city often lack affordable access to welfare benefits in the city, including subsidized 
housing, education, and health care (Fan 2002). There exists undeniable and profound 
institutional exclusion and systemic discrimination of rural migrants in the city through the 
hukou system (Solinger 2006; C. Chan 2012). Due to the importance of hukou status in Chinese 
society, many scholars of urban China conflate legal hukou status with urban citizenship and 
assert that rural hukou status is the main determining factor in migrant workers’ poverty and 
social exclusion (K. Chan and L. Zhang 1999; Fan 2001; F. Wu 2002; K. Chan 2012).  
                                                
12 It should be noted that rural China has been recently re-valued as a new nostalgic project that tries to 
return to old values and the rural as the center of “Chineseness.”  
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Although I emphasize the importance of the structural and institutional inequity inherent 
in the hukou system, the evidence in this chapter indicates that the importance of the hukou in 
Chinese society has decreased in recent years. While the importance of the institutional nature of 
hukou has decreased, other markers of social status have increased. Social capital is determined 
instead through behavior and tastes deemed by the middle and upper classes as “civilized” or 
“uncivilized,” thereby increasing the socioeconomic divisions between migrants and locals. 
Hukou is not an adequate measure of urban citizenship in China today because, as my data 
suggest, hukou status is not a determining factor of belonging in a cultural sense. An expanded 
definition of urban citizenship is greatly needed to go beyond legal structures and include 
everyday practices of exclusion. I present evidence to claim that social capital, belonging, and 
class is the most relevant way to discuss membership in urban Chinese society. While the state 
defines citizenship through hukou, urban citizens re-define citizenship for their own purposes to 
determine who is and is not a worthy urban citizen through judgments of personal behaviors and 
manners. While I do not suggest that the state exhibits a reduction of power or influence by any 
means, rather I assert that practices of exclusion based on classifications of social and cultural 
capital by various urban residents illustrates an act of re-appropriation of official state discourse. 
I use the term “urban citizenship” to extend beyond the political usages of nationality and 
legal residency status in defining citizenship. In establishing a definition of urban citizenship, I 
draw on the scholarship of Holston and Appadurai (1996): “Moreover, in addition to the legal, it 
[citizenship] concerns the moral and performative dimensions of membership which define the 
meanings and practices of belonging in society (200). I further expand the definition of urban 
citizenship to include relational processes of social capital, cultural membership, and belonging 
in a local community (Ong 1999; Secor 2003; Staeheli 2003; Staeheli 2012). The term “urban 
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citizenship” thus encompasses legal status, as well as consumption patterns, normative 
boundaries, and cultural capital. Drawing on Lefebvre, I define urban society as the interaction 
of the center and periphery in a new social, political, and cultural sphere embodying the 
centrality of difference (Stanek 2011). Lefebvre emphasizes the multiscalar character of the city 
as a centrality of difference: “There is no ‘reality’ without a concentration of energy, without a 
focus or core—nor, therefore, without the dialectic: centre-periphery...implosion-explosion. 
What is the ‘subject’? A momentary centre. The ‘object’? Likewise. The body? A focusing of 
active (productive) energies. The city? The urban sphere? Ditto” (Lefebvre 1991, 399). Indeed 
the city and the urban sphere were the main focus of Lefebvre’s conceptualization of the 
centrality of difference. In this chapter, I argue that the migrants in Old Nanjing strive for their 
right to the city as a centrality of difference, while others try to maintain homogeneity in the city 
by excluding the newcomers in multiple ways.   
Migrant workers are often effectively excluded from urban society based on the material 
inaccessibility of social capital, such as brand-name cars, large houses, or American college 
degrees. As such, a relational and processual definition of urban citizenship based on social 
capital is particularly relevant to urban China today, where migrant workers are excluded from 
urban society not only on the basis of rural hukou status, but also based on the educational 
background, cultural differences, and social norms defined by urban society. 
My research questions therefore ask: how important are daily practices in determining 
urban citizenship as belonging in urban society? How are notions of belonging in urban space 
rearticulated in the new capitalist economy? Answering these questions requires examining how 
everyday practices are changing in urban Chinese society to align with new social norms defined 
by an ideal lifestyle reliant on upper-class consumption practices. My research involves 
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qualitative analysis of interview transcripts from the three main social groups in urban China: the 
middle-class, urban poor, and migrant workers. Interviews from all three groups are included to 
illustrate the ways in which people from the three different groups are interacting with each 
other, as well as how various members of each group are accepting or resisting the dominant 
discourses of civilized behavior and consumption practices defined by the state and upper-class 
residents. 
Although rural migrants are undoubtedly discriminated against in daily life, the hukou 
itself is not as important as it once was in determining belonging. Instead of hukou status, level 
of education and upholding standards of morality, order, and civility in everyday life are the 
most important indicators of belonging in urban society (Pow 2007). I examine notions of 
suspicion, ignorance, and exclusion of the migrant worker in everyday practices. When 
analyzing interview transcripts, the rejection of the migrant worker was related to notions of fear, 
chaos (luan), civility (wenming), and quality (suzhi).  
My first task below is to examine the current literature and theoretical frameworks 
surrounding urban citizenship and geographies of belonging. Next, I present my ethnographic 
fieldwork data composed of four sections highlighting the antagonisms and alliances between 
classes: 1) the declining importance of the hukou, 2) friendship and stratification between 
migrants and locals, 3) official state and unofficial discourses of personal quality (suzhi), and 4) 
discussions of chaos and order. Finally, I conclude that mannerisms signifying association with 
the urban lifestyle, such as certain consumption habits or “civilized” behavior, are manifested in 
social and symbolic capital and remain the most widely held standard of acceptance in urban 
society.  
 
  
82 
II. Geographies of Urban Citizenship, Belonging, and Exclusion 
Marshall (1950) first coined the term “social citizenship” in referring to a citizen’s right 
to economic welfare and security, and “to live the life of a civilized being according to the 
standards prevailing in the society” (72). Extending on his notion of social citizenship as 
reaching beyond legal or political status, citizenship in this chapter will be understood as a sense 
of belonging and membership in a community (i.e. urban society). Established membership is 
predicated on the exclusion of rural migrants as marginalized and ostracized outsiders.  
I elicit inspiration from Secor’s (2003, 2004; Secor and O'Loughlin 2005) research on 
rural migrants in Turkey, who are located on the periphery of national identity and cultural 
belonging. I draw on her definition of urban citizenship as a set of discursive and material 
relationships between the individual and the city. These relationships are “comprised of 
practices, meanings and identities” in everyday life (Secor 2003, 149). For example, in speaking 
about India, Doshi’s (2012) study is also relevant to my case in China:  
[t]he idea of accumulation by differentiated displacement illuminates how regimes of 
redevelopmental rule rely on simultaneously inclusive and exclusionary technologies of 
subjection through eviction and market-oriented resettlement as well as classed, 
gendered, and ethnicized subjectivities that shape and remake these regimes and urban 
space itself. (846) 
 
I draw on Doshi’s important contribution to understand how the remaking of Chinese cities 
creates spaces of inclusion and exclusion based on divisions of class and ethnicity.13 I understand 
urban redevelopment in post-socialist China as a part of the broader processes of global city 
formation and state restructuring as context to the changing and contested notions of class.  
While I understand everyday practices as situated within the political-economic context 
of state-led capitalism and socialist legacy of the hukou system, I move to push beyond the 
                                                
13 Even though most rural migrants are categorized as “Han,” I take into account the profound regional 
differences in language and culture to understand rural migrants as embodying diverse ethnicities (Honig 1992).  
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conventional literature to expand the notion of citizenship in China. In framing the conception of 
urban citizenship as belonging, I draw on Staeheli (2003) when she writes: 
… Processes of inclusion and belonging are at the core of citizenship. In this 
conceptualization, citizenship is relational, and is more of a process than a status…the 
spaces of citizenship extend beyond the sites of government into the neighborhood, the 
workplace, public spaces such as streets and parks, and the home. Thus the struggles and 
practices of citizenship are powerfully shaped and conditioned by spatial relationships 
and the geography of the city. (99)  
 
In this case, the spatial relationships of the rural/urban dichotomy, rural-to-urban migration, and 
place-based identity play a crucial role in creating the social relations and processes that 
constitute citizenship. Indeed, the image of the migrant worker as the dialectical other helps to 
constitute urban upper-class identity. For example, in figure 18 the waste picker retrieves scrap 
materials from a demolition site of an old city in Shanghai. The rural migrant worker, the 
dialectical “other” of urban modernity, constitutes the cleanliness and order associated with 
modernity through waste picking.  
 
Figure 18: A rural migrant waste picker collects scrap materials from a demolition site in 
Shanghai. Her work constitutes the urban modernity manifested in the backdrop of the typical 
urban landscape in urban Chin comprised primarily of high-rise condos. Source: Photo by 
author, May 2012. 
A. The Right to the City 
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Lefebvre’s definition of the “right to the city” is a useful analytic when discussing urban 
citizenship because it urges for expanded interaction between diverse peoples and multi-
functional space in order to create innovative and creative modes of living (Lefebvre 1996). I 
draw on Secor (2003, 2004) and Lefebvre (1996) to define the right to the city as having access 
to the opportunities of the city, the legitimate occupation of urban space, and membership in 
urban society. The right to the city comprises the struggle by the residents to create the city as a 
work of art, or oeuvre, as a centrality of difference created by and for themselves (Lefebvre 
1996). For Lefebvre, creating a “centrality of difference” is defined as, “restoring the unity of the 
moments of space [lived, perceived, conceived], integrating the body shattered in abstract 
space...and a refusal of the functionalized” (Stanek 2011, 169). The city as an oeuvre is opposed 
to the production of abstract space through capitalist and state modes of production that create 
spaces of isolation and homogeneity for the purpose of extracting exchange value. My definition 
of the right to the city as a tool to understand citizenship follows Secor (2004): 
…The right to the city refers…to the right to participate in making ‘the urban,’ the right 
to inhabit and transform urban space and thus to become a creator of the city as oeuvre. 
In other words, a critical element of urban citizenship struggles—that is, contests over 
identity, belonging, and rights to the city—is the assertion of the right to become a 
producer of the city, of urban space, and of citizenship itself. (365)  
 
In other words, the identity and belonging of migrant workers involves a struggle over 
citizenship and thus contestation over the right to the city as an oeuvre. Lefebvre and Secor’s 
notions of the right to the city is relevant to my case study because the legal and social 
determinants of urban citizenship in China involve a struggle over legitimate occupation of urban 
space between locals and migrants. Urban citizenship as belonging in China involves 
contestation over the production of space in the city by and for whom. 
B. Bourdieu and Social Capital 
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Bourdieu’s (1984; Bourdieu and Thompson 1991) conception of symbolic and social 
capital is particularly useful in understanding citizenship and class in urban China. Bourdieu 
describes class identities as emerging out of both economic resources and cultural orientations. 
He relates individual behavior to broader structures wherein symbolic and economic capital can 
be exchanged to establish a certain class identity (e.g., money buys a Rolex watch, a symbol that 
makes the wearer seem important and powerful). Bourdieun theories of capital are particularly 
important in the context of China, where authoritarian state structures may play a larger role in 
citizens’ everyday lives than in liberal countries in the West. Bourdieu’s theory on the cultural 
practices and material realities intimately connected to notions of social status illuminates the 
relationship between suzhi and class in urban China (Hanser 2008; L. Zhang 2010).14 In China, 
carrying a certain bag, wearing certain clothes, or speaking a certain dialect, can often establish 
one’s “right to the city” as an urban citizen. Indeed, rural migrants are often associated not only 
with speaking non-standard Mandarin, but also with carrying a large plaid or striped plastic bag.    
Bourdieu’s (1984) work Distinction is based on an ethnography that studied how people 
choose between what is tacky, trendy, or ugly and how behaviors are classified as “refined” or 
“crude” in the course of everyday life. Bourdieu is concerned with “how culture and 
consumption practices contribute to the reproduction of social inequality” (Stevens 1998, 44). 
For Bourdieu, class is intimately connected to the ways in which habits and aesthetic values are 
socially constructed. His theory is based on understanding the economic and cultural importance 
of various types of social, cultural, symbolic, and financial capital, which comes in various forms 
including clothes, cars, educational degrees, language dialects or accents, art, value judgments, 
                                                
14 In this chapter, I also use the term “inner-quality” to refer to the concept of suzhi, a measurement of one’s 
personal quality, morality, civilized behavior, and level of education. The Chinese word suzhi has multiple 
definitions in English as the concept does not fully exist in the English language. The numerous English translations 
of the word include character, essence, qualification, disposition, and constitution. Please see chapter 2 for 
additional discussion of the term. 
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and any other method of classification or practice that denotes status (Bourdieu 1984, 471). 
Bourdieu sees power as culturally and symbolically created through socialized norms that guide 
behavior and thinking. Bourdieu’s notions of power are often compared to Gramsci’s notion of 
“cultural hegemony” because power for them is not about outright domination, but rather willing 
consent to social norms (Burawoy 2012).  
One of the most important concepts for Bourdieu in linking cultural capital and class 
formation is habitus: “Bourdieu’s notion of the ‘habitus’ is meant to explain how cognitive 
schema of perception, appreciation, and action come to be subtly inculcated in individuals and 
groups” (Stevens 1998, 44). The frequent classification of certain behaviors and mannerisms as 
“uncivilized” or “low-suzhi” in urban China today reflects a type of authority over cultural and 
social norms. It is important to note here that Bourdieu’s theory accounts for the flexibility of 
various definitions and measurements of suzhi. For Bourdieu, social and symbolic capital 
depends on the “field” in which one is located. A “field” for Bourdieu is a network of 
relationships, such as a religious (e.g., priest and parishioner) or educational (e.g., adviser and 
student). The authority and power one occupies in any one particular field changes depending on 
the context and environment (Bourdieu 1984, 87). For example, a Republican politician with a 
southern accent and cowboy boots will have more symbolic authority and cultural power in 
Alabama than in Boulder. The field in which one is located influences habitus, and in turn, 
influences how suzhi is defined: a Han migrant from the southwestern Sichuan Province exhibits 
“high suzhi” in Tibet, but “low suzhi” in Shanghai. Hanser (2008) touches on the importance of 
flexibility and variability in the notion of class mobility and habitus in China: 
[t]he social conditions under which an individual’s or group’s habitus developed may not 
be the same as those under which that habitus comes to be exercised. This can result from 
individual class mobility, as when people move upward or downward in status or class 
position…The strategies people use to adapt to social change are shaped by historically 
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constituted dispositions. In China, the urban proletariat is a prime example of a group that 
is experiencing downward mobility and loss of status in a society that increasingly 
disavows its state-socialist past. (156-57) 
 
Rural migrants in Nanjing are thus socially excluded based on material differences and cultural 
practices of habitus that effectively prevent them from joining urban society. As I will show in 
the ethnographic section, by adopting the dress, dialect, and habits of urban residents, migrant 
workers can, if they choose to do so, become “worthy” residents of the city—in effect, by 
adopting the habitus of the elite class in urban China, they can become urban citizens. 
Bourdieu’s examples of fashion, art, and language are not concrete but rather highly variable as 
they change depending on the current fads and the person engaging in active classification, as 
well as the field one occupies (Bourdieu and Thompson 1991). For example, a Rolex watch is 
definitely fashionable, but will have different measures of symbolic capital if one is at a party of 
hipster graduate students in Boulder as opposed to a Chinese business meeting in Nanjing.  
In applying Bourdieu’s conception of social capital and distinction, L. Zhang (2010) 
writes that the spatialization of class in China is made possible by the production of new housing 
developments: “[Class in China] consists of taste, judgment, and the acquisition of cultural 
capital by a social group through housing choices and lifestyle practices” (15, emphasis added). 
She directly relates this notion of class, partially determined by housing choice, to suzhi and 
habitus: 
…[suzhi] refers to the quality of a subject of a population. Like habitus (Bourdieu 1977), 
suzhi is neither idiosyncratic nor completely predetermined by the socioeconomic 
position of a social group; rather, both suzhi and habitus mediate between the conditions 
of existence and subjective experiences. They are articulated through specific spatial 
practices and the embodied practices of individuals while mediating between social 
practices and the conditions of existence. (L. Zhang 2010, 15-16, emphasis added) 
 
L. Zhang (2010) connects physical and social space here with symbolic capital of taste and 
distinction in the formation of class in urban China. I draw on L. Zhang’s connection between 
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suzhi and habitus to understand the role of suzhi in shaping urban citizenship in China. By 
“mediating between the conditions of existence and subjective experiences,” the complex 
characteristics of urban citizenship as a relationship between material inequality and cultural 
context becomes clear (L. Zhang 2010, 15). Bourdieu’s conceptions of social capital connected 
to Chinese conceptions of suzhi can be practically applied to understand the ways in which urban 
citizenship and class is realized in contemporary urban China. These notions of social difference 
inform my understanding of citizenship beyond the political-legal code of hukou in China. 
I emphasize the importance of scale in this question. I do not deny that institutional bias 
based in the hukou system on the national scale provides further structural disadvantage to the 
socioeconomic status of migrant workers. That is not the question of this chapter because the 
answer to that question has already been documented. Rather, I am investigating notions of urban 
citizenship on the neighborhood and individual scale and how belonging and membership in 
urban society is determined (Ding and Schuermans 2012). In the sense of belonging and 
exclusion in a community, I understand migrant workers not to be excluded based purely on their 
rural status or hukou alone, but rather on everyday practices that determine their “right to the 
city.” 
III. Antagonisms and Alliances: Discourses of Fear, Chaos, and Civility 
The following sections illustrate that the major political-economic transformations in 
post-Mao China caused massive social upheaval and rearticulations of social class and 
citizenship in the city. The ethnographic accounts describe migrant workers being socially 
excluded from urban society based on behaviors, mannerisms, and other forms of social capital. 
During everyday conversation, many middle and upper class research participants describe 
certain activities stereotypically associated with rural migrants, such as spitting or speaking non-
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standard Mandarin, as uncouth, crude, uncivilized, or “hickish” (tu). The city’s residents, 
businesses, and government officials do not necessarily outright reject migrant workers; quite the 
contrary in fact, as some in the city welcome and even express appreciation for migrant workers’ 
cheap labor. For example, Tang Yingxin, a 29-year old female high school teacher living in an 
apartment and earning 5,000 RMB ($800 USD) a month, told me during an informal interview:  
We cannot do without migrant workers and the cheap labor they provide. We wouldn’t be 
able to live in the city the way we do without their work, especially since they do very, 
very tiring work, the kind of work that the local people in the city are not willing to do. 
We couldn’t have the lifestyle we want without them. (Interview with author, July 9, 
2013) 
 
The sense of appreciation for migrant workers’ hard labor suggests that there is often a hidden or 
shameful awareness of structural inequality. One of the most common stereotypes of migrant 
workers is that they are hard working and entrepreneurial. Yet, they are socially excluded based 
on cultural and educational differences that essentially prevent them from joining urban society.  
A. Declining Importance of the Hukou: Economic Liberalization Trumps Socialist Legacy? 
According to my observations, rural migrants are quite knowledgeable about the intricate 
and complicated laws regarding urban residency status and the hukou system. From their 
perspective, the hukou is little more than a formality. It is treated as similar to a birth certificate 
that does not seriously impede movement into or around the city or hinder one’s ability to find 
(low-wage) jobs. Although hospital fees are slightly higher than they would be for a local, they 
were still manageable enough that my respondents reported going to the hospital at normal rates 
and they sometimes even had obtained special subsidized health insurance. Most migrant 
children are still able to attend urban elementary schools, though migrant children are often 
placed in special classes with a less advanced curriculum.15 Although some faced obstacles to 
                                                
15 Students may be separated into an A or B class, with A being more advanced and B being less advanced. 
While it is not clearly defined as urban and rural, the A class is mostly composed of local children while the B class 
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middle and high school admissions and high tuition fees, rural hukou holders broke this barrier 
by bribing school officials, excelling on entrance exams (but not for college, see footnote), using 
connections to obtain admission, or by attending urban schools for migrant children.16 If the 
children remained in the countryside with their grandparents, both male and female parents did 
not hesitate to move to the city for work.  
Although some migrants expressed nostalgia for the pollution-free, open spaces, and 
friendly neighborly relations in the countryside, virtually everyone expressed excitement and 
enthusiasm for the convenience and modernity of the city. For example, rural migrants almost 
always communicated full support of city development and construction projects (see chapter 5). 
They often declared that people and places in the city were more civilized and progressive than 
in the countryside. Still, fifteen of the twenty migrant workers interviewed had plans to 
eventually return to their hometowns in the countryside, which perhaps indicates that rural 
migrants do not necessarily desire urban citizenship. Rather, they desired the employment 
opportunities that the city offered, but did not necessarily possess a desire to become a member 
of urban society. Another possible interpretation is that they recognize that urban citizenship—in 
both a political-legal and cultural belonging sense—is impossible and therefore do not foresee 
the feasibility of remaining in the countryside, especially after retirement when collection of 
social security in the city would be impossible.   
The institutional obstacles that migrants faced were not so insurmountable as to prevent 
them from moving to and living in the city. One 22-year old female migrant worker from Henan 
                                                                                                                                                       
is mostly composed of rural migrant children, given one or two exceptions (personal communication with a middle-
school teacher in Shanghai, April 2012).  
 
16 Children of migrant workers who go to high school in the city are still only allowed to sit for the national 
college entrance examination (gaokao) in the location of their hukou, which is an example of the continued 
institutional discrimination of rural hukou holders living in cities.  
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province who had been living in Nanjing for two years and owned a second-hand clothing shop 
in Old Nanjing approached the hukou with the following attitude, “The hukou is a hassle 
[mafan], but little more than a piece of paper. It’s not a big deal. There’s nothing we can do 
about it, but it doesn’t affect our daily life.” Her words reflect a majority of respondents who 
expressed nonchalance regarding the hukou. Most people just shrugged when asked about the 
role of the hukou in their lives and said, “There’s nothing to be done about it [mei banfa], we just 
have to do what we can to survive, and right now living and working in the city is the only way 
to do that.” Indeed, migrant workers have high incentives to move to the city since jobs are 
scarce in the countryside, and even low paying jobs in the city allow urban workers to send home 
remittances. While having a rural hukou may or may not still be a burden, most migrants 
reported that the benefits of moving to the city far outweighed the costs.  
Their apathetic attitude toward the hukou suggests that, despite the formal institutional 
barriers to access welfare in the city and an administrative annoyance, for the most part rural 
migrants are not strictly barred from accessing space or jobs in the city simply because of their 
rural hukou. All but one of the migrant respondents had been living in Nanjing for at least two 
years. These efforts to make the city their (temporary) home illustrate subtle resistance to the 
state discourse that defines their rural residency through the political-legal structures of hukou. 
The migrants seem to disregard the state discourse of hukou status that tries to stop them from 
remaining to the city. They engage in counter-hegemony by making the city their own through 
certain spatial practices, such as squatting in abandoned homes (frequently witnessed in Old 
Nanjing) or engaging in entrepreneurial business practices, such as selling street food or peddling 
trinkets (see figure 19), or collecting waste materials for recycling. Sometimes those practices 
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might be illegal, such as selling street food without a hygiene license. Through these cultural and 
economic practices, they make the city their home despite the hukou restrictions. 
 
Figure 19: A rural migrant street vendor appropriates urban space for herself as she sells kid's 
toys and school supplies outside of a middle-school located in Old Nanjing. Source: photo by 
author, May 2013. 
B. Conflicting Attitudes between Locals and Migrants: Evidence of Social Stratification 
 Migrants are often socially discriminated against through the locals’ everyday practices of 
explicit prejudice, social exclusion, and stereotyping. Everyday practices and behavior are thus 
the most important aspect of determining an individual’s urban citizenship and social status in 
China. These practices range from modes of livelihood, such as selling vegetables, trinkets, or 
scraps in the street, to mannerisms such as spitting or talking loudly. How much do the locals 
and migrants comply and recognize these classifications of social capital? I frequently observed 
both locals and migrants, rich and poor, practicing behaviors designated as “uncivilized.” While 
some accept and perpetuate these notions of cultural capital by complying to social norms, others 
resist and openly ignore these status symbols, social norms, and class categories (e.g., spitting is 
a frequent sight despite its classification as “uncivilized” by some). 
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My interviews illustrate conflicting aspects of antagonisms and alliances between local 
urbanites and rural migrants. While seven of the middle-income respondents expressed 
appreciation or sympathy toward migrant workers, ten were openly prejudiced or explicitly 
discriminatory towards migrant workers (the others were more ambivalent). Sixteen out of 
twenty middle-class respondents reported that they had never been friends with a migrant worker 
(“laiwaigong”), although ten of them said they would be willing to be friends with a migrant 
worker, but just never had the opportunity. On the other hand, eighteen of twenty-one local 
Nanjingese respondents reported that they had never been friends with a migrant worker, and 
only four said they would be willing to be friends with a migrant worker if they had the 
opportunity. Thirteen of twenty migrant workers surveyed said they had never been friends with 
a local Nanjingese, though sixteen of twenty said they would be willing to be friends with a local 
Nanjingese. The most common reasoning on both sides for not engaging in friendship was, “I’ve 
never had the opportunity, but even if I did, we wouldn’t have anything in common.” The 
answers to these questions about friendship suggest that due to socioeconomic and spatial 
divisions between migrants and locals, the two groups rarely have the opportunity to come in 
contact with one another and form friendships. While locals are most often employed in some 
capacity in manufacturing, service, or managerial work, and often members of an official work-
unit, the migrant workers I interviewed usually work in the informal sector, including selling 
vegetables, scrap picking and recycling, and informal street vending. Others interviewed 
included those that work in the formal service sector, such as in spas or hair salons, massage 
parlors, or karaoke bars (where they live on-site).  
Meanwhile, eight of the low-income migrant workers defiantly asserted that they were 
often discriminated against in a xenophobic manner (paiwai), while six other migrant workers 
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said, “I don’t know what you’re talking about! I’ve never been discriminated against and I have 
lots of local friends” (the others were more ambivalent). It was clear that the experiences differed 
greatly from person to person depending on factors such as level of income, education, age, and 
length of time in the city. Four of the respondents living in Nanjing for over ten years admitted to 
being discriminated against when they first arrived, but reported that they are no longer 
ostracized. However, the eight respondents who were discriminated against experienced extreme 
social divisions between themselves and the local urbanites. For example, Li Jianhua, a 31-year 
old male migrant worker from Taizhou City of Zhejiang Province (one of the wealthiest 
provinces in China) was a manager of the public shower who earned 3,000 RMB ($480 USD) a 
month and had been living in Nanjing for three years told me, “Yes, I’ve definitely felt excluded 
in a xenophobic manner (paiwai). The Nanjingese think they are so amazing (liaobuqi) and they 
look down on everyone else” (Interview with author, June 2013).17 Despite some recent changes 
in attitudes towards social acceptance, especially among the younger generation, the social 
division between locals and migrants is still very palpable. 
 Despite obvious socioeconomic and cultural divisions between local Nanjingese and rural 
migrant workers, some respondents described high levels of friendship or interaction between the 
two groups. Three of the migrants had local Nanjingese spouses (they reported high levels of 
friendships and interactions with locals). Some respondents said that because Nanjing was not as 
advanced or developed as larger cities such as Beijing or Shanghai, people from Nanjing were 
more accepting and tolerant. For the most part, respondents from all three social groups surveyed 
over thirty years-old tended to express more discrimination towards migrant workers, while 
those aged younger than thirty years-old were less likely to exhibit explicit prejudice. The four 
                                                
17 Li Jianhua is also quoted in chapter 5 as talking about how backward Nanjing’s development stage is 
compared to the rapidly developing economy of Taizhou. He had a very negative attitude toward Nanjing in general.  
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respondents (two local and two migrants) younger than twenty years old insisted that social 
divisions between local urbanites and rural migrants do not exist. For example, Qiu Lijuan, an 
18-year old female migrant from Sihong, who was born and grew up in Nanjing and interning 
(unpaid) at a beauty salon, said, “Yes, of course I am a friend with the locals. Amongst my 
friends at school, everyone is the same, I don’t notice any differences between outsiders and 
Nanjingese” (Interview with author, July 2013).18 My roommate in Old Nanjing, 20-year old Xie 
Rui and a friend of Qiu Lijuan’s, agreed and scolded me during our interview for accidentally 
using a more derogatory term for migrant workers (nongmingong, or “peasant”) instead of the 
more politically correct term, (wailaigong, “worker coming from the outside”). The seven 
college-age interview respondents at Nanjing University referenced their friendships with other 
students from all over the country at school as an indication that divisions between locals and 
outsiders was not a problem.  
 Some middle-income respondents expressed sympathy and appreciation for migrant 
workers and awareness that their urban economy relies on their low-cost labor. In this sense, 
migrants are welcomed into the city and even encouraged to move there. Other urbanites 
volunteered with charities that helped migrant workers in the city. Yu Ling, a 23-year old female 
getting her Master’s degree in international relations at Nanjing University, told me: 
I regard it [volunteering at a migrant school] as a way to help people. Because I think my 
life is much better than theirs considering their economic situation, because I have a 
hukou in the city and my parents work near my home. I don’t have to experience their 
situation so I think it’s important for people like me to do something for them to help 
them. (Interview with author, May 2013)  
 
                                                
18 Even though Qiu Lijuan was born in Nanjing, she still considered herself to be from Sihong in Northern 
Jiangsu and did not consider herself to be Nanjingese. She and her family had been living in Old Nanjing for five 
years. In May 2012 I accompanied her on a trip to her hometown, where her maternal grandmother and mother’s 
relatives still lived in a rural area of northern Jiangsu Province. Her dad was Nanjingese, but she did not associate 
herself with him. Qiu Lijuan’s family was one of the poorest families I interviewed in Nanjing with a household 
income of 1,500 RMB ($240 USD) a month earned from selling street food and used to support Qiu Lijuan’s high 
school tuition fees and her relatives in the countryside.      
  
96 
Her attitude reveals that the social stratification between urban and rural residents is tangible and 
obvious. Charities and volunteer organizations are established to provide social welfare in the 
absence of state services to migrants as a disadvantaged group. Furthermore, the attitude of the 
need to help migrant workers reflects the awareness of the material inequalities between the two 
groups. Charitable outreach denotes the socioeconomic gap between the wealthy urban elite and 
the disadvantaged migrant workers.  
The development and charity trope suggests an implicit sense of social distance between 
rural and urban dwellers. A common stereotype of the migrant worker is that they are extremely 
hard-working and live terrible and difficult lives. Meanwhile, the locals are often stereotyped as 
lazy in comparison. Zhu Chongyang, a 40-year old female accountant living in Old Nanjing who 
had been living in Nanjing for 22 years and was married to a local Nanjingese, told me, 
“Migrants work really hard to have their own businesses and they can eat relatively more 
bitterness (bijiao neng chiku) than the locals. The local people as I’m sure you have discovered 
for yourself are a bit lazy” (Zhu Chongyang, interview with author, June 2013). The common 
stereotype of local Nanjingese laziness represents the division between locals and migrants, as 
well as reinforces the justification and evidence for social divisions. 
Despite some respondents declaring that they saw no difference between migrants and 
locals, other respondents said they “could never be friends with a migrant worker” for various 
reasons, illustrating that there is significant social stratification and some explicit discrimination 
and prejudice against migrant workers amongst some urban residents. Li Xinyi, a 27-year old 
female elementary school teacher living in a gated community told me:  
Mostly the vegetable sellers ask me questions about my job and my salary. I never ask 
them any questions. Why not? Because there’s nothing for me to ask! What would I ask 
them, “How do you grow your vegetable?” I’m not interested in their life.  No, I would 
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not be a friend with a migrant because we have nothing in common. I have no connection 
[guanxi] with them. (Interview with author, May 2013) 
 
Her words signify the awareness of exclusion and stratification between classes. Even though 
they are both Chinese, the vegetable seller and Li Xinyi have nothing in common. Xinyi has 
more in common with her foreign friends at the international school where she works than with 
the people selling vegetables at the market.  
Other respondents refused to consider the possibility of being friends with a migrant 
worker. Cao Li, a 45-year old male noodle shop owner in Old Nanjing, considered himself to be 
on a level above the migrant workers of the area as a native to the city of Nanjing: “Migrant 
workers from the countryside have a different way of thinking and it’s not okay. I can’t accept it. 
They are not very educated, nor are they cultured. They are backward and uncivilized,” he 
explained as he rested he hands on his potbelly and chain-smoked:  
Meibanfa, there’s nothing to be done. You simply can’t be friends with someone who is 
on a different level economically with you. It’s not balanced. It’s like the old Chinese 
proverb: “Things of one kind come together, and people of one group crowd together” 
(wu yi leiju, ren yi qunfen). (Interview with author, January 2012) 
 
His response reflects an acceptance, or Gramscian “consent,” of the legacy of the socialist state 
discourse emanating from the hukou restrictions on rural to urban migration. These responses 
illustrate that although some notions of prejudice and discrimination against migrant workers are 
becoming less noticeable to some, clear delineations between migrants and locals still exist. As 
the next section illustrates, urban citizenship as belonging is based on mannerisms and behaviors 
of migrant workers rooted in socioeconomic divisions and material inequalities that are reduced 
to cultural differences or uncivilized and even morally degenerate behavior. 
C. Discourses of Inner-Quality: Producing the Civilized City   
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Discourses of moral and civilized behavior rather than official hukou or class status play 
a major role in determining belonging in urban Chinese culture. Social exclusion is established 
through standards of civilized behavior and judgments of inner-quality (suzhi).  Discussions of 
suzhi are ubiquitous in everyday conversation as it is used to describe any manner of 
characteristics related to someone’s education, mannerisms, or skills. Furthermore, it is pervasive 
on public service announcements, especially public transportation. For example, many signs in 
buses proclaim, “Create a civilized city; Ride a civilized bus; Be a civilized person” (see figures 
20 and 21). Suzhi is thus a part of the officially-sanctioned state discourse as a part of the state’s 
larger project to create “global citizens” prepared to enter the corporate workforce (Greenhalgh 
2010).  
 
Figure 20: Bus Stop Propaganda: This bus stop says, “Speak in a civilized manner. Break away 
with the old customs and establish the new; Let's build a new, civilized city together, hand-in-
hand. The civilized are lovely people; If you participate too, it will be even more wonderful.” 
Figure 21: This bus stop sign says, “Greenify and beautify the 
ancient city; Dress up a new and beautiful Nanjing; Adhere to 
society’s public morality; Safeguard the city’s environment; Love 
Nanjing; Build Nanjing; Beautify Nanjing; Share the same piece 
of blue sky; Construct a new homeland together; Build an elegant 
environment; Live a longer life; We can voluntarily replace the 
current situation with extreme cleanliness; Create a civilized city; 
Ride a civilized bus; Be a civilized person.” 
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 The state discourse of “act civilize” reinforces notions of exclusion and prejudice against 
migrant workers and others who are deemed uncivilized by official rhetoric and popular 
stereotypes. The bus stop signs as state propaganda reveal the government’s investment in 
perpetuating and reinforcing discourses that encourage the self-responsible citizen. While urban 
residents create their own definitions of urban citizenship through judgments of moral or 
normative behavior, and thus produce their own definitions of urban citizenship that ignore the 
official state discourse of hukou. At the same time, the state also reinforces and employs 
discourses of suzhi to perpetuate its agenda to develop Nanjing along a pre-determined trajectory 
of “civilization.” In other words, the state-perpetuated suzhi discourse rearticulates citizenship 
through a “top-down” structural method that is designed to revitalize the grassroots and build a 
“civilized” city from the “ground-up.” The discourse of suzhi and the resulting behaviors 
classified as high suzhi are thus both a result of and a pushback against official state discourse.   
Many participants expressed annoyance or exasperation at the “low suzhi” or lack of 
quality of the Chinese people, expressing shame and embarrassment that many Chinese people 
did not practice “proper” manners. For example, in response to the question, “what could still be 
improved about your living environment in Old Nanjing,” one migrant worker responded, “The 
thing that needs to be improved about Old Nanjing is the people’s suzhi. The neighbors are too 
guoban, too “out” [unfashionable]. And they gossip too much. People’s suzhi is getting lower, 
people throwing trash around and talking dirty or cursing [zanghua]” (Li Qingzi, 18-year-old 
female migrant worker, interview with author, May 2012). Unlike some others, her complaint 
about the neighbors’ suzhi is not necessarily associated with migrants or locals. Rather, her 
concern represents the broader concern of many other Chinese people about their social and 
cultural capital and worth as global and urban citizens. I also emphasize that not all of the 
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“civilized” behaviors were practiced by everyone. It was common to see locals and migrants 
engaging in practices that ignored the normative social codes and continued to practice the 
“uncivilized” behavior. Suzhi is a relatively flexible signifier and one can change or improve 
one’s suzhi. After several years in the city, rural migrants are thus sometimes able to obtain full 
urban citizenship by adopting the “civilized” mannerisms of the local urbanites.19 Like 
Bourdieu’s concept of the “field,” one’s classification authority of measuring suzhi and cultural 
power depend on the network of relationships in which one is located in any particular time or 
space.  
 Like habitus, the language of suzhi depoliticizes class differences. Social status is not about 
income or occupation or even hukou status, but rather about clothes, speech, and leisure activities 
as well as subtle behaviors and mannerisms, such as spitting. The discourse of suzhi attempts to 
separate cultural difference from poverty, thus both excusing extreme inequality through 
language of classified differences. The classification of behavior as low or high suzhi 
simultaneously obscures structural inequality and obviates material difference by shifting from 
the material to the cultural or symbolic forms of capital.  
D. Discourses of Fear, Ignorance, and Chaos of the Migrant Worker 
 Migrants are often associated with uncivilized behavior and low suzhi, as well as crime, 
disorder, or chaos (luan). This section is thus about the suspicion, ignorance, and exclusion of 
the migrant worker surrounding discourses of safety (see also chapter 6 on security mechanisms 
in gated communities). The fear of migrants is partially founded on the belief that migrant 
workers are criminals based on the idea that the crime rate in the city increased with their arrival 
in the city 30 years ago. Zhu Chongyang said, “The migrant workers’ personal quality is no good 
                                                
19 Although most are restricted to changing their hukou due to economic hardship, rural migrants can even 
change their official hukou status to urban by buying property in a city and obtaining an invitation from a local 
work-unit. 
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(suzhi buxing), they are disorderly (luan), and they make me feel unsafe. Since they started 
moving in about 20 years ago, we started to get stuff stolen. If the neighborhood was more stable 
and not constantly changing in population, then we wouldn’t have these safety issues” (Zhu 
Chongyang, interview with author, June 2013). In response to the interview question, “what 
impact has increased rural migrant populations had in your neighborhood?” nine of the other 
local, long-term residents mentioned “increased crime” at least once. For example, Hou Bo, a 68-
year old male SOE retiree and Old Nanjing resident told me, “Migrants’ suzhi is not okay, take 
for example those tattered (polan) migrants. They have influenced our security here in Old 
Nanjing. Their suzhi is low and they don’t practice good hygiene. When they walk around asking 
if we have a room for rent and we always say no” (Interview with author, June 2013). His words 
were a common opinion expressed by many urban residents. Seventeen of the middle-class 
respondents also mentioned at least once that rural migrants were associated with crime. Whether 
or not these rumors of criminal activity are true (although very few of my respondents had 
personally experienced a crime—usually pickpockets or bike theft—many related a story of a 
friend that had experienced a more serious crime, such as a break-in or assault), the fact that rural 
migrants are perceived to be associated with increased crime in the neighborhood indicates that 
they are unwelcome in the city.  
 Drawing on Staeheli’s (2003) argument that “citizenship…is more of a process than a 
status,” changes in the city resulting from the type of unprecedented migration and rapid 
demographic shift ruptured previous social relations. The dramatic process of economic and 
social change resulted in a rearticulation of citizenship by city residents in order to respond to 
immense changes in the social landscapes. New neighbors started moving in who did not speak 
the same dialect and did not have the same customs and habits. Meanwhile, post-industrial 
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changes meant that inequality was growing and state-owned enterprise employees were being 
forced to retire early. Amongst these changes, the rural migrant became an easy target for 
scapegoating and crime was blamed on these new populations. Thus citizenship became 
associated with a process of considerable social changes, rather than static legal hukou status. As 
the processes of defining and articulating citizenship in the city have been challenged, “the 
struggles and practices of citizenship are powerfully shaped…by spatial relationships” (Staeheli 
2003, 99). The urban-rural divide is growing and becoming defined on certain “uncivilized” 
behaviors associated with certain groups coming from western and inland China. Following 
Bourdieu, the differences between rural migrants and urban locals are directly related to class 
distinctions based not on a static occupational status, but instead on dynamic trends and fads 
associated with the wealthy elitist class in the “modern” city.         
One of the key themes surrounding fear and ignorance of the migrant worker is around 
the Chinese word luan, which means chaos or disorder, and also connotes morally degenerate 
behavior, especially illicit sexual activity. It is not the actual spaces or activities that are deemed 
immoral or luan, but it is who is participating in the activity that matters. Some activities, such as 
going to massage parlors, drinking alcohol, or singing at karaoke bars, were only deemed 
uncivilized when associated with migrant workers. I draw inspiration from Rolandsen’s (2011) 
study of leisure activities in China: “Moral judgments are made on the basis of social 
status…Karaoke is only unhealthy when practiced by people of a low social standing” (133). 
Like Bourdieu’s conception of habitus, everyday practices are considered luan depending on the 
person participating in the activity. Classification of these behaviors as luan is key to 
understanding the constitution of social class through symbolic and social capital. For example, 
one respondent said that it made her uncomfortable when she saw migrant workers drinking 
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alcohol in the cafeteria of her university. Although drinking alcohol and smoking tobacco during 
lunch is an entirely acceptable activity in Chinese culture, especially among government officials 
and rich businessmen, but in the context of migrant worker activity, it is deemed inappropriate. 
Guo Ling, a 27-year old female getting her PhD in sociology at Nanjing University told me, 
“when we are in the [university] cafeteria, and we see that there are some migrant workers eating 
there, we will try to distance ourselves from them. I feel like migrant workers are relatively crude 
(culu) and loud. Sometimes they even drink alcohol in the cafeteria” (Interview with author, June 
2013). The common social exclusion of migrant workers is often based on discourses of fear or 
disorder.  
The fear of migrant workers is related to the contested notion of urban citizenship as the 
right to the city as an oeuvre. The rejection of migrant workers from the city based on their low 
suzhi, uncivilized behavior, and luan activities signify the renunciation of the city as a 
Lefebvrian centrality of difference and interaction. The people and places perceived as disorderly 
are scorned, while the normative behaviors based on the organized and planned aspects of the 
city are considered high-class and cosmopolitan. For example, Li Qingzi, a 27-year old female 
secretary said,  
Every place with a lot of migrants is chaotic (luan) and dangerous, like the train stations. 
I honestly hope that other cities develop quickly so that the migrants will go there and 
won’t come to Nanjing anymore. When I say “migrants” (wailairen), I’m talking about 
the unemployed floating population specifically, not the educated people with jobs that 
come from other provinces. (Interview with author, July 2013)  
 
Her attitude demonstrates that migrant workers are being rejected based on their so-called luan 
or disorderly activities. This quote includes a theme that is common among the interview 
respondents, the need to distinguish between rural migrant workers and white-collar workers 
from other cities. Social stratification is growing because it is important in a conversation to 
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distinguish what “kind” of migrant one is talking about—white collar (“bailing”) or manual 
laborer (“gongren”). Almost all my respondents would ask me to clarify, or would clarify for 
themselves, what kind of migrant we were talking about, one that was educated and looking for 
office work, or one that was a peasant doing laborious work (nongmingong).20  
 Those migrant workers who had successfully adapted the customs and habits of local 
urbanites were often accepted into urban society and described as, “Not that kind of rural 
migrant, I’m talking about the backward kind of rural migrant that just arrived in the city.” The 
notion of “high-class” and “low-class” migrants was reflected in the different language used to 
describe these two types of migrants. “Waidiren,” or outsider, is a college educated and/or white-
collar worker living in Nanjing, but not originally Nanjingese, who may have a rural hukou, or 
an urban hukou from another city. “Wailaigong,” “liudongrenkou” (floating population), or 
nongmingong, signify a rural migrant worker with a manual labor or service-oriented job. The 
clear distinction between types of migrant worker is closely associated not only with the type of 
occupation and level of education one obtains, but also the ways that one dresses and behaves. In 
other words, inclusion/exclusion is more about cultural and symbolic capital than place of origin 
or conventional “class status,” because exclusion also involves various signifiers that establish 
one’s worthy presence in the city (Hanser 2008).  
Many local urbanite respondents, both middle and low income, expressed how 
uncomfortable and unsafe it made them feel that migrants would passed in and out of their 
neighborhoods temporarily, usually only staying for a few months at a time. Yang Juan, a 39-
year old female manager of a state-owned company said,    
The migrants’ personal quality is not okay (suzhi buxing) and their situation is very 
complicated (fuza), you can’t tell who is who, or who is from what province, or who does 
                                                
20 The term “white-collar” has been translated into Chinese as “bailing” and is used in Chinese to describe corporate 
office jobs.  
  
105 
what job! So our apartment building, which has both locals and migrants alike, is very 
chaotic, messy, and dirty (luan, za, zang). It would be better if we [my family] could live 
in a high-class (gaodang) apartment complex. That really would be worth the money” 
(Interview with author, July 2013).  
 
Her perception of the migrant workers’ situation as complicated and mixed-up (fuza) indicates 
that the contested urban citizenship of China manifests itself as a struggle over differentiated 
spaces (i.e. housing occupied by people from numerous and vastly different backgrounds). Her 
discomfort is a reaction to the fact that most migrants I talked to temporarily occupy urban space 
to support their livelihoods, but eventually plan to return back home.  
People who wish to preserve the status quo as orderly and civilized reject the presence of 
transient migrants in the city. Along with city residents, city planners and officials in effect reject 
migrant workers from the city by attempting to produce orderly spaces and promoting 
unaffordable housing. Following Lefebvre, city planners and government officials as the 
producers of isolated and homogenous “abstract space,” or space produced for the purpose of 
extracting exchange value, high land rent values and massive city construction projects of malls 
and skyscrapers necessarily exclude migrants from the city by creating unaffordable housing and 
spaces of consumption. Therefore, spaces and people of difference are rejected even when their 
low-cost labor is welcomed, such as the cheap labor required for construction projects that will 
later prevent migrants from living in the city by increasing land value. In short, the discourses 
surrounding fear and ignorance of the migrant worker as luan reveal a struggle over social 
exclusion, a type of social exclusion that has its root in the struggle over the right to the city as 
an oeuvre, the struggle over differentiated places, and the struggle over the right to the city as the 
centrality of difference.  
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IV. Conclusion 
In investigating urban citizenship in China, discrimination against rural migrants in the city must 
be understood beyond the institutional framework of the hukou system to include a definition of 
urban citizenship as the relational process that establishes belonging or exclusion in a 
community. The ethnographic evidence illustrates that while the hukou is not as important as it 
once was, the gulf between the rural and urban continues to widen through material inequality 
and daily practices that categorize certain people and activities as low quality and uncivilized. 
An importance distinction to be made is that of scale. The hukou on the national scale remains a 
distinct marker of institutional discrimination, but the neighborhood or individual scale as 
illustrated in my study gives a distinct illustration of daily life as a migrant worker in the city, 
where the hukou is one of many other larger barriers to urban citizenship.   
These changes are contextualized in a broader political-economic shift and discourses 
that revere capitalism and urban modernity while rejecting the rural. As various citizens accept 
and reject these sanctioned notions of social and cultural capital, the hegemonic project of the 
state and the ruling classes (e.g., cadres and wealthy elites) is both realized and resisted. By 
reducing exclusion to social taste or aesthetic difference, exclusion is depoliticized as a function 
of cultural difference. In other words, symbolic capital is separated from economic capital, even 
though they are actually inherently linked and mutually constituted. Rather than examining the 
material inequalities resulting from structural violence, research respondents reduced social 
differences to variations in taste, lifestyle, or culture. 
Practices of incivility and low suzhi are significant markers of exclusion and unwanted 
occupation of urban space. Rural migrants are socially excluded from urban society and rejected 
from securing social citizenship based on low levels of social, symbolic, cultural, and financial 
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capital. Western notions of citizenship are thus challenged in the Chinese context because the 
notion of belonging in the Chinese city is more about personal quality and civilized behavior 
than about official legal status. Urban citizenship in China primarily concerns discourses of 
inner-quality (suzhi) and civility that discourage and reject the presence of migrants in the city 
and restrict their “right” to the city. As Secor’s (2003) study in Turkey argued: “[t]he concept of 
urban citizenship pivots upon the creation of demarcating lines of inclusion and exclusion in the 
city, of membership within the imagined urban community, and of claims to urban space and the 
right to the city” (164). Citizenship in China rests on various practices of inclusions and rejection 
of the migrant worker as the dialectical other of modernity. Where both locals and migrants 
occupy and appropriate urban space, they actively define urban citizenship through their 
production of the space of the city. Rural migrants are not divorced from the city because their 
labor is essential to creating the modern city, but their cultural and social differences are rejected.  
Inspired by Secor’s (2004) study of various modes of resistance and appropriation of the 
term “citizen” in the context of rural to urban migration in Turkey, I showed the way that 
Chinese citizens are re-appropriating the definitions of citizenship established by the state (i.e. 
hukou) by constructing their own definitions of urban citizenship that are based on behavior 
classified as acceptable or unacceptable in the city. I showed evidence of the classification of 
certain types of behaviors that are often associated with rural migrants as “uncivilized” and “low 
suzhi, which creates certain class differences and social boundaries that classify certain people as 
worthy or unworthy residents of the city.  
In this chapter, I used evidence of symbolic capital in the constitution of class identity to 
challenge the primacy of hukou in defining citizenship. My research contributes to Secor (2003) 
and Staeheli’s (2003) definitions of urban citizenship as a process of discursive and material 
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relations by illustrating how citizenship is contested in China based on behavior, as well as 
poverty and inequality. The process of demographic and social change with the increasing 
presence of rural migrants resulted in profound and complex social divisions between locals and 
rural migrants in Old Nanjing.  
Following Bourdieu and L. Zhang, I argue that describing belonging and social status in 
terms of symbolic and cultural capital is a more relevant way to describe membership in urban 
China than hukou status. In looking at this case, Gramsci might argue that urban Chinese 
residents, both locals and migrants alike, are practicing both “common sense” (i.e. cultural 
hegemony of consent) and “good sense” (i.e. counter-hegemony of resistance) by re-defining 
citizenship not based on the dominant state discourse of hukou, but instead on individual re-
articulations of appropriate and inappropriate behavior practiced in the city. Meanwhile, state 
discourses of suzhi encourage and classify certain behaviors as acceptable in the city. Bourdieu’s 
conceptions of social capital connected to Chinese conceptions of suzhi can be practically 
applied to understand the ways in which class is realized in contemporary urban China. In other 
words, these behaviors reflect broader economic and material determinants of class, but the 
classification of those behaviors are a result of individual reappropriation of state discourse that 
determines membership in urban society.  
For Lefebvre, this case illustrates the ways that the state, capital, and individual bodies 
are producing and creating various spaces, which necessarily include/exclude certain 
populations. For example, city residents are excluded by the interests of capital gains through the 
production of space that increases high land rent prices. At the same time, migrant workers 
reappropriate and occupy urban space in various ways to support their livelihoods despite the 
rejection. This chapter presented evidence to point out practices by migrants that create space in 
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the city by and for themselves through business practices, such as selling street food or waste 
picking. This represents an effort by migrants to resist the state discourse of the legal status of 
hukou and emphasizes the role of individual agency in pushing back against hegemonic state 
structures. Borrowing Lefebvre’s (1996) theory, they actively practice their “right to the city” by 
occupying urban space in order to support their own and family’s livelihood. Profound material 
inequalities prevent some migrants from fully accessing their “right to the city.” As Jacobs 
(1961) once famously wrote, “Cities have the capability of providing something for everybody, 
only because, and only when, they are created by everybody” (238).  
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CHAPTER 5 
DILAPIDATED LANDSCAPES: CONTESTING URBAN MODERNITY IN  
OLD NANJING 
 
I. Introduction 
In this chapter, I build on previous ethnographic studies of urban China that examine the 
ways in which new housing development parallels the emergence of new class constructions 
(Pow 2009; L. Zhang 2010; H. Ren 2013). The China studies literature focuses on the role of 
housing production and consumption in the creation of a small but growing middle-class. 
Whereas this existing body of work provides the necessary context for conceptions of class 
formation and social exclusion in gated communities, I instead interrogate similar processes of 
social formation through representations of the cultural landscape in a different circumstance. I 
focus on an unusual part of the city—a “slum” under threat of impending demolition.  
The aim of this chapter is to examine the ways that the pursuit of “urban modernity” by 
directing dramatic changes in the built environment has transformed social life in urban China. 
Drawing on Robinson (2006), I provide a conventional definition of urban modernity as “the 
cultural experience of contemporary city life and the associated cultural valorization and 
celebration of innovation and novelty” (4). Urban modernity defined in this way is often realized 
through the built environment, such as skyscrapers or gridded street designs established on the 
authority of technical urban planning (Kloet and Scheen 2013). My goal in this chapter is to 
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challenge the common practice, especially by the Chinese state, that conflates this definition of 
modernity with prosperity and progress. 
To better understand urban modernity in the Chinese context, I am inspired by the 
research of Hsing (2010), who writing about urban China, argues: “urban construction has 
therefore expanded from an accumulation project to a territorial project of local state building. 
Urban modernity, more than industrial modernity, now captures the political imagination of local 
state leaders” (6). Building on her research on the role of local governments in housing 
construction, I analyze various perceptions and experiences of Old Nanjing. I challenge a 
singular definition of urban modernity, defined as a unique urban culture and society based on 
the innovations of science and technology, by presenting Old Nanjing as an alternative model of 
progress. 
Through informal conversations, I found that many people living both inside and outside 
of the neighborhood consider Old Nanjing and its residents to be uncivilized. Intrigued by the 
dominance of this perfunctory attitude across various social groups, I examined a breadth of 
representations (i.e. “ways of seeing,” such as museums and maps) and practices (i.e. “ways of 
being and doing,” such as games and shopping) in Old Nanjing. In my analysis, I discovered that 
internal and external attitudes about the community are actually profoundly diverse. The 
attitudes reflect differentiated, and sometimes contradictory, opinions about chaos and disorder, 
which challenge certain definitions of modernity and power relations that promote visions of 
order. As Jacobs (1961) writes, “There is a quality even meaner than outright ugliness or 
disorder, and this meaner quality is the dishonest mask of pretended order, achieved by ignoring 
or suppressing the real order that is struggling to exist and to be served” (15). As will be 
  
112 
elaborated in the ethnographic section, the tension between order and disorder that defines 
modernity is exemplified in the representations and practices of Old Nanjing.  
The neighborhood embodies distinct meanings and “ways of seeing” for its various 
actors. My study of such “representations” encompasses urban planning museum exhibits and 
common stereotypes of Old Nanjing. For example, some middle-class respondents stereotype the 
neighborhood as a dangerous and chaotic mess of poverty and crime that should be eliminated. 
For other residents and officials, however, Old Nanjing is a site of cultural and historical 
heritage. For neighborhood inhabitants, Old Nanjing is a thriving business district, life-long 
home, and tight-knit community. As a result, no single vision of an ideal picture of progress is 
presented; rather this site embodies highly contested ideas of city improvement. Drawing on 
Robinson (2006), my goal is to “dislocate accounts of urban modernity from the West and to 
encourage understandings of all cities as potential sites of creativity and innovation” (13). I also 
scrutinize the landscape of diverse, and sometimes contradictory, practices, such as the 
government’s decisions to demolish homes and put up propaganda messages. Other common 
practices observed in the street include operating businesses, playing games, and exchanging 
support. 
The local government strives to eliminate old cities and promote urban construction 
projects in order to achieve the orderliness and cleanliness that defines urban modernity and to 
promote state and capital interests (X. Ren 2011; Brown 2013; Dibazar et al. 2013; X. Ren 
2014). Because urban land-use projects and property values are measured in terms of the ability 
of local governments to achieve such ideals, “the local state builds its territorial authority, and 
finds its political identity in urban modernity” (Hsing 2010, 9). Urban modernity is thus crucial 
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to understanding the built, social, and political environment of urban China and is a main 
motivating factor behind the demolition of old cities.    
This case study reflects a process that is happening across China: the demolition of old 
cities and the extinction of traditional street life (F. Wu and He 2005; He and F. Wu 2007; F. Wu 
2009; F. Wu 2012). The process of demolition results in a total displacement and disruption of 
communities and livelihoods, which is a socially destabilizing, violent, and traumatic process. 
This is thus first and foremost a social justice issue. The representations of Old Nanjing have 
significant implications for the future physical and social existence of the community. When old 
cities are conceived and perceived as dilapidated, dangerous, and backward slums, old cities 
serve as a binary opposite to urban modernity, which threatens their own existence. As city 
officials and residents categorize Old Nanjing as a dangerous and run-down neighborhood that 
impedes further economic development, they pursue their agenda of urban renewal and threaten 
the existence of that community. By better understanding the communities that are under threat 
of demolition, we can better understand the total process of urban redevelopment projects and 
agendas (Harb and Deeb 2013). In addition, my study is also significant because researching 
social divisions is imperative to forming cohesive, safe, and vibrant communities. Furthermore, 
studying the practices of Old Nanjing residents informs our understanding of the way changes in 
the built environment influence and are influenced by social life. 
In this case study, I illustrate that competing experiences and visions exist in the material 
and social landscapes of Old Nanjing. I ask the question: how are the homes and people of Old 
Nanjing regarded by the city government and residents through representations and practices? To 
answer this question, I examine a variety of evidence from both the built and social environment, 
including interviews, observations, museum exhibits, and government announcements. This 
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evidence reveals multiple visions of what ideal progress and economic development looks like. 
For example, while the material poverty of the neighborhood gives an initial impression of 
discomfort, and according to some respondents “backwardness,” many others describe their 
environs as cozy and convenient. Whereas some describe themselves and their neighbors as 
displaying low suzhi, others report that their neighbors are akin to family.21 The disputed views 
of Old Nanjing depict the possibilities of multiple visions of a functional and prosperous city. 
My theoretical starting point for this process includes a cultural materialist understanding of 
landscape and Lefebvre’s notions of the mutually constitutive relationship between spatial 
production, everyday practice, and social formation.  
After establishing a theoretical framework, the first ethnographic section details the 
government’s view of Old Nanjing through representation (e.g., in the city planning museum) 
and practice (e.g., eviction notices). The second ethnographic section reviews the ways the 
neighborhood is described by middle-class interview respondents living outside of Old Nanjing 
as a dangerous and uncivilized place. The third ethnographic section outlines the personal 
narratives of the neighborhood residents, both locals and migrants who discuss civilized and 
uncivilized landscapes. The fourth ethnographic section describes observations of everyday 
practices in Old Nanjing (e.g., mahjong, chess, card playing, prostitution, entrepreneurialism) 
that reinforce contested images of the neighborhood. The material, cultural, and social landscape 
illustrates the representations and practices constitutive of class formation in Old Nanjing.  
II. Reading the Landscape? State Manipulation and Power Relations 
In this chapter, I merge Lefebvre’s theories of space with a cultural materialist approach 
to the landscape (see chapter 2 for full discussion). Lefebvre (1991) reveals that the dominant 
power relations of state and capital construct false signs to neutralize social, physical, and mental 
                                                
21 See Chapter 4 for a full discussion of suzhi, or “personal quality.” 
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space. State power attempts to characterize the entire system of existing material, social, and 
discursive relations as natural, though in actuality these power relations are socially constructed: 
“The state has control of all existing codes. It may on occasion invent new codes and impose 
them, but it is not itself bound by them, and can shift from one to another at will. The state 
manipulates codes. Power never allows itself to be confined within a single logic” (Lefebvre 
1991, 162). Lefebvre warns that one cannot simply decode the symbolic constructions of space 
because state and capital interests construct deceptive signs that serve to mask inequality. In 
other words, actors may have different roles and agency in producing space, but there are certain 
political and economic structures that write the dominant scripts.  
According to Lefebvre (1991), the signs constructed by state and business interests 
conceal the inequitable material and social relations that underpin the production of space: 
“[Social space] is equivalent…to a set of institutional and ideological superstructures that are not 
presented for what they are…it [social space] assumes an outward appearance of neutrality, of 
insignificance, of semiological destitution, and of emptiness (or absence)” (349). It is impossible 
to simply “read” space as a text because, similar to other commodities of alienated labor of 
capitalist production, the landscape conceals the social labor required for its production. For 
example, the skyscrapers of Shanghai signify modernity, prosperity, and power, which on the 
surface obscures the fact that poor, rural migrant construction workers were the main 
contributors to their existence. The wealth and modernity of Shanghai is further predicated on 
the poverty and “backwardness” of the rural inland regions of the country.  
Though space and landscape is subject to multiple interpretations, decoding space is 
incredibly useful. Lefebvre (1991, 163) insists that the symbolic and material must be related to 
one another in order to illustrate “a certain unity” between physical and mental space. How a 
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space is represented both materially and discursively matters for its existence as social, physical, 
and mental space: 
The object of knowledge is, precisely, the fragmented and uncertain connection between 
elaborated representations of space on the one hand and representational spaces (along 
with their underpinnings) on the other; and this ‘object’ implies (and explains) a 
subject—that subject in whom lived, perceived and conceived (known) come together 
within a spatial practice. (Lefebvre 1991, 230, emphasis in original) 
 
The various ways of seeing the landscape reveal both social formations realized in the space and 
the current and future viability of those social formations. Lefebvre argues that for a social group 
to exist, it must produce and occupy space: “the production of space…has nothing incidental 
about it: it is a matter of life and death” (Lefebvre 1991, 417). Though Lefebvre encourages a 
rigorous engagement with both the symbolic and material forms of space, he also cautions to be 
wary of false signs meant to conceal inequality and promote the interests of those in power, such 
as the state. I argue, however, that in the transition to a market economy, where dramatic and 
rapid changes are occurring especially in the built environment of new skyscrapers and 
apartment complexes, the landscape and its constitution of class in urban China is more obvious 
and easier to read than Lefebvre suggests.  
Landscape study is one lens through which to examine the spaces of social relations and 
representations in the construction of social formation. According to Mitchell (2000):  
It [landscape] is a way of carefully selecting and representing the world so as to give it a 
particular meaning. Landscape is thus an important ingredient in constructing consent and 
identity—in organizing a receptive audience—for the projects and desires of powerful 
social interests. (100)  
 
For example, the modernizing influences of state and capital interests portray the dilapidated 
landscape of Old Nanjing as one of poverty, backwardness, destitution, and crime. The landscape 
signified as such is manipulated because in actuality Old Nanjing is a thriving business district 
comprised of a diverse and intimate community with lively public life in the street. Yet the 
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constructed image of a dangerous and undeveloped landscape is crucial for local state and 
business ventures hoping to demolish the neighborhood to make way for high-value real estate, 
such as malls and condos.  
The cultural landscape of Old Nanjing simultaneously obscures and obviates the power of 
the state and capital and the creation of new class formations through the built environment. The 
dilapidated landscape constructs an image of the backward, poor other in dialectical tension to 
the modernity of the middle-class. This furthers the agenda of capital accumulation in the built 
environment of new housing to accommodate the new middle-class interests. L. Zhang (2010) 
applies Lefebvre’s theories to the current situation in urban China. From the theory of the 
production of space and cultural materialist approaches to class, she develops the analytic of the 
“spatialization of class” to describe the ways in which urban society is divided today: “Not only 
is urban space radically reorganized into visibly hierarchical and segregated form by recent real 
estate developments but also new social groups and class subjects are created and made 
discernible through this spatial production” (L. Zhang 2010, 14). Following Lefebvre, she 
explicitly aims to combine economy and culture in her argument. She suggests that the formation 
of the middle-class in China is established through the spatial production of gated communities. 
Indeed, homeownership is the most visible and tangible source of class status and social 
divisions in China today (G. Chen 2011). I employ Lefebvre’s triad of physical space (i.e., the 
perceived), mental space (i.e., the conceived), and social space (i.e., the lived) in order to better 
understand the relationships established in the data. The reciprocal role of social formation, 
everyday practice, and spatial production is crucial to the making of class through the landscape.  
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III. Constructing Cultural Landscapes of Modernity and Backwardness 
This ethnography studies the cultural practices that define and reinforce social divisions 
through categorical differences of modernity versus backwardness. The following sections use 
landscape study as a lens to outline the representations (e.g., stereotypes) and practices (e.g., 
eviction and demolition) of Old Nanjing that accept and resist the dominant discourses that 
contribute to class construction. Social space is defined by Lefebvre (1991) as the merging of 
materialism and idealism through the lived space of everyday life. The social space that these 
class divisions occupy is imperative for social formation, otherwise the social group becomes 
extinct. Lefebvre (1991) argues that spatial production is necessary to the realization of a social 
group: “Any ‘social existence’ aspiring or claiming to be ‘real,’ but failing to produce its own 
space, would be a strange entity, a very peculiar kind of abstraction unable to escape from the 
ideological…realm” (53). The evidence presented illuminates the ways in which the material 
(i.e., physical space) and idealist (i.e., mental space) forms of the landscape construct categories 
of residents as civilized or uncivilized and thereby produce social space and contribute to class 
formation. The ultimate aim of the chapter is to challenge a single definition of urban modernity 
and emphasize that multiple versions of urban vitality, functionality, and progress exist in Old 
Nanjing. 
A. Representations of Old Nanjing by the Nanjing City Government at the Urban Planning 
Museum: Constructing the Modern Versus Traditional Binary 
 
The representations of Old Nanjing at the Nanjing Exhibition Hall of Urban Planning and 
Development define and reinforce visions of urban modernity.22 The Nanjing city government 
defines urban modernity through exhibits, models, and videos at the urban planning museum that 
display investments in technological innovation and building construction in order to achieve 
                                                
22 The exhibition hall is hereafter referred to as the “urban planning museum,” which is the common descriptor used 
when describing these Chinese exhibition halls in English. 
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economic, social, and cultural advancement. This section will illustrate that planning models 
make clear that the city government endeavors to reach targets of “optimal” urban development 
as realized through the materiality of the built environment (e.g., malls and parks). The city as a 
whole is represented in the exhibit hall through the binary of either modern (e.g., models of 
skyscrapers) or traditional (e.g., historical or cultural Chinese architecture). The images of old 
city neighborhoods described as “traditional” constitute the modernity of new construction 
projects and implicitly reinforce conceptions of backwardness associated with the old city 
neighborhoods. These representations of old city neighborhoods further the government’s agenda 
to promote demolition projects and accommodate new real estate. However, it is crucial to 
emphasize that the valorization of tradition is inherent to the construction of the 
modern/traditional binary. In other words, traditional “Chineseness,” especially the rural as 
traditional, is a fundamental and constitutive part of urban modernity (Oakes 1998).  
The model of extant development in present-day Nanjing in Figure 22 intends to illustrate 
the recent urban development and construction projects as crucial technological and scientific 
innovation. The purpose of this exhibit is to portray Nanjing as a city that has already achieved 
the status of a progressive and modern city, and that the city will continue to pursue hi-tech 
improvements, in part by developing the built environment. These projects, the exhibit insists, 
will lead Nanjing to achieve social and cultural advancement, eventually earning global 
recognition as a modern city. 
The model includes old city neighborhoods. Old Nanjing, circled in red, was likely 
included in the model because its “quaint” traditions and cultural heritage constitutes the image 
of the rest of the city as modern, advanced, and orderly. The representation of the city in these 
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static models reinforces images of modernity and development as organized and planned, rather 
than the reality of messiness and disorder in everyday life.   
 
Figure 22: Exhibit at the urban planning museum: This includes a small-scale model of Old 
Nanjing, circled here in red in the southern section of the city. Old city neighborhoods stand as a 
representation of tradition in contrast to the new developments of the rest of the city as a model 
for progress and development. The exhibit constructed in such a way inevitably reinforces the 
dialectical narrative of modernity as progress and tradition as backwardness. Source: Photo by 
author, July 2013.  
In order to achieve “progress” as defined by the city government and realized in the built 
environment of the city, the government must engage in massive urban redevelopment projects 
that require the demolition of old city neighborhoods. Old Nanjing stands as an obstacle to the 
realization of complete urban modernity. The representations of the modern city of skyscrapers 
compared to a “traditional” landscape of the old cities constitute Old Nanjing as a binary 
opposite to the modernity of high-rise buildings. Figure 23 is a photo of a different exhibit in the 
urban planning museum. This exhibit explicitly includes a clear label (circled here in yellow-
green) that declares Old Nanjing (circled here in red) specifically to be the “Old Nanjing 
Historical and Cultural Protection and Rejuvenation Area [chengnan lishi wenhua baohu yu 
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fuxing pianqu].” As this chapter will later discuss, this label is contradictory because the 
government is actively involved in eviction and demolition projects in Old Nanjing. The white 
buildings perhaps represent the newer developments of the city, while the brown buildings 
indicate older areas of the city, reinforcing images of modernity as the brilliant, white, 
cleanliness of progress contrasted with the tradition as the brown and dirty dullness of low-rise 
buildings.   
 
Figure 23: Urban Planning Museum Exhibit: The red circle indicates the location of Old 
Nanjing. This section is labeled by the sign encircled in yellow-green as a cultural and historical 
preservation and rejuvenation district (chengnan lishi wenhua baohu yu fuxing pianqu). The 
representations of Old Nanjing as traditional reinforce notions of the urban modernity of 
skyscrapers in the background. The yellow cord across the picture represents the location of the 
ancient city wall. Source: Photo by author, July 2013.  
At the exhibit hall, Old Nanjing is simultaneously valued and de-valued. It is valued as a 
site of cultural and traditional influence, but also de-valued as its presence impedes future 
development and serves as the oppositional other to modernity. For example, figure 23 is one of 
the full-size city models during an electronically interactive exhibit that shows the city lights of 
Nanjing. Similar to the white and brown divisions of the model above, in figure 24 the 
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skyscrapers are lit up as representations of modernity and technological advancement, while the 
tracts of land representing the older areas of the city are not lit up, but instead left in the dark. 
This image furthers the representation of the older parts of the city as backward and a potential 
imposition to development.  
 
Figure 24: This interactive exhibit lit up periodically to display the city lights of Nanjing in an 
effort to perpetuate notions of modernity in the built environment of new urban development and 
construction projects, especially the skyscrapers. Source: Photo by author, July 2013.  
The idea of the city as urban and modern is perpetuated in the official discourse of the 
museum that produces images of the built environment, especially skyscrapers, as representative 
of cultural advancement and economic prosperity. For example, in connection with the exhibit 
portrayed in figures 22 and 24, they periodically played a video called “Nanjing: Modernization 
and Internationalization of Cultural and Human Social Activities.”23 During the video they used 
the word “modern metropolis” to describe Nanjing, and the images used to represent Nanjing 
consisted of skyscrapers, scientists in a lab, and high-speed trains. Meanwhile, the narrator reads, 
                                                
23 The video is available in Chinese with English subtitles on my YouTube channel at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jnnBqWmNwHY. 
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“A modern metropolis of Nanjing is marching forward and upward in the world,” while 
describing and showing various advances in the built environment, including scientific 
innovation, computer software development zones, and shopping districts while the screen 
panned over a landscape of clean and orderly skyscrapers and parks. The narrator in the video 
recited the following dialogue in the background: 
A smart city is being formed, [with] safe and smooth traffic, convenient and excellent 
medical service, [and] thoughtful city management…Nanjing is adopting the policy of ‘a 
three part city,’ to claim the best scenery as a humanistic, green, and happy metropolis. 
The people’s livelihood is the top priority so that everyone can enjoy a happy life 
together in Nanjing…Nanjing will take the lead in reaching modernization as a modern, 
international, humanistic, and green metropolis with suitable living conditions, full of 
vigor and glamour, as a modern place to present to the world. (Video from Nanjing 
Urban Planning and Development Museum and Exhibition Hall [Nanjingshi Guihua 
Jianshe Zhanlanguan], viewed and recorded by author on July 30, 2013) 
 
The video was played in the background of the city model in figures 1 and 3, which portrayed 
Nanjing as the civilized, orderly, and ideal modern city. This example indicates that the city 
government portrays the urban landscape of skyscrapers and other improvements in the built 
environment as the embodiment of modernity.  
The video also mentioned that Nanjing was preserving its cultural and historical heritage 
in its old cities while it showed images of traditional Chinese architecture, such as pagodas and 
courtyard homes. Another section of the museum was dedicated to the “protection of the well-
known historical and cultural city” and included Old Nanjing in its list of protected 
neighborhoods. See figure 25 for a distribution map shown in one of the exhibits of historical 
and cultural conservation districts in the main urban area of Nanjing.  
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Figure 25: Protection of the Well-Known Historical and Cultural City: Old Nanjing is labeled on 
this map a “well-known historical and cultural city.” The blue dots represent national level 
cultural preservation units, the larger red dots represent county level cultural preservation unites, 
and the orange dots represent city level cultural preservation units. Old Nanjing is labeled at the 
city level with an orange dot. Source: Photo by author, July 2013.     
A growing trend in Chinese cities is to preserve old city neighborhoods as heritage sites 
and make them tourist attractions (X. Ren 2008b). The representation of Old Nanjing as a 
cultural and historical heritage site essentializes Old Nanjing as the traditional, which then 
reinforces the image of high-rise buildings as modern. Meanwhile, other sections of the exhibit 
hall were dedicated to showing the plans for expanding and upgrading Nanjing as a more 
advanced, orderly, and prosperous city (see figure 26). The urban planning presentations 
conceived space in the Lefebvrian sense as abstract—devoid of social relations—by seeking to 
divorce the physical space from social space. While this section illustrates the city’s attempts to 
separate social relations from physical space, I ultimately aims to show the inevitable links 
between lived, perceived, and conceived space.  
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Figure 26: Images of futuristic city plans of urban development in the currently undeveloped 
suburbs of Nanjing. The title of the plan says, “Land Use Plan.” Source: Photo by author, July 
2013. 
The only way to achieve the ambitious plans of the city government will be eliminate old 
cities. When viewing the plans for future development at the museum, one has to wonder how 
many people will be displaced to realize the goals of these city planners and officials. One 
typical city plan on exhibit at the museum displayed the future development of a modern, 
orderly, and prosperous Nanjing in computer-generated and futuristic images of brightly colored 
skyscrapers in an office park. Its description illustrates how the insecure local government is 
attempting to assuage complaints over modern designs and justify its vision of technological 
advancement. The title of the plan is “Land Design” and the description of the plans reads,  
This business district’s major function is to provide high-end occupations (gaoduan 
bangong) and scientific research facilities. A complete set of business and shopping 
activities are concentrated on both sides of the main avenue that cuts through the main 
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commercial section. This district’s buildings and skyscrapers are the first priority. The 
measurements are such that they allow pedestrians enough freedom to traverse easily 
across public space. The design encourages a series of possibilities to arrange interaction 
and relaxation on the terraces. In this area we guarantee that every tract of land contains 
mixed-functionality; definitely not built in the way that every concrete piece of land’s 
function carry out strict limitations. (see appendix B for the Chinese version)  
 
The plan seems to anticipate criticism over single-functional spaces common in traditional 
Western and contemporary Chinese versions of urban planning. This exhibit of the future design 
plan of this tract of land appears to be aimed at attracting more foreign investment. City officials 
promote the image of Nanjing as advanced, while representing the poverty of Old Nanjing as 
“traditional” to negate the image of modernity that they desire. In Smith’s (2008) words that 
draw on Lefebvre, “While the emphasis here is on the direct physical production of space, the 
production of space also implies the production of the meaning, concepts, and consciousness of 
space which are inseparably linked to its physical production” (107). In understanding that 
modernity is constituted only in relation to its binary opposite, the tradition and poverty of Old 
Nanjing provides a stereotypical “other” to define the city’s progress. One of the local 
government’s solutions to poverty as a threat to their goal of modernization is to demolish such 
neighborhoods to improve the city image. The government’s other solution to Old Nanjing as an 
obstacle to achieving the ideal modern city is to deem old cities as traditional sites of cultural 
heritage. The label of “traditional” placed onto poor neighborhoods furthers the image of the 
neighborhood as backward and placed in opposition to the goals of modernity and development.  
In conclusion, this state-run museum displays the city government’s definition of 
modernity and progress as realized through advancement and innovation in the built 
environment. The museum exhibits construction plans to build a “modern” and technologically 
advanced city, while it also declares Old Nanjing as a site of cultural and historical preservation. 
These examples from the urban planning exhibit hall reveal that the representation of the urban 
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landscape by the city government recognizes the tension between preservation and development 
of the built environment. Their attempt to reconcile that tension by labeling dilapidated old cities 
as “sites of cultural heritage” illustrates a contested urban modernity between the development 
model paradigm and traditional cultural heritage. Old Nanjing is also valued in some narratives 
for its quaintness as a historical and cultural preservation site, which also has potential as a 
tourist attraction.24 This contested modernity is based on the modern/backward binary that 
excludes the backward as defined by poverty and the rural from its visions of the future of 
Nanjing.   
B. Representations of Old Nanjing by the Middle-Classes: Constructing Uncivilized Inhabitants 
of Old Nanjing 
 
In my interviews, middle-class respondents’ reactions to Old Nanjing demonstrate that 
the dilapidated homes and disorderly streets of Old Nanjing constitute the poor residents as 
uncivilized and backward. The “middle-class” is defined here as the 20 Nanjing residents living 
in an apartment complex (xiaoqu) outside of the Old Nanjing area earning between 3,000-10,000 
RMB ($490-$1,600 USD) per month. Some of the complexes were gated communities with 
private management companies and some were subsidized low-income and un-gated apartments. 
However, they are grouped together in that they were all located in apartment buildings within a 
complex (xiaoqu), though not necessarily with a management company (see chapter 6 for further 
analysis of the middle classes). The middle-class interview respondents generally conceive of the 
people living in Old Nanjing as being uncivilized.  
                                                
24 Old Nanjing is located within walking distance of the Confucius Temple, a large tourist attraction in 
Nanjing and they built an office in Old Nanjing called the “Cultural Commodity Bureau” and some homes were 
labeled as tourist attractions. Although I would not claim that Old Nanjing is a tourist attraction, every once in a 
while I saw wealthier Chinese tourists would walk around taking pictures of the homes in Old Nanjing with 
expensive, professional cameras.  
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The landscape of Old Nanjing represents the juxtaposition of modern as order and 
backward as disorder, thus constituting class formation of the lower classes through the 
disorderly landscape. Li Xinyi, a 27-year old married female teacher with a household income of 
30,000 RMB ($4,800 USD) a month,25 is the resident of an upscale and gated community in the 
suburbs of Nanjing, but she frequently goes to downtown for shopping and entertainment. When 
I asked her what her impressions of Old Nanjing were, she told me: 
[Old Nanjing] is just such chaos! There are so many people, cars, motorcycles, and street 
vendors. It’s all because of street vendors! It’s just very noisy, crowded, and very dusty 
over there. And the people… The people who get on the metro from that stop are usually 
either rural migrant workers [nongmingong, derogatory term] or… you can just tell by the 
way they are dressed, you just know they are in the flea bottom, I don’t know what you 
call it, the slum. You can just tell they are from the slum or from the countryside. And 
also there is a street with a lot of street food and a lot of street vendors, so my impression 
is just a place full of chaos…The four words to describe that place is mixed, dirty, 
chaotic, and inferior [za, zang, luan, cha]”(Interview with author, May 2013).  
 
The middle-class interview respondents are conflicted over the development plans for the 
neighborhood and the material value of dilapidated old cities. While they complain about the 
pollution and traffic that construction causes, they also emphasize that new construction will 
eventually beautify the city for its residents and give a better image of the city overall. At the 
same time, many of the respondents also referred to the Old Nanjing neighborhood as being a 
site of historical and culture preservation that the city should work to protect. Only 3 out of 20 
respondents said that overall they were satisfied with the way the urban development projects 
were being carried out in Nanjing. Thirteen out of 20 middle-class respondents said they were 
generally dissatisfied with the urban development projects in Nanjing because of air pollution, 
traffic, and other daily inconveniences that it caused. Six out of 20 respondents said that despite 
their dissatisfaction with the air pollution and traffic, such development was necessary to overall 
                                                
25 While her salary as a teacher is 4,000 RMB/$640 USD a month, her husband earns 26,000 RMB/$4,160 
USD a month as a math teacher at an international high school in Nanjing.   
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improve the lives of a majority of people involved, both for the city’s image and investment, but 
also to improve the lives of the people that live there. Five out of 20 respondents mentioned at 
least once that Old Nanjing should be preserved for cultural or historical heritage reasons. Three 
out of 20 respondents said that the development projects were overall more harmful than 
beneficial to everyone involved, and especially for the people already living there, it caused more 
social problems than it helped. The middle-class respondents’ conflicted support for urban 
redevelopment projects further exemplifies the tension and internal contradictions of 
development plans for the area.  
The residents of Old Nanjing are stereotyped as different by many of the middle-class 
interview respondents. There is a general discrimination against the poor people that live in Old 
Nanjing. For example, Li Qingzi, a 29-year old female secretary with an income of 4,000 RMB 
($643 USD) per month and living in a danwei apartment, expressed, “In China, those people [in 
Old Nanjing] are under-educated and associated with thievery and burglary. I could never be 
their friend. Furthermore, in my life the choices I make means I have no opportunity to meet 
these kinds of people” (Interview with author, July 2013). Her prejudice indicates the social 
stratification and social exclusion that exists in Nanjing. In this way, migrants and the poor locals 
are “othered” as strange, unfamiliar people and Old Nanjing is “othered” as a foreign place.  
I specifically argue in this section that the landscape of Old Nanjing illustrates that while 
the material homes have been de-valued, the residents too are conceived of by middle-class 
interview respondents as possessing no value or sometimes even negative value. The 
neighborhood is represented in the popular imagination as a dangerous neighborhood, as 
“somewhere you wouldn’t want to walk around in alone at night” (Li Hua, interview with author, 
July 2013). In the popular imagination, the general impression of the place of Old Nanjing is that 
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it is dangerous and chaotic (luan). In referring to “low-suzhi” activities like setting off 
firecrackers late at night, Li Hua, a 27-year old male salesperson earning 3,000 RMB ($480 
USD) per month and living in a gated community said, “I believe you [referring to the author] 
probably experienced something like that in the Old Nanjing area” (Interview with author, July 
30, 2013). Such ideas about Old Nanjing comprising “low-suzhi” activities were pervasive and 
entered into conversations with me anytime an acquaintance learned where I lived. Their 
reactions of surprise and concern about me living there reveals that Old Nanjing as a dilapidated 
and devalued landscape was conflated in the popular imagination with backwardness and crime. 
The landscape of the modern is thus predicated on the exclusion of the uncivilized subjects of 
Old Nanjing from the modern landscape as peaceful and upscale-gated communities.     
There is a desire amongst the middle-class respondents for the physical and economic 
exclusion of the danger and chaos that is associated with migrant workers and poverty. Many 
respondents expressed discomfort and concern with the idea that migrants only stayed in one 
place for 2-3 months at a time and felt concern that they were unfamiliar with their backgrounds 
and family histories. Fu Yang, a 35-year old female make-up artist earning 4,500 RMB ($720 
USD) per month lives in low-income housing that was previously given to her parents as 
members of a state-owned danwei. She says that many of the homeowners moved away from her 
danwei apartment complex to live in better conditions and now rent their homes to migrant 
workers. Therefore her apartment complex is comprised of a fairly even mix of local Nanjingese 
and migrant workers. Fu Yang admitted that she was very familiar with the local Nanjing 
neighbors, as they had lived in the same compound for over 20 years, but she continuously 
stressed her apprehension with her neighbors who were migrants throughout the interview: 
We don’t know what kind of people they [migrants] are, or where they are from, and they 
seem very mixed up [za], messy and chaotic [luanqibazao]…Because we are close to 
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1912 [the club district of Nanjing], so there are a lot of those types of people, the ones 
that work in bars, work at night and sleep during the day, or the street vendors or 
supermarket workers, you know that type. (Interview with author, May 2013) 
 
Her mistrust and anxiety about the presence of migrant workers on grounds that they are 
transitory suggests that in this case the poverty of migrant workers is equated with crime. Her 
anxiety also illustrates the very tangible social stratification that exists between locals and 
migrants. The modern landscape depends on and is predicated on the cultural and material ways 
that the landscape of migrants is portrayed as impoverished and dangerous.  
The material characteristics of the built environment also play a role in constituting the 
formation of class. The values of safety, peace, and newness of gated communities are defined as 
modern and civilized as opposed to the danger, chaos, and “tradition” associated with Old 
Nanjing. Old Nanjing represents the backward and impoverished in the popular imagination, 
while the posh shopping malls and skyscrapers represent Nanjing’s future as a global and 
modern city that exemplifies progress and prosperity. Furthermore, the residents are dissociated 
with the landscape as the people themselves are often devalued as unsophisticated, while the 
material aspects of the homes that exemplify tradition are valued for their “pure Chineseness.” In 
this way, the homes of Old Nanjing are glorified as cultural and historical heritage sites of 
Chinese traditional untainted by Western influence, which is a crucial and inherent aspect of the 
construction of urban modernity. In other words, tradition constitutes modernity, the 
modern/traditional binary is locked in a mutually constitutive relationship—that is, one cannot 
exist without the other.  
C. Representations of Old Nanjing by Residents: Perspectives of Locals and Migrants 
In this section, I analyze the personal narratives of the Old Nanjing neighborhood 
residents, both locals and migrants, that discuss the uncivilized person as associated with the 
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dilapidated landscape of Old Nanjing. The interview narratives and observations of the material 
form of Old Nanjing discuss development of the built environment in relation to ideas that 
equate poverty with backwardness and incivility. These narratives reveal residents’ subconscious 
knowledge that their homes are low in exchange value, but high in use value, and that these 
residents have conflicting feelings about their neighborhood. For example, many residents 
despise the material discomforts of their old homes—especially the inconvenience of lacking a 
personal bathroom—and yet they recognize the ways the neighborhood supports communal 
living and a mutual exchange of support, describing the ways they cherish the rich public life of 
sociability and friendships in their neighborhood. Both insiders and outsiders of the 
neighborhood describe the residents of Old Nanjing as “uncivilized,” categorizing them as 
backwards, opposing them to modernity, and reinforcing class divisions that are constituted 
through the built and social environments of Old Nanjing.  
Homes in the neighborhood have limited monetary value, and residents are unsure of how 
much compensation they will receive for their homes when the neighborhood is demolished. 
Some dread the day, while others eagerly and anxiously anticipate receiving the compensation 
money. One resident was waiting for her home to be demolished so that her son could get 
married, and he and his wife could have their own bedroom in a new, government-provided 
home. The whole family—maternal grandmother, husband and wife, and son—shared one 
bedroom in the old neighborhood. “I feel quite bad for him [my son]. He and his girlfriend have 
nowhere to go, if you know what I mean. He still shares a bed with his grandmother. Once our 
house is demolished, the government will give us enough compensation money for a three-
bedroom apartment, it won’t be a problem anymore, and then they can get married” (Chen Li, 
interview with author, March 2012). Residents with usage or ownership rights (for a discussion 
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of property rights in post-Mao China, see Hsing 2010) will be compensated for the demolition of 
their home based on the area of the land that the home occupies. One respondent claimed that 
compensation may be as high as 6,000 RMB ($970 USD) per square meter. Many of the homes 
are around 30-40 square meters (320-430 square feet), which is enough for a standard living 
room and one bedroom (no bathroom or kitchen). As a result, their homes are worth at most 
180,000-240,000 RMB ($29,000-$38,500 USD), which is around one-fifth the cost of an average 
apartment in the city (at least 1 million RMB/$160,000 USD). 
As a result of high rates of demolition and relatively low monetary exchange-value for 
old homes, the city and the residents rarely invest in home improvement in old neighborhoods. 
Rural migrant residents, who are renting their places of residence from native Nanjingese 
owners, will not be compensated. Some interview respondents implied that the reason migrants 
failed to maintain their homes was because they did not own the homes, and so had no reason to 
invest time or money into keeping up the neighborhood. According to Smith (2008), this is 
connected to Marx’s conception of the theory of abstract labor value and Lefebvre’s production 
of relative space for exchange value:  
This [the progressive universalization of value as the form of abstract labor] involves not 
just the production of geographical space…but the progressive integration and 
transformation of absolute spaces [of use value] into relative space [of exchange 
value]…It is not Einstein…which in the end determine the relativity of geographical 
space, but the actual process of capital accumulation. (113) 
 
The low exchange-value of the homes signifies that the new, modern economy devalues the 
“traditional” homes and the lifestyles they support on institutional and practical levels. While 
these homes have little exchange value, they have high use value. The discussion of the 
neighborhood’s use-value will be expanded upon in the section on everyday practices and local 
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perspectives, which illustrate the vibrancy of the business districts, cultural heritage practices, 
and tight-knit community and social life of the neighborhood. 
 In terms of the material characteristics, the homes of Old Nanjing are crumbling and 
deteriorated. The walls are falling apart as the cement is chipped, the roofs leak, and many of the 
residents have rat infestations. The paint is cracked and peeling, and the doors and windows are 
cracked, drafty, and broken. Often junk and trash is piled in alleys or in homes. A family of three 
or four will often crowd into a single bedroom on a slab of wood with no mattress. None of the 
houses have proper heating, toilets, hot water, or showers. Sometimes they have running water 
through a tap in the alleyway, and so the kitchens are often located outside the home in the alley. 
Such a dilapidated landscape reinforces the ideas of poverty, backwardness, and chaos associated 
with Old Nanjing. In this way, class divisions are reflected in and reinforced by the dilapidation 
of the built environment. Many local residents complain about this material dilapidation, 
expressing eager anticipation of moving out one day or wishes that the government would help 
with remodeling efforts.  
The central courtyards, communal bathhouses, and outdoor kitchens express in their built 
form the communal-style of living of the neighborhood, which is characterized by some as 
traditional or backward, and cherished by others as familiar (shuxi), cozy, and comforting 
(shufu). Figure 27 illustrates the material dilapidation, while showing the way the spatial 
organization of the dwellings support a communal lifestyle. The local residents themselves 
frequently express shame and embarrassment about the backwardness of their lifestyle, 
indicating that their homes and way of life are devalued by the city and residents on institutional 
and practical levels. For example, Auntie Shen, looking perplexed and frowning, said to me: 
“You know, in China, real estate developers have claimed most places for reconstruction, but 
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this area [Old Nanjing] has not been demolished yet,” she said indicating that the neighbourhood 
I had recently moved into was considered by many Chinese to be a slum: 
Why would you ever want to live here? Our conditions are so much worse than what you 
have in America. I’ve seen your houses on television. Heavens! Our houses are so 
terrible. We don’t even have proper plumbing or a bathroom; we have to go to the public 
toilet down the alley, which is very inconvenient. I think you should take your research 
elsewhere. (Shen Yiling, interview with author, October 2011) 
 
In another incident, Grandma Wang, a 75-year old Old Nanjing resident and thrift store owner, 
said to me, “Our dialect is hard to listen to [nanting] and our homes are ugly. We have low suzhi, 
no good conditions [tiaojian], no culture [wenhua]” (Interview with author, November 2011). I 
noticed that as time went on and I became more familiar with the neighborhood, my contacts in 
the area stopped expressing shame in their homes in the way that they did when I first arrived.  
 
Figure 27: A typical dwelling in Old Nanjing may give the false impression to outsiders that its 
lack of material comforts makes it an undesirable place to live. Source: Photo by author, October 
2011.  
For some, appearances may imply that the material conditions are uninhabitable. From an 
outside perspective, Old Nanjing is often portrayed in the popular imagination, especially in the 
middle-class respondents, as a dangerous, dirty, uncivilized, and chaotic place. The traditional 
and crowded aspects of the neighborhood appear to be uncomfortable from an outsider’s 
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perspective, which reinforces the misconceived notion that the residents live in miserable 
conditions, further constituting the inhabitants as lower class.  
In terms of the native Nanjingese resident perspective on contested notions of economic 
development, only one of twenty-one of the respondents said he was overall satisfied with urban 
redevelopment projects. Four out of twenty-one said they were overall dissatisfied with urban 
redevelopment projects because it benefited the rich outsiders and corrupt politicians, while 
excluding the locals from any social or economic benefits. Sixteen out of twenty-one said they 
felt a mixture of both good and bad feelings regarding urban redevelopment citing reasons such 
as improving the overall quality of life, image of the city, and lifting the prosperity of the city 
residents, but causing inconveniences such as traffic, air pollution, destroying cultural and 
historical heritage, and causing harm to the local communities, especially those who depend on 
livelihoods in the city, children, and senior citizens. This reinforces the contested notion that the 
landscape of modernity is realized through development of the built environment and the 
landscape of backwardness is manifested in poverty. 
The landscape of representation constructed by native Old Nanjing residents involves 
discourses of Old Nanjing as both a place full of value and devoid of value. Most residents 
despise the material aspects of their homes, complaining about the inconveniences of the homes 
especially public toilets. However, most simultaneously express pride in the unique local culture 
and cherish their life-long neighbors as they would family. The residents of Old Nanjing also 
described their neighbors—both the local and migrant neighbors—as backward and low inner-
quality (suzhi). Some respondents specifically associated the residents of Old Nanjing as 
uncivilized (bujiang wenming) and made a connection between the uncivilized characteristics of 
both built environment and the people living there as conflated with poverty. The behavior that is 
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deemed uncivilized and practiced in the neighborhood in turn constitutes the landscape as 
backward and uncivilized. The landscape and class is constituted in a mutually reciprocal 
relationship through the tension between the new capitalist economy and transformed notions of 
progress.  
As a mother of a 6-year-old girl, Zhu Chongyang, a 40-year old female accountant living 
in Old Nanjing and earning 5,000 RMB ($800 USD) per month, is concerned about her child’s 
educational development. Like many Chinese parents, she is deeply preoccupied with her child’s 
future success and her ability to provide monetarily for her child’s future. She told me during the 
interview that she loves the social ties and friendships she holds with her neighbors in Old 
Nanjing, but admits there is one thing she does not enjoy about the neighborhood: 
More migrants mean a more mixed (za), and chaotic (luan) environment.  That’s why 
when people go to buy a house they definitely want to check out the level of their 
neighbors’ quality (suzhi) and see if it’s a good place to raise a kid. If I could choose, I 
would swap out (huan) the people who live here with more civilized residents. (Interview 
with author June 7, 2013) 
 
She is concerned that the uncivilized social environment of Old Nanjing will result in her child’s 
poor social and human development, thus affecting the child’s future ability to get a job and a 
husband. Her anxiety indicates that Chinese citizens in today’s new capitalist economy are 
situated between the dichotomies of wealthy, educated, and civilized in opposition with the 
poverty and backwardness of migrants. Such ideas further exacerbate the social stratification and 
class formations of the poor and middle-class. The landscape of Old Nanjing reinforces these 
notions as poor migrants and locals alike navigate the struggles and experience the cultural 
practices of everyday life. 
Many Old Nanjing local resident respondents were conflicted about the perceptions of the 
neighborhood being depicted as a dilapidated slum. One of my neighbors and key informants, a 
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36-year old male construction contractor earning 1,000 RMB ($160 USD) per month and native 
to Old Nanjing, explained to me one day: 
Its [Old Nanjing’s] architectural structure is different from other contemporary places. 
But this place actually isn’t a slum, not a slum the way America has slums anyway. The 
people that live here don’t have the same thinking (gainian) of other people that live in 
slums. Poor people live here, but the people that live here have connections to this place 
from their ancestors (zubei). (Guo Yifan, interview with author, June 2013) 
 
Almost all local respondents agreed that they cared very deeply for their neighbors as they would 
a family member, and stated that their favorite thing about the neighborhood were the friendships 
with their neighbors. Residents would frequently discuss experiences they had or had heard 
about from relatives about the isolation and loneliness of high-rise apartment buildings, where 
neighbors rarely even say hello. They would often express extreme trepidation about being 
demolished for the reason that they would be displaced into an apartment, which they described 
as isolated, unfriendly, and lonely. Gao Fei, a 37-year old male construction worker living in Old 
Nanjing, related: 
If they [my neighbors] have a place that is better, then of course they are not going to be 
willing to live here [in Old Nanjing], because you know how it’s so inconvenient to go to 
the bathroom, and the rats… But we like the people. I’m willing to live here as a young 
person because with the way my family’s [economic] situation is right now, it’s 
appropriate to live here. Old Nanjing is a really deep and concrete cultural place, and the 
interpersonal relationships are more harmonious than living in a high-rise or an apartment 
complex [xiaoqu]. Also, people live here long term, my neighbors and I go way back, to 
the time we were kids, and our homes have emotion, feeling [ganqing]. Although the 
living environment isn’t very good, but I still would be quite reluctant to leave [liulian] 
this place” (Gao Fei, interview with author, May 2013). 
 
As a result, old homes have little to none exchange-value, though the homes still have use-value 
as providing a community of support. The land, being located close to the city center, does have 
high potential land-rent prices. If demolished, the area would provide exchange value for the 
government and the developers.  
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The rumored social environment of the apartment building marks a contrast with the 
neighborly relations of Old Nanjing, where residents would share meals or eat together, help 
each other with the laundry, or babysit for one another’s families. These practices indicate strong 
familial bonds between the local residents and the residents recognized that these practices were 
unique to the neighborhood. The following interview with a 68-year old male state-owned 
enterprise (SOE) retiree is a typical perspective of a local Nanjingese resident: 
The thing I’m most satisfied with this place is that the relationships with the neighbors 
are very harmonious, in the Nanjing dialect, we say, “Lingju hao, Saijinbao,” which 
means good neighborly relations are more precious than gold. If you live in one of those 
new apartments, you won’t have good relationships with your neighbors. The big doors 
open and close, but “you don’t know me, I don’t know you…” Not like us here in Old 
Nanjing, when we see each other, we chat and our relations are very harmonious. The 
thing I don’t like about Old Nanjing is that the conditions (tiaojian) are very poor (cha), 
dirty, chaotic, and poor. The people who live here have low quality (suzhi) and it needs to 
be raised. It would be better if our cultural level could be raised a little bit”(Hou Bo, 
interview with author, June 5, 2013).    
 
Hou Bo’s articulation of a common saying, “good neighborly relations are more precious than 
gold,” recounts a phrase that challenges definitions of value based on capitalist monetary value 
based on the exchange value of gold. Hou Bo’s opinion reflects the majority opinion of Old 
Nanjing residents, who often expressed anxiety and apprehension about demolition as they knew 
their neighbors would be separated and they would have to live in the isolation of apartment 
complexes. One 60-year old female SOE retiree and native resident of Old Nanjing said: 
This neighborhood has a relatively domestic (shenghuo) lifestyle. Sure you might have a 
more modern feeling in a big apartment building, but you don’t feel as connected to your 
life. It’s easier to get close (jiejin) here. In an apartment building you might say hi to 
other people, but you still separate each other in your heart, but here there is a more 
neighborly feeling. (Yang Shuxia, June 10, 2013) 
 
These fears suggest that the landscape of Old Nanjing is a contested site of urban modernity, as 
people cherish the social relations but despise the physical conditions.  
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 In conclusion, the locals have a love-hate relationship with their neighborhood. While 
they describe their neighbors as “like family to me,” they also describe the people of Nanjing, 
both the locals and the migrants, as displaying low suzhi. Meanwhile, they complain about the 
poor material conditions of the neighborhood, while expressing appreciation for neighbors, 
especially in relations to systems of mutual exchange of support, especially cooking, doing 
laundry, and babysitting. Many locals complained that the migrants did not take care of their 
community (e.g., littering, creating a disturbance at night) because they were not invested long-
term in the community having plans to return home. The various reactions and perceptions of the 
neighborhood’s existence demonstrate that the experience of demolition is highly differentiated. 
The neighborhood of Old Nanjing is caught in the middle of a contest between the progress of 
modernity and preservation of tradition through the practice of demolition and the representation 
of preservation.  
Rural migrants, on the other hand, saw city development as a path toward convenience, 
progress, and prosperity, but some associated the backwardness of the old city as a sign of the 
laziness of the local Nanjingese. Indeed, many of the rural migrant residents reported feeling as 
though Old Nanjing reminded them of village life. Ten out of 20 migrants said they were 
satisfied with urban redevelopment projects in Nanjing. Five out of 20 said they didn’t know or 
they had no opinion. Five out of 20 said there were both good and bad effects, including 
pollution, traffic, and social unrest. These conflicting responses indicate that the rural migrant 
experience in Old Nanjing was highly variable. Indeed, while some rural migrants quickly made 
friends with the locals and were welcomed into the community, others were excluded.  
Some migrants associated the dilapidated landscape of Old Nanjing with backwardness 
and laziness. Although Li Jianhua, a migrant living in Old Nanjing for 8 years, admitted that life 
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in the city was much more convenient than life in the countryside, he complained when 
describing Old Nanjing: 
The thing that needs to be improved is that this place [Old Nanjing] is relatively old and 
broken (pojiu). This place really needs to get some new houses. The houses here are 
terrible and the conditions are quite poor and backward. The city development here is 
quite slow, it’s almost as if there isn’t any change at all, it’s as if this city isn’t even 
trying to progress. The Nanjingese are not okay, they don’t have any creative spirit, no 
drive for entrepreneurialism (chuangye jinshen)” (Interview with author, June 5, 2013).  
 
While migrants’ experiences in the city are highly variable, Li Jianhua’s words reflect the 
common stereotype that local Nanjingese people are lazy. Li Jianhua uses the poor conditions of 
the houses in Old Nanjing as evidence of laziness and backwardness. For example, consider the 
following responses from interviews with two migrant workers. Cao Li is a 44-year old female 
migrant worker and second-hand clothing shop owner. She used to be a massage therapist and 
traveled all around the country, and even travelled to Singapore once, working as a massage 
therapist:  
The government should pay more attention to the way the city looks and beautify the city, 
make it nice to look at. The environment is not very clean or hygienic. They should put 
more money and effort into street cleaning. The government should think about this more 
carefully and work harder to save effort (shengjin) and be more efficient…The 
government should be more like Singapore and be stronger, especially give higher and 
stronger fines for the people who litter. The environment is much better in Singapore, it’s 
much cleaner. (Interview with author, June 2013)  
 
Her opinion reflects the common sentiment among migrant workers that the government should 
take a more direct role in regulating and encouraging the beautification of the built environment. 
Zhang Le, a 52-year old male rural migrant and restaurant owner who has lived in Nanjing for 
over 20 years told me in response to the question “what are the results of urban renewal in 
Nanjing?”,  
Nanjing has seen a huge change in the last 10 years or so. Now, the houses are tall, the 
streets are wide, and the air is polluted.  Yes, I’m quite satisfied with it, I think it’s been 
quite good so far because everyone’s conditions (tiaojian) of life have improved quite 
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drastically, just everything has improved in everyone’s life, like the houses themselves 
are much better now and there is better hygiene, and roads. I think there are only good 
things about demolition. Demolition takes old houses and makes them new, isn’t that a 
good thing? How could that not be a good thing? There is not one bad thing about it, as 
long as the history is preserved, only good things can come from this type of housing and 
economic development. (Interview with author, 2013) 
 
This type of generalization was common and illustrates the ways in which the built environment 
constitutes the making of class identity defined as uncivilized and backward as opposed to 
modern and progressive.  
D. Practices of Eviction and Demolition in Old Nanjing by the Nanjing City Government 
The representations that portray Old Nanjing as an obstacle to further economic 
development make them ideal sites for razing and renewal. Furthering negative representations 
of Old Nanjing is crucial to advancing officials’ agendas to demolish old cities in order to make 
way for construction of malls and skyscrapers. Although Old Nanjing has technically been 
deemed a cultural and historical preservation site in the urban planning exhibition hall, many 
buildings in Old Nanjing are nevertheless being demolished or at least under constant threat of 
being demolished. Figure 28 shows one row of businesses that were evicted shortly before I 
arrived in May 2013. I was quite shocked to see this section already evicted and demolished as it 
was a bustling business district of various shops and merchants when I lived there in 2011-2012. 
The red banner with yellow characters in figure 28 declares, “Earnestly carry out and implement 
‘State-Owned Land and Housing Fine and Compensation Regulations,” [a policy that] protects 
and maintains the legal rights and benefits of those that have gotten fined.” This banner and other 
posters pasted around the area (see figures 28, 33, and 34) indicate that there has been some 
resistance to the eviction of these businesses, or at least that government officials are anxious and 
highly aware of the possibility of resistance. Although I myself did not witness any protests or 
physical and visible public forms of open resistance during my fieldwork, other cities in China 
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did experience residents petitioning the national government or refusing to leave their homes 
(see Hsing 2010; Hsing and Lee 2010). Two of my research respondents said they would protest 
if they were not given adequate compensation money when the time came to be evicted.  
 
Figure 28: Photo of Demolition Practices: This area was a busy street and bustling business 
district in 2012; I was surprised to find these businesses evicted and demolition markings 
covering this area of Old Nanjing when I returned in May 2013. A supermart similar to Walmart 
was flourishing in the lot behind me as I took the photo. The red banner with yellow characters 
declares, “Earnestly carry out and implement ‘State-Owned Land and Housing Fine and 
Compensation Regulations,” [a policy that] protects and maintains the legal rights and benefits of 
those that have gotten fined.”  Source: Photo by author, May 2013.  
According to my research respondents a majority of what was once called the “southern 
city” (chengnan), the neighborhood that had once encompassed Old Nanjing, had already been 
demolished to make way for schools and apartment buildings by the time I first visited in 2010. 
Figure 29 depicts the entire area I consider to be my field site; the arbitrary boundaries of “Old 
Nanjing” as the space I have bounded for the purpose of this thesis. Other old city neighborhoods 
surround this area and are scattered around the city and beyond. The scale of demolition beyond 
this map is outside the limits of this thesis as reliable data is difficult to obtain. I therefore focus 
my concern on the area depicted in this map, as that is where I lived and conducted my fieldwork 
for the past three years.  
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During my time visiting and living in Old Nanjing periodically from 2010-2013, about 
one-third of the homes and businesses in my field site were evicted, gutted, and demolished 
(labeled as section C in figure 29). Figure 29 is satellite imagery from Google Maps on March 
17, 2014 showing the aftermath of the entire demolition of section C. Demolition of this area 
began in 2011 and was completed by summer of 2013 (see figures 30 and 31). Approximately 
700 square meters of land comprising my field site, about 200 square meters was demolished and 
500 square meters were preserved since 2010. While the remaining two-thirds appears well-
protected for now and the residents face seemingly little threat (labeled as sections A and B), 
everyone admits that they plan for their homes to be demolished eventually, but nobody had any 
idea when that will occur. While some said, “I guess a year or two,” others insisted they had no 
idea, “we’ll wait and see what the government decides,” they told me. Although sections A and 
B seem to be preserved under conservation of cultural and historical heritage mandates, residents 
expect to move out eventually, though they don’t know when. 
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Figure 29: Satellite Image of Demolition in Field Site: The area in the red circle (section C) is the 
plot of land, mostly residential, that was demolished in 2012. This satellite image can be viewed 
at your leisure at https://goo.gl/maps/lCSgf. The map of Old Nanjing with GPS tracks in chapter 
3 is a map of section A only.  
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Here are some on-the-ground pictures of the demolition in section C. 
 
Figure 30: Before the demolition in section C, February 2012. Source: Photo by author, February 
2012.  
 
 
Figure 31: After the demolition in section C in July 2013. Source: Photo by author, July 2013.  
When I was conducting research in Old Nanjing in 2011-2012, big red characters reading 
banqian, or “evict and relocate” and chai, or “demolish,” were spray painted on the outside of all 
of the homes in section C. Propaganda, eviction markings, and posters also covered many of the 
buildings. The remaining residents, however, have not been given notice of compensation or 
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official orders to move out yet. Torn and faded posters around the neighborhood read, “The 
Earlier You Move Out, The More Rewards You Will Get” and “Cast Away Illusion and Make 
Practical Negotiations.” Residents say the posters were put up in 2008, but no one forced them to 
move out until 2012 (see figure 32). 
 
Figure 32: Eviction Markings: These red characters 
read “ban qian,” meaning “evict and relocate.” This 
house was located in section C and the residents were 
under constant threat of demolition for four years until 
they were finally evicted in 2012. Source: Photo by 
author, February 2012.  
 
These efforts to improve the built environment through slum clearing efforts reflect the 
city government’s goal to achieve urban modernity demonstrated in new construction projects. 
Other posters pasted on homes in section C read, “Expedite Construction, Bring Benefit to the 
People, Take the Interests of the Whole into Account, Develop Together” (see figure 33). So far, 
the remaining residents in sections A and B have been spared this propaganda, posters, and 
spray-painted demolition markings thus far.  
 
Figure 33: A house in section C with numerous colorful posters and banners urging residents to 
leave peacefully. Source: Photo by author, February 2012.  
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When I returned in May 2013, more demolition had occurred in some other areas. Posters 
pasted on the houses and buildings contained various slogans, including those in figure 34, 
declaring: “Improve the quality of the people’s living environment and build a livable and happy 
district. Keep operations transparent and strengthen the supervision. Manage strictly, urge 
actively, govern honestly, and build. Support integrative and standardized government policies. 
Legal, public, and fair penalties and fines” (propaganda posters in Old Nanjing, recorded on May 
24, 2013). Figure 34 depicts that demolition has been continuing in Old Nanjing through the 
summer of 2013.  
 
Figure 34: Demolition and eviction markings and posters urging residents to accept 
compensation packages without resistance. Source: photo by author, May 2013.  
Furthermore, a notice pasted on the sides of some homes and businesses being 
demolished was titled, “A Letter to the Residents that were Fined Based on the Program to 
Renovate the Dangerous and Old Houses on Zhixi Road.” The letter tells residents: 
Respected Resident who has been fined: The program to renovate the dangerous and old 
houses on this plot of land is a key project of the city government. The purpose of this 
morale-boosting project is to improve the living environment for the benefit of our 
offspring and future generations.  Since this project was first implemented, the program 
has obtained the vigorous support of a vast majority of the residents. More than 40% of 
the inhabitants have already reached an agreement with the government and have been 
evicted. At this point, we still have a portion of the residents that have entertained notions 
that do not correspond with reality. They ask for sky-high prices (mantian yaojia), while 
  
149 
they wait and survey the situation with hope. We once again earnestly inform you of the 
following rules and regulations regarding demolition and eviction. (letter seen in Old 
Nanjing, May 2013)   
 
The letter outlines the rules and regulations of how to comply with the eviction policy and how 
to avoid getting fined by moving out within a certain period of time, and stating the rights and 
responsibilities of residents getting evicted and the government for being able to evict (see 
appendix C for the Chinese version). This letter is an example of insecurity in response to 
contesting power relations of the state. At least half of the residents have not reached 
compensation agreements yet, which indicates open resistance to the state’s agenda.    
  These examples represent a contested urban modernity as their urgency reveals the 
insecurity of the city government of potential resistance by residents to their slum clearing 
efforts. A few residents have recently (within the past year) invested in renovating their homes, 
such as adding a second floor or adding showers and toilets. A few of the neighbors told me that 
they added a second floor to their homes because it adds more square meters to their home, 
meaning that they will be compensated more once they are demolished. At least twenty homes 
have been converted their homes into restaurants, convenience stores, and thrift shops and are 
not planning on being demolished in the foreseeable future (see figure 35). 
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Figure 35: A home in section A of Old Nanjing has been converted into a cigarette and alcohol 
shop. Many of the homes sell second-hand clothing or other small conveniences, such as beer or 
ice cream. The continuing establishment of businesses in Old Nanjing signifies that the business 
owners and investors are not planning on being demolished in the near future. Source: Photo by 
author, October 2011.   
E. Everyday Practices: Contesting Urban Modernity and Rural Backwardness 
I understand practices in Old Nanjing (e.g., card playing, prostitution, and business in the 
street) as constitutive of class formations. Everyday practices in the streets of Old Nanjing 
illustrate contested urban modernities and class making. For example, the low-income housing 
also supports rural migrants, who supply the “modern” city with cheap labor. I will first discuss 
the practices considered “uncivilized” or morally degenerate, including waste-picking, 
prostitution, gambling, and selling second-hand clothing. I will second describe the practices that 
are considered “traditional.” One common practice of rural migrant workers in the neighborhood 
was recycling and waste picking (see figure 36). The cleaners of the city are considered 
backwards by the local urban interview respondents, while it is the cleanliness they enable 
through their cheap labor that grants the city is mark of modernity. Even though the migrant 
workers actually constitute the modern city by providing cheap labor markets, including street 
cleaners, informal recycling workers, and waste pickers, they are seen as the opposite of modern 
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(Brown 2013). The everyday practices of the people of Old Nanjing challenge the image of 
modernity that the aspiring global city of Nanjing is seeking to achieve (Kloet and Scheen 2013). 
In these cases, the people are divorced from the landscape as their practices are deemed either 
“uncivilized” or “traditional,” while the material homes of the landscape are considered a 
“cultural revitalization” district by the city government.  
 
Figure 36: A typical practice for rural 
migrants living in Nanjing is waste 
picking. Here one of my research 
respondents picks through some materials 
to judge its appropriateness for recycling. 
This man, Gao Li, makes his living on 
recycling scrap and waste he collects 
around the area. Source: Photo by author, 
October 2011.  
 
Prostitution, sex toy, and pornography shops were also common business ventures in Old 
Nanjing, which further reinforced outsiders’ perceptions of it as a “morally degenerate” place. 
For example, on one street in the neighborhood, pink and red lights shine behind white curtains 
that advertise “health preserving massage” (baojian anmo), a common euphemism for brothels. 
During the day, especially in the scorching summer time heat, young women approximately 18 
to 20 years old can be seen lounging in these “massage parlors” wearing suggestive pajamas 
(e.g., tank tops and shorts) and playing cards with each other as they wait for clients. The illegal 
activity of prostitution and selling pornography exemplifies the ways in which the residents of 
Old Nanjing contest power relations and ignore the rules of the state. The everyday practices 
common in Old Nanjing indicate that the cultural landscape of the social and built environment 
were mutually constitutive of class formation, especially playing mahjong, which is associated 
with gambling and therefore is illegal (see figure 37).  
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Figure 37: Mahjong is often associated with 
gambling as an illegal and immoral activity. 
Although mahjong is a common activity and is 
considered to be a traditional Chinese activity, when 
it is associated with gambling, it is seen as lower 
class. Source: Photo by author, October 2011.  
Another practice that was considered 
“uncivilized,” especially by the local residents of Old 
Nanjing, were the thrift shops that occupied at least one-third of the homes in section A. When I 
told one of my research participants that I wanted to interview some of the business owners, he 
said, “Whatever for? The owners of those ratty businesses don’t represent Old Nanjing culture. 
They are backward and uncultured, you have no business interviewing them.” However, I found 
the bargaining culture of the second-hand clothing stores fascinating. I often sat with Grandma 
Wang outside her business to chat with her and the frequent passersby, frequently observing her 
bargaining techniques. See figure 38 for a picture of Grandma Wang’s shop. 
 
Figure 38: Grandma Wang's thrift store. 
Source: Photo by author, October 2011. 
 
Grandma Wang often emphatically 
tried to convince her customers of the high 
quality of the clothing, while her customers 
asked for a lower price by pointing out how something was dirty or broken. Similar to Hanser’s 
(2008) study, service workers display their expertise and knowledge over their customers, 
wielding power over their customers. When I returned in summer 2013, she often complained to 
me that people were asking for lower prices and that she was getting fewer customers as people 
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more frequently wanted to buy new clothes instead of second-hand ones as the economy 
prospered.  
The business practices associated with the thrift shops also exemplified social 
stratification, as the customers often portrayed themselves as higher class than the shop owners. 
One day the socioeconomic disparity was made particularly obvious to me. Grandma Wang and I 
were talking about her children when suddenly she looked at me straight in the eye as tears 
streamed down her face. “If you have money, life is good. But if you aren’t cultured, you can’t 
read and write, then you have to do business like this, business that doesn’t make any money, 
even as a 75-year-old woman like me,” she said, pointing to her second-hand clothing shop: 
If you are poor, you cannot give good circumstances (tiaojian) to your kids. They end up 
with little education, and then they are stuck doing the same thing that you do, business 
that doesn’t make any money. It is the worst feeling in the world to realize that you can’t 
give your kids the life they deserve and the life you want to give them because you don't 
have the tiaojian to help them. I’m not willing to be a burden on my son, so I opened this 
shop so that I could take care of myself. (Interview with author, February 2012) 
 
As she spoke, a group of three men and two women walked out of her shop with crinkled noses 
exclaiming loudly for everyone around to hear, “That store smells! And the clothing is so ugly!” 
The men wore matching suits and red shoes that looked out of place. The women had plastic 
water bottles, heavy make-up, tight jeans, and high-heels and looked like foreign tourists in the 
old city neighborhood. The association of the business owners in Old Nanjing as lower class and 
the visible social stratification between the service worker and consumer illustrated class 
formations in the neighborhood.  
The other practices that I frequently witnessed in the neighborhood were not considered 
to be “uncivilized,” but rather more “traditional,” such as Chinese chess, drinking tea and 
smoking, cooking in outdoor kitchens, fishing, sitting around and chatting, walking birds in their 
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cages, mahjong, preparing and cleaning vegetables for an upcoming meal, and selling trinkets. 
These practices created a unique cultural landscape in Old Nanjing (see figure 39).  
 
Figure 39: Playing Chinese chess, drinking 
tea, and smoking are common cultural 
practices among men in Old Nanjing. 
Source: Photo by author, October 2011. 
 
These everyday practices of Old 
Nanjing are described by respondents as 
“uncivilized,” “traditional”, or “stuck in 
the past.” When I asked the long-time residents during my interviews, “What has changed in this 
neighborhood during the last 30 years?” five of them responded with the phrase, “nothing has 
changed.” Indeed, for many people nothing has changed in terms of way of life or daily 
experience as residents still use communal bathrooms, showers, kitchens, and courtyards. 
Walking into the neighborhood, one had the feeling of stepping back in time about 50 years—
dinner was cooked on outdoor make shift coal stoves, chickens walked freely around the streets, 
pet pigeons cooed. This gave a feeling of rural, village life. A crowd of at least 10 adult men 
stood surrounding mahjong, card, and Chinese chess tables, and children and adults alike walked 
in and out of their neighbors’ homes freely. These are considered by some in the city to be 
“traditional” Chinese practices because such habits are rarely observed in gated communities or 
high-rise apartments. Figure 40 illustrates a common practice in Old Nanjing, sitting and chatting 
in the street. This type of practice is almost completely eradicated in gated communities and the 
newly developed parts of the city. 
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Figure 40: Common practices in Old 
Nanjing, such as sitting around and chatting 
with tea and caged pet birds, are constitutive 
of the cultural landscape. Source: Photo by 
author, October 2011. 
Old Nanjing is more than just a site 
of cultural heritage because it is also still a 
site full of young families, children, parents, 
and grandparents that is being used to support social reproduction and livelihoods. The houses 
are cozy, and nobody complained about sharing a bedroom with their family. My neighbors often 
held lively parties with their friends that spilled out onto the street. The lack of personal 
bathroom allowed for a communal way of living and socializing in the public bathhouses. 
Residents described their neighbors and friends as close as family. The lack of running water 
inside meant that kitchens were located outside, and the smell of delicious food being cooked 
wafted through the air every day at noon and 5 pm. The landscape allowed for a communal way 
of living that supported a tight-knit community, and also provided a relatively good security 
system of watchful eyes. The neighborhood was extremely lively and active, especially during 
the synchronized street dance at 7 pm every evening, a common activity for middle-aged and 
older women in urban China. Old Nanjing was not a dead and deteriorating community, but 
actually a thriving business district and lively neighborhood and community of strong cultural 
and social networks. Because Old Nanjing seemed on the outside to be crumbling and 
deteriorating, it was represented in the imagination of some and official discourse as an 
opposition against modernity. In reality it was a thriving and vibrant community of families and 
businesses that exemplified a contested urban modernity.  
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IV. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I employ ethnographic methods to examine the cultural landscape of 
dilapidated homes and impoverished residents in Old Nanjing. Building from interviews, 
conversations, observations, and government notices, I find that various actors located inside and 
outside of Old Nanjing construct categories of “civilized” and “uncivilized” spaces of the city 
based on certain representations and practices associated with contested notions of modernity. I 
argue that city residents’ application of these categories reinforces social divisions in the built 
and social environment. The “preservation by bulldozer” tactics of the government indicate the 
valuation of the “traditional” landscape as constitutive of modernity, while dismissing the 
residents of the neighborhood as “uncivilized” or “morally degenerate,” because perhaps the 
residents are not sophisticated enough to fully appreciate the material value of their traditional 
homes. In other words, the people are separated from the material landscape in the construction 
of the modern/tradition binary.  
The socially constructed binary between the modern and the backward is manifested in 
various forms in urban China. The contrast between the modern and traditional is often described 
in popular media, political rhetoric, and government propaganda in the following patterned 
binaries: progressive and backward; new and old; orderly and chaotic; clean and dirty; rich and 
poor; hard working and lazy; civilized and uncivilized; high quality and low quality; urban and 
rural; and native and migrant. The binary between the modern and traditional is also manifested 
in the built environment in various ways. The sections of Nanjing defined in the popular 
imagination as modern are gated communities or large shopping malls characterized as 
harmonious (hexie) and civilized (wenming). Meanwhile, backwardness is viewed as the chaotic 
(luan) and uncivilized old city neighborhoods, sometimes referred to as “dangerous slums.” 
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Furthermore, “civilized” behavior, defined by many research participants as lining up, paying 
attention to traffic signals, speaking standard Mandarin, or throwing away trash, are often 
attributed to local urban residents. In practice, of course, urbanites do not necessarily practice 
these behaviors. Rural migrants, on the other hand, stereotypically display “uncivilized” 
behavior, defined by locals and migrants alike as spitting, jaywalking, littering, wearing pajamas 
in public, or swearing. Although these behaviors are attributed to rural migrants, they do not 
necessarily practice these habits either (see chapter 4). Notions of modernity and civility are thus 
highly contested and diverse.  
This chapter highlights the ways in which the cultural landscape is dynamic and how 
definitions of urban modernity are inherently unstable (Dibazar et al. 2013). Following Lefebvre 
(1991), an examination of the material and symbolic forms of space, and the insider and outsider 
perspective of the landscape through representation and practice, illustrate highly differentiated 
notions of urban modernity. The data illustrate the mutually constitutive relationship between 
spatial production, everyday practice, and social formation by showing how class is related to the 
built environment. I agree with L. Zhang (2010) that the categories of the “uncivilized” and 
“civilized” are reflected on the built environment. For example, the material dilapidation of 
homes in Old Nanjing contributes to the social construction of the neighborhood and its residents 
as “uncivilized.” Such material inequalities in the built environment as rearticulated under the 
new capitalist economy constitute the inhabitants as lower class. Meanwhile, the everyday 
practices common in Old Nanjing were deemed “uncivilized” by outsiders, furthering the 
reflection of class divisions in the social environment through everyday practice. Old Nanjing 
exemplifies a contested modernity because despite the stereotypes of Old Nanjing as backward 
and uncivilized, many aspects of the neighborhood itself, such as its ability to provide low-
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income housing for cheap laborers that clean the streets and collect garbage, are constitutive of 
the clean, modern, and orderly city that officials hope to achieve (Pow 2007). Furthermore, the 
perspectives of the local residents themselves exemplified Old Nanjing not as a dilapidated slum, 
but rather as a thriving business district and tight-knit community. In conclusion, the 
modern/backward binary is constituted in the built and social environment and constructs 
categories of civilized and uncivilized urban inhabitants through representation and practice that 
reinforce class divisions. In the context of transitioning to a market economy, class divisions are 
changing rapidly, and therefore are more obvious and easier to read in the landscape than 
Lefebvre suggests. I argue that the modern/backward binary is contested through the diverse 
experiences and practices of the local residents of Old Nanjing.  
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CHAPTER 6 
STATE, MARKET, AND SOCIETY IN URBAN CHINA: THE PRIVATIZATION OF 
HOMEOWNERSHIP AND THE FORMATION OF THE MIDDLE CLASSES 
 
I. Introduction 
While in the previous chapter I recounted experiences in an intimate community with a 
vibrant street life, in this chapter I describe the less-socially active life in various types of 
apartment buildings. Although the apartments were often described by those both inside and 
outside of the communities as lonely and isolating, I stress here that my respondents reported a 
wide diversity of experiences ranging from “dead and isolating” to “safe and peaceful.” There 
was a significant difference between those living in gated communities and those living in 
danwei apartments. This difference will be explored in more detail later in the chapter. The 
flourishing public sociability and communal lifestyle of Old Nanjing compared to the 
individualism of separate condos illustrates a profound shift in lifestyle practices under economic 
reform. Indeed, the pervasive political-economic transition of “opening up and reform” (gaige 
kaifang) resulted in far-reaching material and social changes (Rofel 2007). Moving from a 
theoretically egalitarian to an evidently inequitable society was one of the most striking 
developments in urban China during the last 30 years (Anagnost 2008).  
The shift from “socialism” to “capitalism” has been made most obvious through the 
process of conversion from state-provided housing to commercialized housing (see figures 41 
and 42), which has resulted in extreme housing inequality and the popularization of exclusionary 
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gated communities. Following L. Zhang (2010) and Hsing (2010), I use the term 
“commercialized housing” rather than “privatized housing” because the housing market is a 
hybrid of state control and free-market capital. The market is neither completely privatized nor 
totally state-controlled. State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), public developers, and private 
businesses are actively engaged in property development in China. Housing is also not wholly 
“privately-owned” because homes are bought and owned on 70- to 90-year leases. A new law 
passed in 2007 recognizes the legal status and protection of private property. I examine a case 
study of apartment building residents to show that the impacts of economic reform as manifested 
in changes in the built environment affects the lived experience and practices of socialization. 
 
Figure 41: Typical danwei housing, built in the 1980s. Rent for a 2-bedroom apartment here 
costs around 1,000 RMB/$160 USD per month. Source: photo by author, July 2013. 
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Figure 42: A high-security and upscale, gated community in the suburbs of Nanjing equipped 
with indoor and outdoor swimming pools, tennis courts, and a private-management company 
(wuye guanli) responsible for security, mail, and trash services. A typical apartment in this 
community costs around 5,000 RMB (US$824) per month, about five times more than a typical 
apartment in the city. Source: Photo by author, May 2013. 
The complexity of the state-market relationship in urban China has been well 
documented (see chapter 1), and I contribute to the existing literature by adding the social and 
qualitative component of how broader structural changes are affecting the lived experience of 
common citizens. I am interested in how ruptures in Mao-era conceptions of the state and market 
caused changes in ideas of public (i.e. communal) and private (i.e. individual) life. While people 
moved towards living more private lives, the built environment changed to accommodate these 
lifestyle changes, such as building single-family condos, separate toilets, and individual showers. 
Meanwhile, the proliferation of high-rise apartment buildings were catalyzed by state and capital 
interests in the commodification of land and housing markets, which also encouraged more 
private and individual lifestyles. Perhaps most important, the popularization of new apartment 
buildings featuring “modern” amenities such as dishwashers, wireless internet and air 
conditioning, were fueled by a rising demand for certain material comforts witnessed through 
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and encouraged by the more apparent and growing elite class in China, as well as access to 
American televisions shows and movies featuring luxury homes (Wang 2005, 2010).  
Class aspiration is an important part of Chinese culture and the growing demand of new 
housing complexes—that is, buying an apartment with multiple rooms, private bathrooms, and a 
modern kitchen is an important marker of success (Wang 2010). The transformations of public 
life and sociability caused and were caused by changes in the built environment that encouraged 
more individual and private lifestyles, as well as the growing demand for such homes. In other 
words, the production of new housing engaged in a mutually constitutive relationship with 
growing notions of individualism. In this I follow Ong and L. Zhang (2008) who write:  
we challenge the Chinese discourse on privatization as limited to market activities. 
Instead we view privatization as a set of techniques that optimize economic gains by 
priming the powers of the private self...We view privatization as a process that both 
produces free-floating values of self-interest and allows them to proliferate in daily life. 
(3) 
 
The privatization of daily life, not just in the marketplace, but also in the “privatization of the 
self” is manifested through new housing preferences. In short, not only did the spatial production 
of new housing supply allow for the constitution of the new middle classes as a social group, but 
also the growing demand for new material comforts and the aspiring middle classes fueled this 
spatial production. This process describes the mutual constitutive relationship between the new 
middle classes and the new, gated communities. It is not simply that the built environment 
produces class differences, but that class differences (differences in both “taste” and financial 
resources) produce a variegated built environment.  
In contextualizing this case study within the changing economic climate from communal 
and socialist to private and capitalist, thinking about the public/private divide is useful in 
understanding the changes brought about through new ideas of modernity: “The contrast between 
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the ‘personal’…and the impersonal…is in fact widely experienced…as one of the great divides 
of modern life. But historically these two poles [public and private] emerge together; and the 
sharpness of the split between them is one of the defining characteristics of modernity” 
(Weintraub 1997, 20-21). The aim of this chapter is to examine the ways in which privatization 
in its various forms has transformed social life in urban China.  
The data show both positive and negative aspects to these lifestyle changes. For example, 
many of my respondents described the benefits of privatization and modernity, especially the 
increased availability of food and material comforts (e.g., personal toilets and reliable 
electricity). The same respondents usually expressed nostalgia for certain aspects of the Mao era 
and complained about the loneliness and isolation of individual condo life. My initial experience 
hearing these stories left me wondering whether or not the economic reform largely benefitted or 
harmed the majority of the population. This question encouraged me to delve deeper into the 
ways in which life has changed since economic reform began over 30 years ago. It is thus useful 
to compare the lived experience of Old Nanjing, which retains some aspects of the customs and 
lifestyles of the past (e.g., public life and social contact in the street), and life in various types of 
apartment buildings, some of which retain aspects of life under the danwei socialist system 
during the Mao-era.26 
My research questions reflect the importance of political-economic structures in daily life 
and how contentious political issues have individual effects on the local level. I ask the 
questions: How do various city residents perceive condos with private management companies 
versus public housing units? How has public and social life changed along with changing notions 
                                                
26 The danwei apartments in which I conducted my research were built in the 1980s. These apartments were 
distinguished from the “commercialized housing” in a few major ways: they did not have management companies 
(wuye guanli), their owners bought them as over 75% subsidized by the state, they were built over twenty years ago, 
they were not gated, and they had sizable (at least 50%) migrant populations living there. 
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of individualism in the new “capitalist” economy? How are the emerging middle-classes formed 
and taking on various identities through transforming notions of private property ownership and 
high housing prices? I show through an analysis of everyday life of apartment building residents 
that the emerging state mode of production in urban China—which produces high-rise apartment 
buildings geared toward private homeownership—is transforming social relations. The new 
social relations are illustrated through new conceptions of private property, safety, neighborly 
relations, and perceptions of future prospects for their children. 
In this chapter, I first outline a literature review on gated communities and the middle-
class. I then briefly establish a theoretical framework drawing on Lefebvre to establish my 
understanding of the state mode of production in producing abstract space through private 
property and its resulting fragmentations and homogenizations. Finally, I present an 
ethnographic case study of the middle classes in Nanjing, China. The ethnography is separated 
into two parts: first, the socioeconomic disparity and contestation over urban space as 
exemplified in the differences between public and private housing. Second, I discuss some of the 
primary concerns of my middle-class research participants: the burden of skyrocketing housing 
prices, pressure for their child’s future success, and the stress of being able to provide for the 
family. I conclude that the recent proliferation of private homeownership has created new class 
formations constituted in the uneven development of housing.   
II. The Middle Classes and Gated Communities: Exclusion, Privilege, and Morality 
I am using the United States as a comparative model because there is a long tradition of 
U.S. based research investigating the effects of gated communities on society (for example, see 
the studies by Y. Zhang and Fang 2004 and Madrazo and Kempen 2012 that compare urban 
processes in the U.S. and China). Much of the U.S. based literature discusses the perceived 
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disadvantages of gated communities, including: exclusion, segregation, and loss of public and 
social life (Blakely and Snyder 1999; N. Duncan and Duncan 2003).  
The critical urban planning literature in the U.S. traces its roots to Jane Jacobs’ (1961) 
searing critiques of scientific and technical planning practices of her time. Old Nanjing is the 
kind of city that Jacobs (1961) envisions will emerge out of organic social processes of diversity 
and “sidewalk contacts.” Sociability is defined as the frequency of vibrant and lively interactions 
between various people located in a given place. Based on her experiences in Greenwich Village, 
NYC, and other U.S. cities, Jacobs (1961) defines public life as sociability in the following 
ways: diversity as agreeable and amiable; life in the sidewalks and streets; disorderly; and 
sociability among strangers. For Jacobs, public life is not about political participation or 
collective action, but instead about the spontaneity and sociability that arises from the interaction 
of heterogeneous individuals, which is of key importance in sustaining life in the street. Some of 
her policy prescriptions include encouraging the use of sidewalks as nodes of contact and 
security: 
The tolerance, the room for great differences among neighbors…are possible and normal 
only when streets of great cities have built-in equipment allowing strangers to dwell in 
peace together on civilized but essentially dignified and reserved terms. Lowly, 
unpurposeful and random as they may appear, sidewalk contacts are the small change 
from which a city’s wealth of public life may grow. (Jacobs 1961, 72) 
 
Despite the prevalence of Jacobs’ ideas in the theoretical urban planning literature, the 
proliferation of gated communities in the U.S. continues. The popularization of single-family 
homes in the suburbs reflects purchasing power dynamics and lifestyle preferences of the 
wealthy classes, which perpetuates the existence of these communities despite their recorded 
failures and reflects the cultural hegemony of the elite classes. In Old Nanjing the life of the 
street is absolutely crucial to that community’s social relations, and the loss of street life in other 
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areas of Nanjing due to the proliferation of high-rise apartment buildings is described in this 
chapter. 
While the current Chinese trajectory of urban development does not generally follow the 
Western literature inspired by Jacobs, Old Nanjing exemplifies the kind of city Jacobs (1961) 
describes:  
Under the seeming disorder of the old city, wherever the old city is working successfully, 
is a marvelous order for maintaining the safety of the streets and the freedom of the city. 
It is a complex order. Its essence is intricacy of sidewalk use, bringing with it a constant 
succession of eyes. (50) 
 
In defining public life as sociability, Old Nanjing serves as an example, while gated communities 
in China, including those described in this chapter, serve as the counter-example to public 
sociability.  
Lefebvre (1991) draws on Jacobs’ work in The Production of Space, “She [Jacobs]…very 
forcefully demonstrate[d] how destructive this [abstract] space can be, and specifically how 
urban space, using the very means apparently intended to create or re-create it, effects its own 
self-destruction” (364). Lefebvre then goes on to describe how Jacobs’ work invoked a need for 
“participatory” and “advocacy” planning in urban policy circles. Lefebvre (1991, 364) describes 
the participatory planning process as a failure because it was the work of capitalism co-opting 
liberal democratic institutions in order for capitalism to re-appropriate the space for its own 
purposes. In using Lefebvre’s and Jacobs’ framework to look at China, it becomes clear that 
similar processes of a change in social life have occurred there, but the discourse of 
“participatory planning” has not. In other words, while I make some important connections and 
similarities between the process of “death and life” of U.S. and Chinese cities, I recognize and 
emphasize that the process unfolds in different political-economic contexts.  
  
167 
Scholars have also taken an interest in gated communities in China (Miao 2003; F. Xu 
2008; F. Wu 2010). The proliferation of private homeownership has profoundly affected the 
social life of many in urban China, including altering conceptions of marriage, individuality, 
freedom, privacy, and class (L. Zhang 2010; G. Chen 2011).27 The creation of emerging middle 
classes is partially constituted through new formations in the built environment. The emerging 
middle classes in China are transforming urban space with the proliferation of gated 
communities, establishing social status through conspicuous consumption, and emulating upper-
class tastes and lifestyles (Pow 2009; H. Ren 2013).28 Evidence in the gated community literature 
points to increased socio-spatial segregation as class-based interests in privacy and freedom are 
mutually constituted through property. The following section reviews the China scholars 
studying the constitution of the emerging middle-classes in gated communities, luxury 
apartments, shopping malls and other “civilized” spaces.  
Pow (2009) investigates the territoriality of middle-class interests, especially privacy, 
freedom, and private property established in gated communities.29 For Pow (2007), “the moral 
ordering of urban spaces is a key component in shaping and structuring territoriality and social-
spatial exclusion in Shanghai’s gated communities” (1554). The middle-class legitimize their 
demand for gated communities in order to maintain their ideals of “civilized modernity” by 
                                                
27 The ethnographic section of this chapter will discuss these changes in social life in more detail. I use the 
term “privatization of homeownership” in following the trend in the literature including those cited here because the 
prices are determined by the market and homes are obtained through mortgages as the responsibility of the 
individual. This points to an important distinction between the land market (state-owned and controlled) and the 
real-estate market (managed by both public and private developers). As this chapter will show, I emphasize that 
using the terms “public” and “private” are highly contentious to describe these relationships.  
 
28 Following Zhang (2010) I use the term “middle classes” because the middle-class is such a complex and 
heterogeneous category (see my discussion in Chapter 1 and 5 for a more in-depth analysis of class formation). The 
social formation of the middle classes comprises an amalgamation of various actors, structures, and practices. 
 
29 Territoriality is defined as the spatial manifestation of social power and the interrelation of society and 
space, wherein social power is secured through the control of space. Hsing (2010, 8) defines territoriality as “spatial 
strategies to consolidate power in a given place and time.”  
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excluding and “othering” rural migrants. These discourses will be further explored in the 
ethnographic section. I build on L. Zhang’s (2010) Lefebvrian approach to the “spatialization of 
class” to understand the emerging middle classes in the context of socioeconomic disparity as 
manifested in the built environment: “the production of commodity housing…provides the 
physical and social ground on which the making of the new middle classes becomes 
possible…Emerging places offer a tangible location of a new class to materialize itself through 
spatial exclusion” (L. Zhang 2010, 3-4). In conclusion, the extant literature on the emerging 
middle classes in China reveals that the middle classes as a dynamic and fluid category of people 
has begun to define itself through the exclusion of the “less-deserving other.” The middle 
classes’ interest in private property, social order, and consumption is thus mutually constituted 
through certain housing production based on values of individualism and freedom.   
China’s housing market is one place where debates over public and private property are 
played out. In examining the relationship between private homeownership and poverty in China, 
G. Chen (2011, 2012b) argues that the new capitalist economy has created an environment where 
homeownership is virtually required, which results in poverty and housing deprivation for the 
lower classes. China’s housing market is considered to be “privatization-oriented” because 
private homeowners have better access to housing than non-owners (G. Chen 2012b). Even poor 
homeowners, though destitute, have better housing conditions and social advantages over non-
owners (G. Chen 2012b). She writes, “the homeownership paradox occurs because both ends of 
the current ownership path (whether or not to own) cannot provide sustainable housing solutions 
for the poor. To own a housing property, for many poor families, is not a better choice, but only 
a ‘less bad’ arrangement among the limited options open to them” (G. Chen 2011, 1150). In 
other words, the state mode of production of space in urban China has resulted in a cultural 
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normative and societal imperative to own a home, which results in housing deprivation and 
poverty for non-owners. The privatization of housing in China is a contentious debate, where 
many argue that the proliferation of private homeownership in China has resulted in an increase 
in the gap between the rich and the poor and relative disadvantage to the poor (see for example 
G. Chen 2011). While G. Chen focuses on the disadvantage of housing ownership to the poor, I 
instead explore a case study of how private homeownership has affected the emerging middle 
classes in urban China with both positive and negative effects. My case study analyzes the 
changing role of the state in service provision, middle-class desires for increased security, the 
burden of high housing prices, the pressure for child’s future success, and the deterioration of 
social life in the neighborhood.   
As discussed in chapter 2, the local state in urban China plays a key role in controlling 
land-lease sales and profits politically and economically from land commodification and large-
scale urban construction projects (Hsing 2010). As such, the social space of the middle-classes 
reinforces state power as it encourages private homeownership and construction of new 
apartment complexes. This process disguises the broader political-economic structures that are 
contributing to the extreme uneven development and inequality in urban China. The discourse of 
self-responsibility helps maintain state power. The Chinese state thus depends on the social space 
of the middle classes to maintain its legitimacy while protecting the middle classes’ interests in 
private property and wealth accumulation.  
III. Ethnographic Sketches of the Material and Social Relations of Housing 
The following sections present an ethnographic sketch of the emerging social spaces of 
the middle classes as they engage with new production and consumption processes of the 
housing market. I illustrate in this chapter that the formation of the middle classes is highly 
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contested, heterogeneous, and dynamic. Following Pow (2009), L. Zhang (2010), and Ren 
(2013), the interests and preferences of the middle classes produce the built environment (i.e., 
gated communities). These class-based interests include protecting private property rights, 
individuality, freedom, privacy, and security, while maintaining a civilized, orderly, clean, and 
quiet environment. In analyzing the desires and frustrations of the middle classes in achieving 
these ideal living conditions, I interrogate the Lefebvrian theory of a mutually constitutive 
relationship between production of space, social formation, and practices of everyday life.30 I 
conclude that new conceptions of homeownership, self-responsibility, and individuality 
reinforced by housing market reforms influence class formation and everyday life. These 
processes of social formation and individual experience include: the emerging middle classes in 
opposition to the migrant worker, desires of privacy and material security as realized in gated 
communities, social and cultural pressures related to obtaining private homeownership, and lack 
of social interaction in the street. 
In the first section, I examine the relationship between the built and social environments 
of twenty residents living in apartment buildings in Nanjing. I compare the differences between 
danwei versus commercial housing and owners versus non-owners. I analyze the responses to 
questions regarding satisfaction levels of the living environment, compound management, 
security concerns, and desires for privacy. In the second section, I examine the social life and 
economic pressures of the emerging middle-classes in terms of high housing prices, children’s 
future prospects, and declining social life in the neighborhoods.  
A. Urban Landscape Transformations: From Danwei Housing to Gated Communities  
                                                
30 In the Chinese context, I specifically examine the state mode of production as processes of spatial 
formation shaped by the state, including those underpinned by notions of the free market, private property and 
exchange value. 
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There exists a clear and strong distinction both socially and materially between privately 
managed (wuye guanli) communities and state-provided danwei housing (see figures 43 and 44). 
For example, danwei housing provided by the state is considered by its residents to exhibit poor 
hygiene, unpleasant or deteriorating living conditions, and inadequate security. Many residents 
of danwei housing see the buildings, their neighbors, and sometimes themselves as low quality or 
uncivilized.31 Gated communities with wuye guanli, on the other hand, appear impeccably clean 
and orderly, have well-manicured gardens, boast of peace and quiet, and maintain reliable 
security guards and anti-theft systems. Many residents both inside and outside of the gates view 
these compounds as well as the residents as prestigious, high-class, and civilized. The wuye 
guanli assumes responsibilities previously regulated by the state, including the mail, trash, and 
security.  
 
Figure 43: A typical danwei style apartment building built in the 1980s. Source: Photo by author, 
July 2013. 
                                                
31 See chapters 2 and 4 for more discussion of these notions of self-identity and an analysis of “quality,” or 
suzhi in Chinese, and how one’s sense of identity is increasingly shaped in economic terms and measurements of 
value.  
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Figure 44: A typical wuye guanli housing compound built in 2012. Source: photo by author, May 
2013. 
Shaping the urban landscape of danwei versus wuye guanli housing 
 
The Maoist state (1949-1976) sought to create an egalitarian society by eliminating 
private property and distributing comparable public housing by way of each urban citizen’s work 
unit (danwei). Known as danwei housing, its architectural style and functionalist planning was 
heavily influenced by Soviet-style urban design (Bray 2005). Danwei housing provided by the 
state was designed and implemented with the intention of fostering equality and a collective 
social life.  
Although few Chinese citizens would deny that material conditions have improved 
immensely with commercialized housing—private toilets, indoor heating and cooling, and 
reliable electricity to name a few—six research participants also reported discomforts of the 
privatized and commercialized housing, including the isolation and loneliness of their high-rise 
apartment buildings and the immense pressure of a life-long mortgage. While members of the 
middle classes often yearn for privacy and material comfort, many are also nostalgic for their 
previous social life in danwei housing. The conflict between danwei and wuye guanli housing 
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illustrates how new formations of property relations under a market economy shape social 
relations. 
 Of the twenty middle-class respondents that I interviewed,32 ten lived in privately 
managed gated communities, referred to in Chinese as having an wuye guanli, while ten lived in 
state-provided apartments, known colloquially as danwei fenpeide.33 All of the respondents made 
very clear throughout the interview the type of community in which they lived because these two 
types of housing are different in China and indicate social status. For example, if I asked them 
about security, they might respond, “Oh no, you don’t understand. I live in a danwei fenpeide 
apartment. It’s not like the new apartments with wuye guanli. We don’t have a security system, 
let alone security guards,” or in response to a question about trash or recycling, they may 
respond, “I don’t know anything about that because the wuye guanli takes care of it for us.” If I 
asked them how much their home cost and if they took out a mortgage, they may respond, “Our 
house was extremely cheap because it was given to us by the danwei so we didn’t need to take 
out a loan.” Within these two distinct housing types, occupation and income varied greatly, 
though usually respondents with a higher income lived in apartments with wuye guanli. Also 
within both of these groups were owners and non-owners alike, which also may play a factor in 
housing and social life satisfaction.  
 Of the ten respondents living in wuye guanli, nine were generally satisfied with their 
living conditions in terms of their physical environs. In responding to the question of what they 
were satisfied with, respondents described secure safety mechanisms, peaceful environs, 
adequate trash or hygiene upkeep, and close proximity to public transportation. Their satisfaction 
                                                
32 For an explanation of how I determined the category of “middle-class” and an explanation on methods 
and interviews, please see Chapter 3.  
 
33 This descriptive term was used by respondents to indicate that they or their parents had obtained the 
government-subsidized apartment at a low price through their work units. 
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reflects the overall acceptance of economic reform and general embrace of the new material 
comforts that capitalism provides. Li Xinyi, a female middle-class resident (non-owner) of an 
upscale gated community of high-rise apartment buildings that was just built less than a year ago, 
provides an image of the comforts of the wuye guanli. She pays 5,000 RMB/$813 USD a month 
to rent her 2-bedroom apartment, about five times more than a typical danwei apartment costs to 
rent: 
I have nothing to complain about this apartment. It’s got a big garden outside so we can 
take a walk. It’s got a gym and an indoor and outdoor swimming pool so I can go work 
out. And also it’s very safe here too, the wuye guanli is very professional and they always 
help us with whatever we need, so it makes us really comfortable and feel safe staying 
here. (Interview with author, May 2013) 
 
She gave some examples of the services the wuye guanli provided, which included 24/7 security 
guards at each entrance, 24/7 on-call repair service, trash, landscaping, and mail. This represents 
a broader shift in Chinese political-economic trajectory and society that devolves state power and 
involvement in everyday life to private companies.  
 Of the ten respondents living in danwei housing, seven reported that they were generally 
dissatisfied with the living environment, and three were satisfied. Of the seven middle class 
respondents reporting that they were overall dissatisfied with the danwei housing, most reported 
unruly, crude, or disruptive neighbors, poor security systems, poor hygiene, and poor trash 
collection and management. During an interview, Yang Juan, a 36-year old female middle-class 
(state-owned enterprise employee) and owner of a danwei-subsidized house, explained why she 
was dissatisfied with the living environment of public housing: 
It would be better if this place had a wuye guanli, you know a normal management 
company. The parking lot is always full, and there is trash strewn about everywhere, it’s 
pretty annoying. Because there’s nobody to take responsibility for it, so people just park 
their cars wherever and there’s nobody to pay attention to (guan) this problem. I think if 
we had a wuye guanli this apartment complex would be quite nice. But without a wuye 
guanli, the people who have relatively good qualifications (tiaojian) have already moved 
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out. So most of the people that live here are renters, people who work in the downtown 
area. You know, outsiders (waidide). People who own the homes here usually don’t live 
here; it’s very uncommon to run into a homeowner in this complex. (Interview with 
author, July 2013) 
 
Yang Juan expresses common sentiments shared by many urban residents as a homeowner of 
danwei housing. The subject of her complaints highlights the retreating role of the welfare state 
and the increasing privatization of public services. The wealthier owners rent their homes to 
migrants working in the area as her house is located in downtown and in close proximity to many 
restaurants, bars, and markets. She not only dislikes her living environment because it lacks 
appropriate management services, including trash collection, but she also disapproves of the 
quality of her neighbors. Her words mark a clear distinction between owners and renters of 
danwei housing. The owners embody “high quality” residents, who are usually native Nanjingese 
working for the government or other official work unit. They are compared to non-owners of 
danwei housing exemplifying lower quality, who are usually rural migrants working manual 
labor or service jobs.  
 Yang Juan continues on to say during the interview that she thinks living in a “high-
class” apartment would be well worth the money if she could ever afford it so that her daughter 
could be raised in a more “civilized environment” (wenming huanjing). Her words indicate that 
due to changing socio-spatial relations in urban China, social divisions between groups have also 
become very divisive since the middle class define their identity in opposition to the “Other” 
rural migrants. Therefore when rural migrants also inhabit the same apartment complexes as the 
“higher quality” local members of the middle class, they feel threatened, and uncomfortable. The 
identity of the middle-classes is predicated on Othering migrant workers and excluding those 
deemed unworthy through establishing class formation in the built environment (see chapter 4). 
Middle-class residents create discursive constructions of a “moral order” defined as an urban and 
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civilized modernity that is explicitly directed at the social exclusion of rural migrants (Pow 
2007). 
 As a result of the recent influx of rural migrants, many participants automatically 
associate the danwei housing with lower quality or less civility because migrant workers are 
living there. 28-year-old Li Qingzi, resident of her family’s danwei apartment, which her mother 
owns, often complained to me about her apartment complex. Before visiting her home in 
celebration of the Chinese New Year in early 2012, she warned me that because her family had 
spent their entire life savings on hospital bills when her father got cancer, they had no money left 
to buy a house, and as a result were still living in a danwei apartment given to them in the early 
1990s, and as she described to me, was in terrible condition. Indeed, the compound was quite 
dilapidated and unkempt, though I was surprised that she expressed such anxiety about bringing 
me there as she seemed to think I would think less of her if I knew of her family’s home’s 
condition. The next year, during a formal interview, I asked her what aspects of her home she 
was satisfied with and what could be improved. She responded:      
There is absolutely nothing to like about it, I hate it. It will be demolished at the end of 
this year so there’s nothing to improve. It’s loud, and the environment is just terrible. 
There’s nothing good about it. It’s old and falling apart. You’ve seen it yourself so you 
should know. It’s the world’s worst apartment complex. Almost everyone that lives there 
are outsiders (wailairen), and they all have too many kids, and they don’t pay attention 
(guan) to them well enough because they’re too poor, so the kids are always running 
around causing a ruckus, being loud, and dangerous. (Li Qingzi, July 2013) 
 
One aspect of Li Qingzi’s complaints is that the physical environs and built environment itself is 
not adequate. She also dislikes the people that live there, categorizing them as wailairen, an often 
derogatory term used to describe migrant workers, and describes them as overpopulated. There is 
a disconnect between her perception and the lived experience expressed in her view since 
migrant workers generally have no more than two children. I visited her apartment complex for 
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Chinese New Year in 2012 and although her house was more “run-down” than many others I had 
visited, it was a typical danwei apartment complex.  
 Her perception of the poor quality of her house is that which is juxtaposed as an 
alternative against luxury apartments. The deterioration of danwei housing, as well as the 
increased presence of migrant workers there, has resulted in devaluation of state-provided homes 
not only by the government, but also rejection of danwei housing by the citizens themselves. 
Their preferences reflect the overall political-economic shift from state-provided social safety 
nets to neoliberal discourses of self-responsibility. This shift challenges previous state-generated 
notions of social egalitarianism and introduces new social divisions as manifested through 
housing equality. As a result, the middle classes usually describe danwei housing as backward 
and reserved for rural migrants, who are socially excluded by residents who stereotype them as 
hickish, crude, and less-educated.  
 Another obvious trend in the shift from danwei to private housing is in the social services 
provided by the state versus private management companies. As Yang Juan relates above, private 
management companies are coveted aspects of gated communities, as they often take care of 
aesthetic landscaping, trash collection, and security. In L. Zhang’s (2010) study of the middle 
classes as constituted in gated communities, she takes interest in new forms of the devolution of 
state power to private companies. She describes how direct state intervention by way of the 
danwei social unit as provider of housing, cafeteria, and childcare has shifted to private real-
estate management companies that are now primarily responsible for keeping social order and 
administration of local services, such as postal services: 
But because these agents are commonly regarded as commercial entities, their political 
nature is often overshadowed by their market role and commercial interests…The rise of 
this privatized local governance should not be understood as a retreat of state power or 
the opening of civil society; rather, it signifies the emergence of a distinctive mode of 
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postsocialist governance that draws upon nonstate actors and combines neoliberal 
techniques of rule and the use of violence. (L. Zhang 2010, 187-88)  
 
Her work reveals the convergence of socialist rhetoric and government with neoliberal 
governance as realized through the privatization of public services. The changing aspects of the 
state-market relationship in contemporary urban China is inherently connected to the shift from 
state-provided danwei housing to private homeownership, a shift that affects social relations and 
social life. Instead of the local state being directly involved in the coordination of daily life and 
social affairs (as it was with the management of danwei housing), it now instead encourages 
private homeownership to drive its own agenda of capital accumulation through construction of 
the built environment.  
Desires for increased security  
 Although concerns about physical safety were relatively absent from everyday life for all 
of my respondents, concern for safety and security of material possessions was ubiquitous across 
all social groups. For example, most homes in both gated communities and un-gated 
communities alike had bars over the windows and doors, as well as some with barbed wire 
fences and 24/7 security guards (See figures 45 and 46). The concern of middle classes for their 
safety and security, especially in regards to their concern for material possessions, indicates the 
retreat of police presence, the widening gap between rich and poor, and the penetrating discourse 
of fear surrounding the rural migrant as an intruder and threat.  
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Figure 45: Security Concerns: This is a picture of a typical gated danwei apartment complex, 
where some of the residents have opted to get security bars over their windows. It is rumored that 
thieves have learned to climb up the side of buildings, so even those on the top floor have 
invested in security measures. Source: Photo by author, June 2013.  
 
Figure 46: Security in a typical alley in Old Nanjing, where many of the homes have steel bars 
over the windows and doors. Source: photo by author, May 2013. 
 I follow Pow (2007) in asserting that “territoriality in Shanghai’s gated communities is 
constructed and enforced via a moral spatial regime that is fixated on the subject of the migrant 
worker/outsider-as-threat and intruder” (1542). New private property relations are reflected in 
the use of security devices that serve to exclude rural migrant workers and reinforce middle-class 
interests in private property regimes. Pow (2007) further explains, 
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to ensure that physical and social order in the neighbourhood is well maintained, a prime 
objective in gated communities is to keep unruly ‘trouble-makers’ from trespassing into 
the estate and ‘messing up’ the internal order and peace. Invariably, threats to the 
civilised order in gated communities are seen to come from migrant workers who are 
often perceived to be disorderly in conduct, lacking in basic civil etiquette and ignorant 
of the concepts of order and civility. (1551)  
 
Security mechanisms are thus essential devices for securing middle-class identity through the 
exclusion of the rural migrant as Other. Through discussions of safety and security, I analyze 
how transforming notions of private property and class relations are constituted in the security 
mechanisms of gated communities. 
 In response to the question, “do you ever feel unsafe in your neighborhood,” most 
middle-class respondents replied, “No, I always feel very safe! I just have to watch my wallet, 
cell phone, and bike very carefully.”34 Only two out of ten middle-class respondents living in 
danwei housing said they felt unsafe, citing the high numbers of migrants living in their 
compounds as reason. However, when I asked all of the research participants, “what security 
measures do you think are necessary for your apartment complex,” almost everyone responded 
that at the very least 24/7 security guards, video cameras, fully-enclosed compound gates, and 
security doors and windows (fandaomen) were necessary to keep out intruders. Both the fear of 
losing one’s material possessions and perceptions of migrants associated with thievery permeate 
everyday practice and discourse.  
 While most respondents living in apartments with wuye guanli reported high levels of 
satisfaction with their security systems, those living in danwei apartments generally expressed 
dissatisfaction with their security systems. For example, Fu Yang, a middle-class resident of her 
parent’s danwei apartment, admitted she often felt unsafe in her neighborhood: 
                                                
34 For the urban lower-class and migrant workers living in Old Nanjing, the answers were more mixed, with 
about half of respondents saying they never felt unsafe and half of respondents saying they felt unsafe.  
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Anyone can get through the four entrances to the compound because there isn’t a gate. 
Anyone can easily pass through the compound’s four entrances. It seems like they put up 
some security cameras recently, but I don’t know if they’re useful. There’s so much that 
can be improved upon in terms of security! They don’t even have a security gate or a 
security guard! Anyone can just walk in. I feel very unsafe, especially around the migrant 
workers. (Fu Yang, interview with author, May 2013)  
 
The safety and security discourses revolve around two new aspects of social life in postreform 
urban China: the increasing presence of rural migrants and the widening gap between the rich 
and the poor. 
 Along with new notions of security, many of those in the Chinese middle-classes have 
expressed newfound needs for privacy and freedom. After Li Xinyi mentioned that she wanted to 
become a homeowner because she wanted privacy, I asked her what was so important about 
privacy to her. She replied,  
Privacy, [pause] I just think it’s part of the human rights, people should respect other 
people’s privacy. Freedom, [pause] I just always liked freedom.  And security, [pause] 
I’m a person that always feels insecure, I need something that makes me feel secure and 
having a house is one thing that can make me feel secure. I just feel like it’s my house and 
no one can kick me out. That is the best type of security. (Interview with author, May 
2013) 
 
The transition from danwei to private housing marks a significant shift in social life in urban 
China, including growing social divisions especially between the lower and middle classes as 
exemplified in the need to keep intruding rural migrants as residents and thieves out of their 
proximity. Yang Juan furthers the emphasis on the importance of safety and security and the 
privatization of services in her community:  
Normally, compounds always have a security guard at the gated entrances, including 
cameras on all sides of the compound. Something like this would be much better than 
what we have. But in our old and run-down complex, we don’t have any of that. We have 
no mode (mei banfa) of going about doing that, so we don’t get to have those security 
measures. If you look at a normal complex with wuye guanli those kinds of security 
measures are all quite good. (Interview with author, July 2013) 
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China’s new modes of governance through privatization have shifted the relationship between 
the state and the market. The shifts emphasized here go beyond shifts in political-economic 
ideologies or modes of governance to include an examination of in-depth and penetrating 
changes in social relations.  
B. Public and Social Life Transformations: From Egalitarian Community to Competitive 
Individuality 
 
While the focus of the previous ethnographic section is on the built environment, the 
following section reviews changes in social life for the middle classes in urban China. I noticed 
that the members of the middle classes were highly stressed and anxious about their own 
economic situations as well as their children’s future prospects of employment and wealth. 
During my frequent interactions with various age groups of the middle classes, concern about 
money, especially around housing prices and potential job prospects, constantly dominated 
topics of conversation. I link these concerns about financial security to the new conceptions of 
the relationship between the state, market, and society.  
According to H. Ren (2013), the middle classes in China are highly unstable (i.e., 
constantly fluctuating) and inherently risk-prone because they usually obtain their wealth 
through unconventional or risky means. Furthermore, the middle classes are often in a tenuous 
position economically and live in virtually constant fear of losing their current position. 
According to some ethnographic studies of the Chinese middle classes, as a group they are 
extremely insecure in their social and economic status, and as such are constantly plagued by 
fear of failing and therefore motivated to invest heavily in their child’s future success (L. Zhang 
2010; H. Ren 2013). In my interactions with the Chinese middle classes, I also observed this 
insecurity and the ways in which this insecurity and vulnerability is a reflection of the inherent 
interconnection between state-market-society.  
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Burden and pressure of high housing prices 
Many homeowners often complain about the social and economic pressures of owning a 
home. People with life-long mortgages deem themselves “house slaves” (fangnv) to describe the 
way they felt about working to pay off a loan payment each month. Furthermore, many of the 
non-owners from all social groups reported immense societal and cultural pressure to buy a home 
and/or provide for his or her child’s home. In China today, social status is marked by 
homeownership, as well as the home’s value and desirability. For example, many women will 
not marry, or sometimes even date, a man who does not yet own a home (or at least have a 
mortgage on a home). Meanwhile, many parents, especially parents of sons, are under incredible 
pressure to buy a home for their child and will spend their entire life savings on it. While in 
Nanjing during the summer of 2013, I was riding on the back of an unofficial mo-ped taxi when I 
asked the elderly female driver how she got into the job. She replied that her son wanted to get 
married, but could not get married without first buying a house. Though she had technically 
already retired and was collecting social security benefits, she had bought the mo-ped and started 
taxiing people around the city to help contribute to her son’s future home.  
Skyrocketing housing prices, social pressure to succeed in school so that one can get a 
good job and afford a home, and romantic relationship drama related to one’s homeownership 
situation are the most common topics of conversation among young people in China. A common 
topic of inquiry when one is first introduced to another is about homeownership; the number of 
homes, the amount of square meters, or the value of one’s home immediately reveals one’s social 
status. While I wanted to talk about demolition and redevelopment, my participants talked about 
putting aside pennies to save for their child’s future home. When I asked, “What are you most 
dissatisfied with in your life right now?” the most common response was, “high housing prices.” 
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One of the subtle contradictions I noticed in the interviews was the conflict over whether 
or not to buy a house. One of my interview questions asked, “Is buying or renting a home more 
appropriate for you?” Eighteen out of twenty middle-class respondents said they prefer to buy a 
house as opposed to rent one, though many confessed they would probably never actually be able 
to afford buying their own home. Only five out of twenty-one Old Nanjing residents hoped to 
own a home someday, and only two out of twenty migrant workers hoped to own a home 
someday, each group saying they simply would never be able to afford their own home. The 
reasons cited by the middle-class participants for wanting to own a home included cultural 
norms, social and parental expectations, a necessary step for the marriage, and the privacy, 
security, and freedom of owning your own home. For the most part, middle-class participants 
explained to me, “In China you must own a home. It’s socially unacceptable to rent, especially if 
you’re married. If you get married before owning your own home, you might as well have no 
home, and then you have no family (meiyou jia).”35 Although many middle-class Chinese 
insisted during interviews that it is a cultural and social imperative to own a home before 
marriage, respondents from all social groups confessed they would probably never be able to 
afford their own home. Some maintained that because housing prices are so astronomical, there 
was no shame in renting a house. Low-income respondents in particular had been renting their 
homes for years either because they had a rural hukou, or were past retirement age, or were 
unemployed. The Old Nanjing local and migrant residents told me “it’s not big deal if you rent a 
home. Anyway that’s all I can afford.”  
                                                
35 It should be noted that for many people, owning a home that was subsidized by the danwei is acceptable 
in this case. Indeed, with the privatization of danwei homes, many work units will subsidize the purchase of a home 
of one’s own choice rather than provide a specific home at low-cost, similar to a voucher system. In terms of the 
cultural norm, it is acceptable to own a danwei home. In the context of the participants who don’t like their danwei 
homes, that’s usually because they are still living in their parent’s danwei home from 20 years ago and so the 
conditions are quite dilapidated. 
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For the middle classes, many decisions, from choosing a major in college (as that choice 
will determine future job prospects and income level) to deciding when to get married are 
influenced by the burden and pressure of housing prices and the social imperative for private 
homeownership. For the poorer residents of Old Nanjing, homeownership was not even a 
possibility. Across all social groups, the repeating idea of “There’s nothing I can do about it; 
money determines our situation” was pervasive across all social groups. For the poorer classes, 
that meant, “I’ll never be able to own a home.” For the middle classes, that meant, “the burden of 
high housing prices is creating a lot of stress for my family and me.”   
The topic of skyrocketing housing prices and of the pressure and burden of being able to 
provide for a home was ubiquitous in everyday conversation across all social strata. For example, 
Yang Juan told me: 
Our homes here in China are so expensive. The houses in the buildings across the street 
are 30,000 RMB [$4,878 USD] per square meter. A house similar to mine would 
normally cost 3 million RMB [$488,000]! This price is quite frightful! So I could not 
afford to buy a house in the city without the danwei subsidy. The housing prices are quite 
terrible. (Interview with author, July 2013) 
 
I noticed that people did not show interest in making fundamental or structural claims to the 
challenges of the new economic system, but instead focus solely on the stress and pressure of 
social reproduction and providing for the family. Following Gramsci, the cultural hegemony of 
the local state and upper classes perpetuates and reinforces the ideology of capitalism (Jessop 
1997; Shin 2013). In conclusion, the burden of high housing prices has penetrated everyday life 
in urban China, which reflects a broader societal change in the context of economic reform that 
reflects new conceptions of homeownership, self-responsibility, and individuality as key to the 
new middle-class identity.  
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Immense pressure to buy a home was related to the idea that middle-class respondents in 
particular felt that they must own a home and that there was no other option. The following 
quotes exemplify new understandings of private property and desire for freedom in post-reform 
urban China. Fu Yang, a 30-year-old middle class female, explains why it is so important to buy 
a house in China, especially before marriage (even though she told me later that by her 
calculation, it is actually more economical to rent than to buy a house):  
Chinese people would definitely choose to buy a house, because we don’t like to rent 
houses. If they are living somewhere long-term, and they have a family, then they would 
prefer to buy a house…Because Chinese people take family very seriously, so if they buy 
a house they feel like they really have a family and it’s their own. But if they are just 
renting, then it will never be theirs, it’s always someone else’s. If I had enough money, I 
would definitely choose to buy a house. But if my economic conditions don’t allow that 
situation, then I must rent. That’s my only option. But while I’m renting I will feel that 
it’s not my home. (Interview with author, July 2013) 
 
One common phrase used to describe couples that get married before buying a house is “naked 
snails without shells” to signify that the new couple has no home or family if they are only 
renting. Indeed, a popular soap opera on TV was titled, “Snail Home” (wo ju) and chronicled the 
tales of several people living in Beijing struggling with high housing prices and chasing the 
dream to own a home. Fu Yang’s words reveal that new imperatives for private homeownership 
combined with the pressures of high housing prices have transformed daily life in urban China. 
Li Xinyi also told me about her immense and passionate desire to be a good mother and provide 
for the things that her children need:  
I don’t like living under someone else’s roof. You don’t get any freedom. The landlord 
can come by anytime and check your place, invade your privacy, give you attitude 
because you are the tenants, even though you pay rent every month on time. I feel if I 
have kids I want to provide them a stable life, which means I don’t want to have to 
constantly move, that’s the most important thing, when I have kids I want to give them a 
very stable living situation. I’ll need to buy a house for that. (Interview with author, May 
2013) 
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These examples indicate new imperatives of private homeownership as based on new private 
property relations under post-reform China. I do not suggest that the state discourse on 
neoliberalism has dominated everyday discourse and directed thoughts and actions in an uni-
directional manner, but rather that the Chinese middle classes themselves accept and promote the 
narrative of needing to buy a home.  
Concern and investment in children’s future success 
L. Zhang (2010) defines the middle-classes as marked by three distinct qualities: “their 
moment of emergence, their highly heterogeneous composition, and their heightened sense of 
insecurity” (7). The insecurity and fear of the middle classes of falling behind are notable 
characteristics of this group. I noticed a strong sense of deep desires to provide their family’s and 
child’s needs, especially in their child’s future as a productive citizen. During my fieldwork in 
2011-2012, my neighbors in Old Nanjing had a 5-year-old daughter in kindergarten. Their 
daughter had three classmates from school that would often come over to their house for play 
dates and the eight parents of the four girls were close friends. The three classmates were from 
middle class families. The neighbors and their family friends became very close friends of mine 
as well, as I helped their daughters with English and they frequently invited me over for dinner 
on the weekends. After dinner, the women would frequently sit around the dinner table and chat 
about their daughter’s progress in school or the latest endeavor or fad to help their daughters 
achieve higher marks in school (e.g., music lessons, dietary supplements). During the spring of 
2012, everyday conversation was dominated by the stress of ensuring their daughters would pass 
the entrance examinations at the best primary schools in the city. “It is important that my 
daughter be placed in a good primary school for first grade. If she doesn’t get into a good school 
now, she will only fall farther and farther behind her classmates. She will never have any hope of 
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passing the college entrance exam at that point.” The mother of the family, Zhu Chongyang, 
went to great lengths in researching the schools, waiting in long lines, preparing her daughter for 
the reading and writing tests, and talking to school officials. She said to me one day near the end 
of the spring semester, “I have a heavy burden on my heart every day. It affects my relationship 
with my husband and my daughter. It is the greatest stress I have ever experienced, not knowing 
which school my daughter will go to.” They discussed spending their entire savings on sending 
her to a private school, but then had to wonder how they would pay for her college. Eventually, 
they were thrilled to report that their daughter was accepted into an average public school not far 
from their home.  
When I returned in summer 2013, the daughters were finishing up first grade. The parents 
reported that first grade was incredibly stressful, involved frequent testing, and hours of 
homework every night. One night that summer after their daughters’ final exams, one of the 
mothers, looking exhausted as she retired with her feet up on one of the chairs, said,  
There isn’t a day when we don’t have some kind of business to do. All of my free time is 
taken up helping my daughter with her homework, I don’t have any time for myself. 
There’s so much pressure on them at school, it’s too much sometimes, and so much 
pressure on us as well to make sure they do well. Everything is so busy all the time. (Han 
Yangrui, interview with author, June 2013).  
 
The mothers nodded their heads in agreement at this comment. Indeed, this was a common 
complaint by the mothers. I could hear my neighbor helping her daughter with her homework 
every night for hours, often late into the night. I asked one of the other mothers what she liked to 
do for fun, and she responded, “Because right now I have made my 5-year-old daughter’s studies 
top priority, I don’t really have time for my own hobbies. Right now she has a lot of homework, 
so after work I always accompany her in doing homework” (Yang Juan, interview with author, 
July 2013). What can account for this pressure? I once asked them, “but you all have daughters, 
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so maybe you don’t have as much pressure to buy a house.” To which they responded, “it is true 
that we do not have as much pressure as families with sons to save money, but we must cultivate 
our daughters personalities, educations, and suzhi levels so that they can attract one of the top-
choice males that has a house. Otherwise we are hopeless for our daughter’s and our own 
future.” They also expressed the sentiment that their daughter might need to help pay for the 
house, or they might need to provide gift’s for the husbands family, or the daughter might be 
expected to own a car to make her more desirable for the male. This phenomenon is not unusual 
in China, as similar processes in New York City, South Korea, and Japan have been documented. 
Rather this reflects a combination of cultural norms, the One Child Policy, and economic 
transition in China that has exacerbated these anxieties. 
Deterioration of social and public life 
Out of the twenty middle class respondents, seventeen reported that their relationships 
with their neighbors were non-existent. This information contrasts with the interviews with the 
21 Old Nanjing residents, where 20 out of 21 of the respondents reported that their relationships 
with their neighbors was excellent, saying “they’re just like family to me.” When prompted 
about what kind of interaction Old Nanjing residents have with their neighbors, the respondents 
had similar answers, including cooking and eating dinner together, helping each other with 
laundry, and helping each other with babysitting duties. The extreme contrast in neighborly 
relations between Old Nanjing and the apartment complexes indicates a dramatic change in 
society in concurrence with the move from one-story houses to high-rise apartment buildings.  
I define public life as social interaction and life in the street. I show that the privatization 
of homeownership in China has resulted in the death of public life in the lack of socialization in 
streets similar to that observed in the United States (Jacobs 1961). I understand this shift as 
  
190 
contextualized in the promotion of new housing structures for the nuclear family has resulted in 
increased isolation and loneliness for apartment building residents. As Jacobs (1961) asserts, the 
death of the interactions in the streets of American cities resulted in the death of public life. In 
China, when people moved into high-rise apartment buildings, a dramatic shift changed in that 
they stopped having close relationships with their neighbors as the death of the space of the street 
in urban China occurred. This comparison between Chinese and American cities does not 
account for any effect of cultural norms, which are important factors. The purpose of the 
comparison is to draw out some similarities between two seemingly different contexts.  
Most respondents reported the complete lack of social life in their compound and feeling 
very isolated and lonely. Li Hua, a 29-year-old male middle class reported, “like most of the 
modern Chinese urban populations: don’t ask, don’t tell. Sometimes we see each other and say hi 
and that’s it and we don’t ask them about their life and they wouldn’t do so either, and personally 
I know very little about my neighbors” (Interview with author, July 2013). Another 29-year-old 
female respondent said, “I don’t have any contact whatsoever with my neighbors, we are all 
closed doors” (Li Qingzi). Many of the other responses were the same, indicating that the social 
and material changes brought about by economic reforms changed a part of daily life and the 
culture of the street.  
I once brought Li Qingzi to visit my home in Old Nanjing. As we were walking to my 
home from the bus stop, almost every neighbor stopped and chatted with me as we walked down 
my street. Li Qingzi was shocked at their hospitality and was in disbelief about the close social 
interactions I had with my neighbors in Old Nanjing. I told her that stopping to chat with people 
as you walked down the street—whether going to work or going to the bathroom—was an 
everyday occurrence for me. Not only that, but we often shared meals, food, and other services 
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like babysitting or English tutoring on my part, while my neighbors took care of me when I got 
food poisoning. My friends from the middle classes could not believe this when I told them 
because it was so different than their lives in the apartment complexes, many of which were 
quite isolating. The transforming social space of urban China constitutes and is constituted by 
changing property and class relations as based on the new private property regime. Changing 
conceptions of the state and market in urban China profoundly influence social relations on an 
individual level in everyday life. In following Lefebvre, the mutually constituted relationship 
between space-state-market-society is based on the housing market reforms. This is exemplified 
in changing notions of private property, which create new conceptions of homeownership, self-
responsibility, and individuality, causing new social pressure and stress in buying a house and 
providing for the family.  
IV. Conclusion 
Due to the changes in the mode of production and material life in postsocialist China, 
socio-spatial relations have shifted with the commodification of land and proliferation of private 
homeownership. The urban landscape is thus experiencing a conflict between the retreating role 
of the welfare state and active role of the state in shaping space and urban life (see Pusca 2008 
and Schwenkel 2012 for examples of landscape and the role of the state in other “post-socialist” 
spaces of Albania, Czech Republic, and Vietnam). The social and material shifts as reflected in 
the changes of the living environments and popular discourses reflect a broader political-
economic message that rejects the overbearing welfare state and largely embraces free market 
economics.  
I have argued that changing conceptions of the state and market in urban China 
profoundly influence everyday social relations on an individual level. Indeed, the opaque and 
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dynamic issue of commodified state-owned land and private homeownership reflects the 
complexity of the relationship between state and market in urban China (Hsing 2006b).36 In L. 
Zhang’s (2010) words, China is a “hybrid form of political economy, which combines market 
forces, socialist state rule, and neoliberal techniques” (4). In the case of the commodification of 
land and housing in post-reform China, the Chinese real estate market seems wrought with 
contradictions. On the one hand, the private and public are distinct material spheres as public 
danwei housing is socially and materially different from the privately managed gated 
communities. On the other hand, the distinction between public and private housing is blurred in 
China since one might live in privatized-danwei housing that is simultaneously subsidized by the 
university, purchased by the owner, built by a state-owned construction enterprise, and managed 
by a private company.  
While the change from public life to private life has already been well documented in the 
capitalist democracies of the West (Weintraub 1997), China provides an interesting case study to 
test critical theories in a recently transformed society under capitalist and socialist political-
economic policies. Due to the pervasiveness of housing prices in everyday conversation topics, it 
is imperative to include a chapter that studied the immense political-economic and social 
changes regarding the commercialization of housing. The ethnography illustrated how social 
relations and social reproduction has been transformed with the proliferation of private 
homeownership in urban China. One form in which new social divisions are played out in 
various parts of the world is in housing inequality as the wealthy elite barricade themselves 
behind highly-securitized gated communities alongside rapidly expanding urban slums, which is 
made especially obvious in rapidly developing countries such as China, Brazil, and India (see 
                                                
36 I use the term “commodified land” in following Hsing’s (2010) Polanynian approach to describe the 
unique land market in urban China because all land is owned by the state but leased to public and private developers.  
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Caldeira 2000; Roy 2011; Doshi 2012). I follow their lead by specifically focusing on the effects 
of economic reforms on housing inequality and social relations. 
The highly contested social spaces of the tenuous middle classes materialize in the 
differentiation between danwei and wuye guanli housing. The residents’ perceptions of the built 
environment and notions of security and privacy within the context of the state’s changing 
political-economic environment exhibit the complexity of the state-market-society relationship. 
Lefebvre’s notion of the production of space helps to unpack the phenomenon of the emerging 
mental, physical, and social spaces of the middle classes. The production of row after row of 
identical high-rise apartment buildings reflects Lefebvre’s notion of the production of abstract 
space as a perpetual cycle of expanding homogenous space while obviating inequalities. Abstract 
space as produced through the drive of capital and the state to accumulate wealth and power for 
the purposes of producing for exchange-value. Meanwhile, abstract space creates highly variable 
spaces of material inequality, such as the social and economic inequality between town and 
country (Lefebvre 1991, 277).   
There are political debates in China and around the world that contest whether state 
regulation or deregulation allows for more or less economic growth and benefits for the largest 
amount of people. Meanwhile, debates in the scholarly literature on China is furthering the 
exploration of how social relations in China are changing as a result of the hybrid economy of 
free markets and state control. The state plays a very active role in regulating the real estate 
market, while adopting managing techniques that promote self-governing and encourage various 
modes of privatization and consumption (L. Zhang 2010). The theoretical debates on the 
question of the role of the state in the production of space primarily involve Lefebvre in his 
understanding of the mutually constitutive relationship between the production of space, 
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formation of class, and everyday practice. These debates are effecting everyone in China in a 
major way, though the focus of this chapter is on the emerging middle classes as homeowners or 
aspiring homeowners that are insecure and anxious about their socioeconomic position, and as a 
result, project their anxiety onto the success of their children. The state is exacerbating 
socioeconomic inequality by encouraging private homeownership and its key role in working 
with developers to produce both homogenous and highly differentiated spaces. The state is 
embroiled in the market because it controls all land-lease exchange and profits economically and 
politically from large-scale urban infrastructure projects. Increasing a sociological, geographical, 
and anthropological understanding of the ways that broader political-economic shifts on global 
and national levels influence people’s daily lives is crucial to improving our prospects for 
happier and healthier lives in the future.  
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CONCLUSION 
While international trade proliferates and many developing countries experience record 
levels of GDP growth, evidence in the urban studies literature points to increased socioeconomic 
segregation and a widening gap between the rich and the poor in the countries (Sassen 1999; 
Brenner 2004; Banerjee-Guha 2010). Questions thus arise concerning the role of privatization 
and neoliberalism in exacerbating uneven development and thus increasing social tension 
between the winners and losers of laissez-faire economics (Peck and Tickell 2002; Swyngedouw, 
Moulaert, and Rodriguez 2002; Smith 2002). Amongst these changes, the state has not lessened 
in importance. In fact, the state is more important than ever as the site of contestation between 
the benefits of state regulation versus deregulation of the economy. This debate takes center 
stage in political debates over types of state formation in countries around the world. These 
political disputes over market regulation and privatization affect social relations and everyday 
life. Dramatic evidence of these global processes is China’s entrance into the global economy 
and its transition to a privatized economy. This provides the global and national contexts that 
situates my local study in broader processes of change. 
My main findings in this thesis include the following conclusions. In chapter 4, I find that 
though the importance of the hukou in daily life is decreasing, the material and social divisions 
between the urban and the rural in China is increasing. While K. Chan’s (2012) finds that the 
hukou on the macro-scale is contributing to major barriers to the growth of the middle-class in 
China, my study finds that on the micro-scale, the hukou is one of many barriers that rural 
migrants face to urban citizenship. My study is significant for understanding citizenship beyond 
political-legal definitions of hukou and new classifications of social capital that depoliticize class 
and instead use distinctions of taste. These urban-rural social and cultural divisions are made 
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clear through the classification of certain behaviors associated with the rural as “uncivilized,” 
which denies rural migrants their right to the city through everyday practices of exclusion.  
Symbolic and cultural capital thus intertwined with economic capital mutually constitute of class 
divisions. The state-constructed definition of citizenship (i.e. hukou) is rearticulated through 
individuals’ determinations of what constitutes a worthy resident of the city through behavior 
and consumption. Local and migrant urban residents contest these categories and reappropriate 
state discourses of citizenship and suzhi (inner-quality). Migrants too push back against state 
attempts to manage population flows by producing and occupying urban space for themselves.  
In chapter 5, I show that the landscape as a “way of seeing the world” symbolizing the 
material concretization of power creates class divisions. The landscape of Old Nanjing is 
constituted in representations and practices. The class identities constructed through the 
landscape illustrate cultural hegemony. Old Nanjing residents both consent to and resist class 
categories of “modern” and “backward” through various representations (e.g., stereotypes) and 
practices (e.g., chatting in the street). The representations and practices of Old Nanjing therefore 
both challenge and accept the state-constructed singular definition of urban modernity. Some 
practices of Old Nanjing openly contest the power relations of the state, either by refusing to 
evict or negotiate with the authorities, or through illegal activity such as prostitution, selling 
pornography, or selling food without a license. While L. Zhang (2010) also finds class divisions 
to be mutually constituted in the built environment of the middle classes, I draw on her work 
while focusing on old cities and poor communities to find how recent economic reforms and new 
class divisions have affected these communities. Finally, in chapter 6, I show how state 
restructuring resulted in a change in both the built environment (e.g., proliferation of high-rise 
apartments) and social environment (e.g., the death of public life and community). These 
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changes dramatically affected daily life and everyday practice in urban China. While G. Chen 
(2011, 2012a, 2012b) finds that private homeownership has resulted in mostly negative affects 
on poor populations, I show that there were both positive and negative affects on the middle 
classes.      
My study contributes to the urban studies literature by providing a spatial approach to 
class divisions through an interrogation of the rural/urban relationship, as well as investigating 
the social construction of landscape and the built environment. I extend the China studies 
literature by providing an ethnographic study of perceptions and attitudes of in-groups and out-
groups, which sheds light on the current nature of social cohesion in urban China. I expand the 
geography literature by confirming with evidence the theoretical development of L. Zhang’s 
(2010) notion of the “spatialization of class” in poor communities. Moreover, I examine how the 
privatization of homeownership has changed social relations in urban China.  
I have argued that social divisions in China can be partially explained through the 
concepts of production of space, cultural hegemony, and cultural capital. In this thesis, I have 
presented evidence that suggests Lefebvre and Gramsci provide appropriately complementary 
theoretical frameworks for explaining the social changes brought by economic reform in urban 
China. For example, in following Lefebvre, one of the primary arguments of the thesis is that 
class divisions are mutually constituted in spatial production of the built and social 
environments. I argue that Lefebvre is a particularly important theorist in my case study due to 
his explicit concerns on the role of the state and his direct engagement with the state modes of 
production. Gramsci also engages more deeply with structural aspects of power relations, while 
acknowledging the inherent fluidity and contested nature of power. Jacobs (1961) describes 
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rational urban planning and gated communities in the U.S. that are strikingly similar to what I 
witnessed in China.   
These theoretical frameworks are not a perfect fit for my work, and some caveats must be 
explicitly expressed. These theories were developed in a specific historical, political and cultural 
context that greatly influenced each theorist’s research and experience that informed his or her 
theory. Because China is not a democratic country, one could argue that it is difficult or even 
impossible to use these theories in the Chinese context. Some might even argue that the theories 
are not applicable to China because China is not a capitalist country, while others argue that 
China is masquerading as a socialist state with capitalist characteristics. I am not trying to fit the 
theories into a box containing my data, but rather to use them to gain theoretical insight into my 
case study as a broader picture of the human condition. I have attempted to show in this thesis 
that these theories are most appropriate for drawing out the nuances of the Chinese context. I 
illustrated in this thesis how components of the theory can be used to draw out certain aspects 
that would otherwise remain unnoticed. An example of this can be drawn out from Lefebvre’s 
theory of the right to the city.  
The “right to the city” literature has come to encompass a myriad of different studies 
related to social justice. When these studies take place in Western democratic countries, they 
focus on the “right to the city” in terms of one or more of the following paradigms: to speak and 
be heard; political participation and citizenship; the link between exclusion, rights, and justice; 
the privatization of public space; access to public space; right to assemble; the struggle to 
produce differentiated space; representation in public space; the production of public space and 
the centrality of difference (Mitchell 2003). When I read about the right to the city in the 
Western context, especially in regards to growing literature on the fight over public space, at first 
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I struggled to see its relevance to the Chinese context. At first glance, it seems as though there is 
no such thing as the right to the city in China, because there conceptualization of public space in 
terms of political speech, representation, and participation is unknown. Admittedly freedom of 
speech is contested, as there are protests and petitions that happen frequently. For example, 
despite widespread internet censorship, many people obtain devices and networks that allow 
them to disregard the internet sites that are blocked. Though grievances are often spoken in the 
petitions to the central government in Beijing, they are rarely heard. If heard, almost never acted 
upon by the authorities. When examining the right to the city as situated in the Western paradigm 
of rights constituted through law, national citizenship, and the state’s justice system, it can be 
difficult to understand the utility of the right to the city concept in the Chinese context.  
However upon a closer examination of Lefebvre’s (1996) Writings on Cities I came to a 
different conclusion. For Lefebvre, the right to city is a cry and demand for the transformation 
and renewal of urban life calls for a fundamental and radical transformation of the totality of 
economic, social, and political relations. Lefebvre understands the right to the city beyond the 
limitations of the current state structure as a type of citizenship not based on nationality, but 
rather earned by inhabitants through everyday life (Purcell 2003). Lefebvre does not understand 
the right to the city as the right to speak and participate as filtered through democratic state 
institutions. Rather, he urges us to fundamentally reject the current institutional structures that 
operate in democratic and Western contexts, and conceive of the right to the city as a direct 
decision-making process by all inhabitants to produce urban space (i.e. urban space to mean not 
only concrete space, but also the lived, conceived, and perceived space as constitutive of the 
social relations and everyday practices of urban life). Lefebvre directly resists the existing power 
structures of capital and the state, urging us to conceive of entirely new possibilities for the right 
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to the city as the right to appropriation and participation in the process of producing urban space. 
In this sense, the right to the city can indeed be applied to the Chinese context as a way to 
conceive of entirely different social relations under newly established power structures (He and 
G. Chen 2012). I thus used the right to the city to further understand not only how the middle 
classes both accept and reject the presence of migrants in the city, but also how migrants’ re-
appropriation of urban space to support livelihoods and their rejection of the urban as they plan 
to return home in the future is both a result of and a pushback against state discourse. Although 
in the end the right to the city did not take a primary spot in my thesis, in the future I will 
continue to pursue its application in the Chinese context in relation to rural-urban migration and 
private homeownership.  
 In the end, this thesis raised many questions. Do actors and agents really pay any 
attention to structure? How much control do structures have over our agency and what is the 
extent of our freedom? Does it matter that some of us are communist, some of us are socialist, 
and some of us are democratic, or is it all just the same anyway? What implications does further 
economic reform have for the people of China and the U.S.? What happens if when one travels 
to a somewhat similar developmental and neoliberal state in a different historical and cultural 
context? Are the outcomes completely different or are there some similarities? I believe that 
there are worthy comparisons that could be drawn out of comparative fieldwork in China. In my 
future work, I also plan to further investigate the urban planning discourse in China and its 
relation to the state. I hope to interview government officials and urban planning specialists to 
gain further insight into how their plans shape the perceived and lived spaces in urban China. In 
future research, I will further investigate zoning laws, textual analysis, archival work, and 
surveys in order to expand my perspective beyond a heavy reliance on interviews.  
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Appendix A (interview questions): 
 
Name 姓名 
Sex 性别 
Age 年龄 
Ethnicity 民族 
Hometown 家乡（籍贯） 
Birthplace 出生地 
Current address 现居地 
Personal income 个人收入（月） 
Family income 家庭收入（月） 
Marital status 婚姻状况 
Educational level 教育程度 
Major 专业 
Occupation 职业 
How long you have lived in Nanjing？ 在南京居住时间 
How long you have lived at your current address？ 在目前地址居住时间 
 
About your life 关于生活： 
1. What’s your best memory from when you were younger? 
你小的时候在家最美好的记忆是什么？ 
2. What are your hobbies? Do you participate in any social activities in your neighborhood 
or Old Nanjing, such as dancing or Tai Chi? 
你有什么爱好？你在老城南有没有参加一些社交活动，如跳舞、打太极等？ 
3. What are your hopes and dreams for the future? 
你未来的生活目标、计划、愿望是什么？ 
4. How many kids do you have? What hopes do you have for your kid? 
你有几个孩子？你对你的孩子有什么希望? 
5. What is the thing that you are most satisfied with in your life? What are you most 
unsatisfied with? 
你对你目前的生活感到最满意的方面是什么？最不满意的方面又是什么？ 
6. Are you involved in any business ventures? What kind? Why did you choose to go into 
this type of business and how did you get involved? 
你在做生意吗？在哪里做生意？做怎样的生意？你为什么选择你正在做的生意？你
怎样开始做这样的生意的？ 
 
About your neighborhood/Old Nanjing 关于小区或者老城南： 
7. Why did you move here? 你为什么搬到这里？  
8. For Old Naning residents only: If you could choose, would you live in a house in Old 
Nanjing or in a high-rise apartment building? 
如果你可以自己选择，你会住在老城南的老房子或者住在高楼？ 
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9. Are you renting this house or did you buy it? For how much? Did you take out a 
mortgage? 这套房子是买的还是祖的？多少钱？你贷款买吗？ 
10. From the perspective of both long term and short term, do you think it’s better to buy or 
rent a home? 从长期和短期的角度来看，买房跟租房哪一个对你来说更适合？ 
11. For rural migrants only: Are you homesick? What do you miss about home? 
你想家吗？想家乡的什么呢？ 
12. For rural migrants only: In the future do you plan to stay in Nanjing or return to your 
hometown? 你在未来计划留在南京还是回你家乡？  
13. According to your experience, what do you like about your neighborhood/Old Nanjing? 
What do you think still needs to be improved? 
根据你在老城南的个人经历和体会，你住这里最喜欢什么方面？这里什么方面还需
要改进？ 
14. How are your relationships with your neighbors? How are your interactions? Do you 
exchange any mutual support, such as eating together or helping each other with child 
care? 
你现在住的社区邻里之间关系如何？你跟邻居的交流怎样？你跟他们有没有互相帮
助（比如烧饭、带孩子等）？ 
15. How would you describe Old Nanjing? What is special about it? What is different about 
Old Nanjing than other places? What kind of environment does your current residence 
have? Do you have a security system? 您怎么描述老城南? 
老城南有什么特别的？老城南跟其它的地方有什么不同？你怎么描述这个小区附近
？你现在住的地方是怎样的环境？在小区吗？有没有保安和治安管理？ 
16. What kind of changes have you experienced or noticed about Old Nanjing recently? 
老城南最近有什么变化？ 
17. For locals only: Have you noticed that more outsiders are moving here to work? What 
kind of influence has this had on Old Nanjing? 
你有没有发现更多的外来工过来住这里？对老城南有什么影响？ 
18. Do you normally interact with local Nanjingese? What about outsiders or migrants? Are 
you friends with them? Are you willing to be friends with them? 
你平时跟南京本地人/外地人接触？做朋友呢？你愿不愿意跟本地人做朋友？ 
19. Do you think your place of residence is safe? 你在这里有没有感觉到不安全？ 
20. What kind of security measures and safeguards does your apartment complex have? 
Regarding safety, what kind of things does this apartment do well? What things still need 
to be improved? 
你认为保障小区治安的措施都有哪些？关于治安，现在这个小区哪些地方你觉得做
的好？哪里还需要提升？ 
21. Have you ever felt excluded or discriminated against? 你有没有感觉到排外或者歧视？ 
 
About demolition 关于拆迁： 
22. If you were demolished, how would you react? What kind of action would you adopt? 
假如咱们这里拆迁了，你会有怎样的反应？会采取哪些行动？ 
23. How would your life change if you were demolished? Do you think it would change for 
the better or for the worse? 你的生活会怎么改变？你估计会变更好还是更差? 
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24. How do you see the current urban redevelopment in Nanjing? Are you satisfied with it? 
你对现在南京的整体城市改造怎么看？你满意吗？ 
25. Old city demolition has what good and bad aspects? 
老城拆迁有什么好处？有什么坏处？ 
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Appendix B (English translation on page 125-26): 
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Appendix C (English translation on page 148-49): 
 
 
 
 
 
